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Abstract
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the task of generating a mathematically proven
secret key, shared between two remote parties. It is probably the most mature ap-
plication of quantum mechanics. QKD protocols based on continuous variables, like
the amplitude and phase quadratures of light fields, have made great progress in this
field during the last years, offering high key rates in local area networks under the
assumption that potential adversaries are restricted to collective attacks. Recently, a
security proof for continuous variables appeared, which provides security without im-
posing any restrictions to adversaries, and which also considers effects due to the finite
number of measurements. The proof considers a QKD protocol based on Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) entangled states and requires strong correlations between the
quadratures of the two subsystems.
In this thesis the feasibility of QKD under arbitrary attacks is experimentally demon-
strated by an execution of the protocol up to the error correction step. Requirements
for the error correction, which would be necessary to generate a secret key, are given.
In the presented implementation, EPR entanglement was generated by superimposing
two squeezed vacuum modes. The generated continuous-wave squeezed vacuum states
represent the first demonstration of such actively stabilized states at the telecommu-
nication wavelength of 1550 nm, with a noise variance more than 10 dB smaller than
the vacuum noise variance. Furthermore, a phase-locking scheme was developed that
was able to stabilize the generation and measurement of the EPR entangled states
with unprecedented strong entanglement.
Restricting potential adversaries to collective attacks relaxes the requirements for
the experimental implementation. In this thesis simulations show that distances be-
tween the two parties of up to 30 km are feasible for a reasonable number of mea-
surements. This was also shown for entangled states which were generated from a
squeezed vacuum mode and a vacuum mode. For such states the first demonstration
of the EPR paradox is presented. A complete run of the QKD protocol, including the
key generation, was implemented using the EPR entangled states from two squeezed
vacuum resources and a post-selection technique.
Keywords: quantum key distribution, continuous variables, Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
entanglement, two-mode squeezed states, coherent attacks, collective attacks.

Kurzfassung
Quantenschlu¨sselverteilung bezeichnet die Verteilung eines mathematisch beweisbar
sicheren Schlu¨ssels zwischen zwei Parteien und ist vermutlich die am weitesten entwick-
elte Anwendung der Quantenmechanik. Protokolle zur Quantenschlu¨sselverteilung, die
auf kontinuierlichen Variablen, wie z.B. den Amplituden- und Phasenquadraturen von
Lichtfeldern, beruhen, haben in den letzten Jahren große Fortschritte gemacht und ver-
sprechen unter der Annahme von kollektiven Attacken hohe Schlu¨sselraten in lokalen
Telekommunikationsnetzwerken. Erst ku¨rzlich erschien ein Sicherheitsbeweis, der kein-
erlei Annahmen bezu¨glich mo¨gliche Attacken macht und auch beru¨cksichtigt, dass der
Schlu¨ssel eine endliche La¨nge hat. Das im Beweis verwendete Protokoll basiert auf
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) verschra¨nkten Zusta¨nden und setzt starke Korrela-
tionen zwischen den Quadraturen der beiden Untersysteme voraus.
Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit wurde die Durchfu¨hrbarkeit von Quantenschlu¨sselverteil-
ung unter beliebigen Attacken durch Ausfu¨hrung des Protokolls bis hin zur Fehlerkor-
rektur experimentell nachgewiesen. Die Voraussetzungen, die ein mo¨glicher Fehlerkor-
rekturalgorithmus erfu¨llen mu¨sste, um mit den korrigierten Daten einen Schlu¨ssel
zu erzeugen, werden dargestellt. In der pra¨sentierten Implementierung des Protokolls
wurde EPR Verschra¨nkung durch die U¨berlagerung zweier gequetschter Vakuummod-
en erzeugt. Dabei wurden erstmals gequetschte Vakuummoden bei einer Wellenla¨nge
von 1550 nm mit einer mehr als 10 dB niedrigeren Varianz als die des Vakuums aktiv
stabilisiert. Zudem wird ein Phasenstabilisierungsschema vorgestellt, mit dem sowohl
die Erzeugung, als auch die Messung von EPR Zusta¨nden mit der bisher sta¨rksten
gemessenen Verschra¨nkung stabilisiert werden konnte.
Wie in dieser Arbeit mit Simulationen gezeigt wird, verringert eine Beschra¨nkung
auf kollektive Attacken die Anforderungen an die experimentelle Umsetzung und
ermo¨glicht Distanzen bis zu 30 km zwischen beiden Parteien fu¨r eine realisierbare An-
zahl an Messungen. Weiterhin erlauben kollektive Attacken auch die Benutzung von
EPR Zusta¨nden, die durch U¨berlagerung einer gequetschten Vakuummode mit einer
Vakuummode erzeugt werden. Fu¨r solche Zusta¨nde wurde in dieser Arbeit die erste
Demonstration des EPR Paradoxons pra¨sentiert. Weiterhin wurde mittels der ver-
schra¨nkten Zusta¨nde, die aus zwei gequetschten Vakuummoden erzeugt wurden, und
mit Hilfe von Postselektion ein vollsta¨ndiger Lauf eines Quantenschlu¨sselverteilungs-
protokolls implementiert.
Schlu¨sselworte: Quantenschlu¨sselverteilung, kontinuierliche Variablen, Einstein-Po-
dolsky-Rosen Verschra¨nkung, zwei-moden gequetschte Zusta¨nde, koha¨rente Attacken,
kollektive Attacken.
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CHAPTER1
Introduction
Quantum key distribution is a quantum information protocol which enables two par-
ties, Alice and Bob, to exchange a key to cipher messages which are sent over an
insecure channel, e.g. the internet. Cryptographic algorithms used for secure communi-
cation can be classified into two categories: symmetric and asymmetric ciphers [Gis02].
For symmetric ciphers both parties need to share the same key, Alice for encrypting
the message and Bob for decrypting it. Hence, the key needs to be shared before
the actual communication, as otherwise Bob cannot read the message. To overcome
this problem asymmetric algorithms were invented. The key used in asymmetric al-
gorithms consists of two parts, a public one which is known to the general public, and
a private one which is kept secret. Alice then uses Bob’s public key to encrypt a mes-
sage and only Bob, who possesses the private key, can decrypt the message. As these
algorithms are usually slow to compute, public key algorithms are most often used to
exchange a key for a symmetric cipher. The security of such public key algorithms
is only based on the fact that present computers are slow in factoring large numbers
into their prime number decompositions. Indeed, with today’s computers it would
last many thousands of years to decipher an encrypted message. Nevertheless, it was
shown that this time can be dramatically reduced by quantum computers, since with
quantum algorithms the computing time for a prime number decomposition of a num-
ber is only polynomial in the length of its bit representation and not exponential as
with classical algorithms [Sho97]. A cipher whose security is based on the assumption
that present computers are too slow to decipher a message within reasonable time is
called computationally secure.
The one-time pad algorithm, which is a symmetric cipher that is mathematically
secure instead of just computationally secure, was already invented during World War
I and published in 1926 by G. Vernam [Ver26]. To guarantee its security the following
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requirements must be fulfilled
(i) the key has to be as long as the message,
(ii) the key has to be uniformly random,
(iii) the key has to be known only to Alice and Bob,
(iv) the key has to be used only once.
While this scheme is perfectly secure as long as the requirements are fulfilled, the key
has still to be distributed between the communicating parties without anybody else
being able to gain knowledge about it. This problem is addressed by quantum key
distribution (QKD). The first QKD protocol, BB84, was invented by Bennett and
Brassard in 1984 [Ben84]. Here, Alice prepares a photon in a certain polarization
state and sends it to Bob. The polarization of the photon is prepared in either the
vertical/horizontal basis or in the anti-diagonal/diagonal basis. A vertically or anti-
diagonally polarized photon encodes bit 0 and a horizontally or diagonally polarized
photon encodes bit 1. As Bob does not know which basis Alice has chosen, he chooses
one at random and measures the polarization. After Alice has sent a certain number of
photons to Bob they communicate their choice of bases and discard all measurements
performed in a different basis. They proceed by revealing a part of Bob’s measurement
results and compare them with Alice’s preparation. If the number of different values
from the revealed measurement outcomes is above a certain threshold they abort, as
an eavesdropper may have been present. Otherwise, they correct the errors in their
unrevealed outcomes and generate a key. The security of this protocol is based on
the no-cloning theorem [Sak11], which states that quantum states cannot be copied
without introducing errors. It is also based on the fact that a measurement of a
non-eigenstate changes the quantum state.
1.1 Continuous-Variable Quantum Key
Distribution
While the protocol described above uses discrete polarization states of single photons
to distribute a key between Alice and Bob, in principle any two non-commuting ob-
servables of a quantum system would work. Besides the polarization, two commonly
used ones are the amplitude and phase quadratures of light fields which have con-
tinuous eigenspectra. Using amplitude and phase modulation of Gaussian states for
encoding a key and homodyne detection for decoding it, enables the use of fast and
cheap standard telecommunication components like amplitude and phase modulators
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and PIN photo diodes. In comparison, implementations of the BB84 protocol have to
employ specialized single photon sources and single photon detectors. The first proto-
col using continuous variables was introduced by Cerf in 2001 [Cer01] and was based
on squeezed states. Shortly afterwards a QKD protocol based on Gaussian modulation
of coherent states was proposed [Gro02] and implemented [Gro03]. Further develop-
ments of the implementation of this protocol can be found in [Lod07, Fos09, Jou12].
Recently, distances between Alice and Bob of up to 80 km were reached using this
scheme [Jou13].
Instead of prepare-and-measure schemes, like the BB84 protocol for discrete variable
QKD and like the Gaussian modulation protocol for continuous variables, entangle-
ment-based systems can also be used [Eke91, Urs07, He06, Rod07, Su09]. In such
systems a bipartite entangled state is generated and distributed to Alice and Bob, who
perform measurements by randomly choosing an observable from two non-commuting
ones. While in prepare-and-measure schemes the key has to be generated a priori
by a random number generator and has to be encoded to a quantum state by state
preparation, in entanglement-based schemes the key is directly provided by the quan-
tum measurement. A combination of the two protocols, a Gaussian modulation of
entanglement, was reported to be beneficial in terms of achievable distance between
the two communicating parties [Mad12].
To analyse the security of a given protocol, possible attacks by an adversary are
classified into individual, collective and coherent (general) attacks. Individual attacks
are attacks for which the adversary does not need a quantum memory [App08, Jen10,
Ari10] to store quantum states and thus measures all exchanged states individually.
If the adversary instead possesses a quantum memory, the quantum states can be
stored and measured collectively. However, to fall into this class of attacks, the same
observable has to be measured for all states. Coherent attacks, also called general
attacks in the following, are attacks where instead of measuring the same observable
for each quantum state, different observables might be employed on different quantum
states. For this class of attacks no assumptions on the adversary’s ability are made.
Assuming that an infinite number of continuous-variable quantum states are ex-
changed reduces general attacks to collective attacks [Ren09]. Indeed, Gaussian at-
tacks are optimal collective attacks [GP06, Nav06] and a secure key rate can be deduced
from the Devetak-Winter bound [Dev05, Lod07, Ren05a]. However, if only a finite
number of quantum systems are exchanged, as is the case in every real implementa-
tion, the situation is more complicated. For collective attacks the security of the QKD
protocol using Gaussian modulation was proven [Lev10]. An implementation of this
protocol can be found in [Jou13]. Using the smooth min-entropy formalism [Ren05a],
a QKD protocol with security for general attacks was provided in [Fur12b]. This pro-
tocol, as well as a similar protocol for collective attacks [Fur12b], employs quadrature
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entangled states. With these two protocols, as well as with the one for Gaussian mod-
ulation, the generated key is universally composable secure [Can01, Ren05a]. This
means that if combined with other cryptographic primitives, like the one-time pad,
the key will remain secret. Proofs based on the mutual information, as for instance
the Devetak-Winter bound, are instead not composable secure [Ren05a].
This thesis describes an experimental implementation of the entanglement-based
protocol of Ref. [Fur12b] for distributing a finite key which is composable secure under
collective attacks. Furthermore, it provides a first implementation of a contin-uous-
variable QKD setup which is able to generate a key with finite size that is secure
against general attacks.
1.2 Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Entanglement
The security proof of the finite-size continuous-variable QKD protocol for general
attacks demands quadrature entangled states with strong Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
(EPR) entanglement [Fur12b]. EPR entanglement [Rei89] is stronger than insepara-
bility, and is connected to the famous EPR Gedanken experiment in which Einstein,
Podolsky and Rosen questioned the completeness of quantum mechanics by presuming
local realism [Ein35]. Only in 1981, Aspect et al. [Asp81] proved the completeness of
quantum mechanics by demonstrating a violation of the Bell inequalities [Bel64]. The
first demonstration of the EPR paradox was performed in 1992 by Ou et al. [Ou92].
Recently the concept of steering, which was introduced by Schro¨dinger in his response
to EPR’s paper [Sch35], gained new attention due to theoretical work by Wiseman
et al. [Wis07], who showed that for Gaussian states a demonstration of steering is
equivalent to a demonstration of the EPR paradox.
This thesis presents an instructive description of steering, as well as the first ex-
perimental demonstration of the EPR paradox and steering using quadrature entan-
gled states that are generated by superimposing a squeezed vacuum state with a
vacuum state. Furthermore, it describes the generation of the strongest EPR entan-
gled states to date, which were phase controlled in all degrees of freedom. Highly
entangled states that are stable over long time scales are not only necessary for the
QKD protocol providing security against general attacks, but also for other demand-
ing quantum information protocols like the superactivation of zero-capacity quantum
channels [Smi08, Smi11].
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1.3 Structure of the Thesis
The structure of the thesis is as follows:
• Chapter 2 introduces the theory of Gaussian quantum information. This chapter
provides the necessary theoretical background.
• Chapter 3 describes the experimental techniques used throughout the thesis.
• Chapter 4 presents experimental results of the generation and characterization
of squeezed vacuum states at 1550 nm. It further gives an instructive descrip-
tion of the steering process, which is followed by the description of the first
experimental realization of the EPR paradox and steering with two-mode entan-
gled states generated by superimposing a squeezed vacuum mode with vacuum
mode. The generation and stable control of EPR entangled states generated by
superimposing two squeezed vacuum modes concludes the chapter.
• Chapter 5 is devoted to the theoretical description of Gaussian finite-size quan-
tum key distribution. Here, the QKD protocols are introduced used in the
following two chapters.
• Chapter 6 describes the realization of the QKD protocol providing security under
collective attacks. First, the secure key rates for the two types of entanglement
generated in Chapter 4 are analyzed. A description of the experimental setup to
gain a secret key follows, including a description of the generation of quantum
random numbers. Furthermore the generation of a secure key using a post
selection technique is provided.
• Chapter 7 describes and analyzes the first experimental continuous-variable
setup which is able to generate a key with security against general attacks. The
feasibility of generating a key is discussed.
• Chapter 8 summarizes the experimental results and concludes the thesis.
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CHAPTER2
Gaussian Quantum Information Theory
In this chapter the theory of continuous variable gaussian quantum information is
reviewed. The basics given here are used in the following chapters. The chapter follows
with some additions the review “Gaussian Quantum Information” by Weedbrook et
al. [Wee12].
We start by postulating the quantized electric field operator Eˆ of an N -mode free
space radiation field at position r and time t to be
Eˆ(r, t) = i
N∑
k=1
Ek
(
aˆke
i(k·r−ωkt) + aˆ†ke
−i(k·r−ωkt)
)
, (2.1)
where Ek = ek(~ωk/20V ) 12 with ek being the polarization vector, ~ is Planck’s con-
stant h/2pi, ωk is the angular frequency of the kth mode, 0 is the electric permittivity
of the vacuum and V is an arbitrary volume. k denotes the wave-vector of the kth
mode. aˆk and aˆ
†
k are the kth mode bosonic annihilation and creation operators, respec-
tively. Hence, the N quantized radiation fields are described by N quantum harmonic
oscillators. The 2N annihilation and creation operators can be arranged in vectorial
form
bˆ := (aˆ1, aˆ
†
1, . . . , aˆN , aˆ
†
N)
T . (2.2)
They satisfy the bosonic commutation relation
[bˆµ, bˆν ] = Ωµν (µ, ν = 1, . . . , 2N) , (2.3)
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where Ω is given by
Ω :=
N⊕
k=1
ω =
ω . . .
ω
 , ω := ( 0 1−1 0
)
. (2.4)
Hereby, we chose the normalization such, that ~ = 2, which yields a variance of
the vacuum noise of 1, cf. Section 2.3. As there is no common consensus, other
normalizations like ~ = 1 or ~ = 1/2 can be found in the literature, corresponding to
a vacuum noise variance of 1/2 or 1/4, respectively. Ω is also known as the symplectic
form which will become clear in Section 2.2.
We define the photon-number operator by
nˆk := aˆ
†
kaˆk , (2.5)
which accounts for the number of photons in the kth mode.
2.1 Quadrature Operators
With the annihilation and creation operators we can define the quadrature field oper-
ators
Xˆk := aˆk + aˆ
†
k , (2.6)
Pˆk := i(aˆ
†
k − aˆk) . (2.7)
In contrast to the annihilation and creation operators the quadrature field operators
are Hermitian and hence observables. We call Xˆk the amplitude quadrature operator
and Pˆk the phase quadrature operator of the kth mode. The operators correspond
to the position and momentum operators of the quantum harmonic oscillator. In
vectorial form they read
xˆ := (Xˆ1, Pˆ1, . . . , XˆN , PˆN)
T . (2.8)
The quadrature operators satisfy the commutation relation
[xˆµ, xˆν ] = 2iΩµν (µ, ν = 1, . . . , 2N) , (2.9)
which follows from Eq. (2.3). Using this result the Heisenberg uncertainty rela-
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tion [Sak11] of the quadrature operators reads
Var(xˆµ) Var(xˆν) ≥ 1
4
|[xˆµ, xˆν ]|2 = (Ωµν)2 = |Ωµν | , (2.10)
where Var(Aˆ) denotes the variance 〈Aˆ2〉 − 〈Aˆ〉2 of an operator Aˆ. Here 〈Aˆ〉 denotes
the mean of Aˆ.
As the quadrature operators Xˆk and Pˆk are observables, they have eigenstates |Xk〉
and |Pk〉,
Xˆk|Xk〉 = Xk|Xk〉 , (2.11)
Pˆk|Pk〉 = Pk|Pk〉 , (2.12)
with continuous eigenvalues Xk ∈ R and Pk ∈ R. We call these eigenstates the
quadrature states [Leo97]. Quadrature states are orthogonal
〈Xk|X ′k〉 = δ(Xk −X ′k) , 〈Pk|P ′k〉 = δ(Pk − P ′k) (2.13)
and complete ∫
dXk|Xk〉〈Xk| =
∫
dPk|Pk〉〈Pk| = 1 . (2.14)
Although quadrature states are not normalizable and hence experimentally not fea-
sible, they are useful to define the quadrature wave functions of the quantum state
|Ψ〉 [Leo97]
Ψ(Xk) := 〈Xk|Ψ〉 , (2.15)
Ψ˜(Pk) := 〈Pk|Ψ〉 . (2.16)
The moduli square of these wave functions, |Ψ(Xk)|2 and |Ψ˜(Pk)|2, are the quadra-
ture probability distributions of |Ψ〉 which are measurable by homodyne detection, cf.
Chapter 3.4.
For N modes Eqs. (2.11) and (2.12) can be written as
xˆ|x〉T = x|x〉T (2.17)
with x ∈ R2N and |x〉 := (|x1〉, . . . , |x2N〉)T . Here, the continuous variables x are the
continuous eigenvalues of the 2N quadrature operators xˆ. Together with the bilinear
form Ω, cf. Eq. (2.4), the continuous variables x form a symplectic space, the phase
space K := (R2N ,Ω). For two vectors ξ,η ∈ R2N , Ω acts as the symplectic scalar
9
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product
(ξ,η) = ξT · Ω · η =
2N∑
µ,ν=1
Ωµνξµην .
2.2 Symplectic Transformations
Symplectic transformations are a change of basis in the phase space K. Like all basis
transformations in linear algebra symplectic transformations must keep the scalar
product invariant. Hence, a symplectic transformation S must fulfill
ξT · Ω · η != (Sξ)T · Ω · (Sη)
= ξT · STΩS · η
for all ξ,η ∈ R2N . Thus,
Ω = STΩS . (2.18)
As the symplectic form originates from the commutation relation, cf. Eq. (2.3), sym-
plectic transformations keep the commutation relation invariant, i.e. physical quantum
states are transformed into physical quantum states.
2.3 Fock States
Fock states, named after V. A. Fock, are the eigenstates |nk〉 of the photon-number
operator nˆk as defined in Eq. (2.5)
nˆk|nk〉 = nk|nk〉 . (2.19)
If |nk〉 is a Fock state with eigenvalue nk, aˆk|nk〉 and aˆ†k|nk〉 are also Fock states, having
the eigenvalues nk − 1 and nk + 1, respectively,
aˆk|nk〉 = √nk|nk − 1〉 , (2.20)
aˆ†k|nk〉 =
√
nk + 1|nk + 1〉 . (2.21)
These equations show why aˆk and aˆ
†
k are called annihilation and creation operator,
respectively. aˆk annihilates a photon from the kth mode of the field, while aˆ
†
k instead
creates a photon in that mode.
Since nk is an integer and the photon number cannot be negative [Leo97]
aˆk|0〉 = 0 . (2.22)
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Hence, |0〉 is the ground state with mean photon number 0. As it contains no photons
this state is called the vacuum state. Its quadrature wave function Ψ0(Xk) = 〈Xk|0〉
can be obtained by solving
0 = 〈Xk|aˆk|0〉 (2.23)
=
1
2
〈Xk|
(
Xˆk + iPˆk
)
|0〉 (2.24)
=
1
2
∫
dX ′k〈Xk|
(
Xˆk + iPˆk
)
|X ′k〉〈X ′k|0〉 (2.25)
=
1
2
∫
dX ′k
(
X ′k〈Xk|X ′k〉+ 2
∂
∂Xk
〈Xk|X ′k〉
)
〈X ′k|0〉 (2.26)
=
1
2
(
Xk + 2
∂
∂Xk
)
〈Xk|0〉 , (2.27)
where in the first line we used the property aˆ|0〉 = 0 from Eq. (2.22). The second
line used the definition of the quadrature operators, Eq. (2.6) and (2.7), whereas
in the third line the closure relation for the quadrature states from Eq. (2.14) was
inserted. In the fourth line the relation 〈Xk|Pˆk|X ′k〉 = −2i(∂/∂Xk)〈Xk|X ′k〉 from
quantum mechanics text books, e.g. [Sak11], was applied1. The fifth and final line
made use of the closure relation for quadrature states again and yields a differential
equation for the quadrature wave function of the vacuum state. This differential
equation is solved by
Ψ0(Xk) = (2pi)
−1/4 exp
(
−X
2
k
4
)
. (2.28)
The normalization factor was chosen to yield
∫
dXk|Ψ0(Xk)|2 = 1. Taking the mod-
ulus square gives the probability distribution of the vacuum state for a measurement
of the Xk quadrature
|Ψ0(Xk)|2 = (2pi)−1/2 exp
(
−X
2
k
2
)
. (2.29)
By computing the Fourier transform of Ψ0(Xk) we can obtain the phase quadrature
wave function of the vacuum
Ψ˜0(Pk) = (2pi)
−1/4 exp
(
−P
2
k
4
)
, (2.30)
1remember that we have chosen ~ = 2 for normalization purposes
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which yields for the probability distribution
|Ψ˜0(Pk)|2 = (2pi)−1/2 exp
(
−P
2
k
2
)
. (2.31)
Hence, the vacuum state has a Gaussian quadrature probability distribution with mean
0 and variance 1 in both amplitude and phase quadrature.
2.4 Density Operator
The physical information about a quantum system is encoded in its quantum state,
which is described by its density operator
ρˆ =
∑
i
pi|φi〉〈φi| (2.32)
on a Hilbert space H. Here, pi is the probability to find the system in the state |φi〉
with
∑
i pi = 1. The density operator is Hermitian (ρˆ = ρˆ
†) and positive semi-definite
(ρˆ ≥ 0), which means that all its eigenvalues are real and positive.
The trace of an arbitrary operator Aˆ is defined as
Tr Aˆ =
∑
i
〈i|Aˆ|i〉 , (2.33)
where {|i〉} forms an orthonormal basis. The trace of a density operator is Tr ρˆ = 1.
In general Tr ρˆ2 ≤ 1, and the identity Tr ρˆ2 = 1 only holds if ρˆ is in a pure state, i.e.
ρˆ = |φ〉〈φ|. Tr ρˆ2 is called the purity of the quantum system.
With the trace we can now define the mean of an arbitrary operator Aˆ. It is given
by
〈Aˆ〉 = Tr ρˆAˆ . (2.34)
2.5 Wigner Function
Any density operator, as defined in Section 2.4, has a representation defined on a real
symplectic space, a phase space. This representation is called Wigner Function. It
was introduced by Eugene Wigner in 1932 in his paper [Wig32].
We start by introducing the Weyl operator, which is defined as
Dˆ(ξ) := exp(ixˆT · Ω · ξ) , (2.35)
where xˆ is the vector of the 2N quadrature operators as defined in Eq. (2.8), Ω is the
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symplectic form and ξ ∈ R2N a phase space vector. The Weyl operator describes a
translation in phase space, i.e. it translates the mean of the quadrature operators by
ξ.
Using the Weyl operator an arbitrary density operator ρˆ corresponds to a Wigner
characteristic function
χ(ξ) = Tr ρˆDˆ(ξ) . (2.36)
The Wigner characteristic function can be transformed into a Wigner function via
Fourier transformation
W (x) =
∫
d2Nξ
(2pi)2N
exp
(−ixT · Ω · ξ)χ(ξ) , (2.37)
where x ∈ R2N is a phase space vector. The Wigner function is real for any density
operator and is normalized to 1, i.e.∫
dx1 . . . dx2NW (x) = 1 .
While the Wigner function is a representation of a quantum system, it is not a
probability distribution as it can take negative values for certain quantum states.
Nevertheless, it can be treated as a quasi-probability distribution. A projection of the
Wigner function to an arbitrary quadrature xµ yields a probability distribution for
this quadrature
〈xµ|ρˆ|xµ〉 =
∫
dx1 . . . dxµ−1 dxµ+1 . . . dx2NW (x) . (2.38)
The purity of a quantum state can be expressed by the Wigner function via
Tr ρˆ2 = 4pi
∫
dx1 . . . dx2N (W (x))
2 . (2.39)
Let us now compute the Wigner function of the vacuum state as an example. For
one mode Eq. (2.37) can be simplified to [Leo97]
W (X,P ) =
1
4pi
∫
dx exp(iPx/2)〈X − x
2
|ρˆ|X + x
2
〉 . (2.40)
Plugging in the density operator of the vacuum state ρˆ = |0〉〈0| yields
W (X,P ) =
1
4pi
∫
dx exp(iPx/2)Ψ0
(
X − x
2
)
Ψ∗0
(
X +
x
2
)
, (2.41)
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where Ψ0(X) is the quadrature wave function of the vacuum state from Eq. (2.28).
By carrying out the integration we obtain the Wigner function of the vacuum state
W (X,P ) =
1
2pi
exp
(
−X
2
2
− P
2
2
)
. (2.42)
By projecting the Wigner function on X or P , cf. Eq. (2.38), the quadrature
probability density functions from Eq. (2.29) and (2.31), respectively, are obtained.
Figure 2.1 shows a plot of the Wigner function and the quadrature probability distri-
butions.
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Figure 2.1: Wigner function of the vacuum state. The black traces show the proba-
bility distributions of the X and P quadratures obtained by projecting the Wigner function
on the respective quadrature.
The Wigner function can also be used to calculate quantum mechanical averages.
We assume Aˆ(xˆ) to be an arbitrary operator defined as a function of the quadrature
operators xˆ. Its average with respect to the quantum state ρˆ can be calculated by
〈Aˆ(xˆ)〉 =
∫
dx1 . . . dx2NA(x)W (x) . (2.43)
Here, A(x) is the c-number representation of Aˆ(xˆ)
Aˆ(xˆ)→ A(x) .
To make this work, Aˆ must be in Weyl-Wigner ordering which is described in detail
in [Sch01]. For what follows we note, that any symmetric ordered operator is already
Weyl-Wigner ordered.
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2.6 Statistical Moments of Quantum States
The properties of a quantum state ρˆ are described by its statistical moments. In
particular, we consider here the first and second moments of a state. For a certain
class of quantum states, the so-called Gaussian states, the first two moments are
sufficient to fully characterize the state. The quantum states that we are interested in
in this thesis belong to this class of states.
The first moment, also known as the mean value, is given by
x := 〈xˆ〉 = Tr ρˆxˆ . (2.44)
Using Eq. (2.43) this can be rewritten in terms of the Wigner function which yields
for the µth component
〈xµ〉 =
∫
dx1 . . . dx2NxµW (x) . (2.45)
The second moment is called the covariance matrix γ. An arbitrary element of the
covariance matrix is defined by
γµν :=
1
2
〈∆xˆµ∆xˆν + ∆xˆν∆xˆµ〉 (2.46)
=
1
2
Tr ρˆ (∆xˆµ∆xˆν + ∆xˆν∆xˆµ) , (2.47)
where ∆xˆµ = xˆµ − 〈xˆµ〉. Using the linearity property of the mean Eq. (2.46) can be
rewritten as
γµν =
1
2
〈xˆµxˆν + xˆν xˆµ〉 − 〈xˆµ〉〈xˆν〉 ,
where the first term is the mean of a symmetric operator. Applying Eq. (2.43) the
covariance matrix element can be calculated from the Wigner function by
γµν =
(∫
dx1 . . . dx2NxµxνW (x)
)
− 〈xˆµ〉〈xˆν〉 . (2.48)
Taking the example of the vacuum state, whose Wigner function is given by Eq.
(2.42), the mean and the covariance matrix calculated from Eq. (2.45) and (2.48),
respectively, are
x =
(
0
0
)
, γ =
(
1 0
0 1
)
. (2.49)
Given the mean x and the covariance matrix γ from a general N -mode Gaussian
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state, the Wigner function can be written as [Wee12]
W (x) =
1
(2pi)N
√
det γ
exp
(
−1
2
(x− x)Tγ−1(x− x)
)
. (2.50)
2.7 Gaussian States
In the last section we have seen the statistical properties of the vacuum state, a state
which is probably the most fundamental Gaussian state. Another state that will
become useful later, is a thermal state. A thermal state is a state which maximizes
the von Neumann entropy for a fixed number of photons Tr ρˆthnˆ = n. The density
operator of such a state is given by [Bar97]
ρˆth =
∞∑
n=0
nn
(n+ 1)n+1
|n〉〈n| . (2.51)
Following the procedure given above for the vacuum state, the Wigner function ob-
tained for the thermal state takes a Gaussian form. Hence, a thermal state is also a
Gaussian state and its mean and covariance matrix is given by
x =
(
0
0
)
, γ =
(
2n+ 1 0
0 2n+ 1
)
. (2.52)
To identify further Gaussian states, we will have a look at the following map
x→ Sx+ d , γ → SγST , (2.53)
where S is a symplectic matrix, i.e. SΩST = Ω, and d ∈ R2N is a translation vec-
tor. Obviously Gaussian states will be transformed into Gaussian states and since
S is symplectic, the new state will be physical. In the following we denote (d, S) as
symplectic map.
A translation of the vacuum state in phase space by dα ∈ R2, i.e.
x = dα =
(
x
p
)
, γ = 12 , (2.54)
where 12 is the 2× 2 identity matrix, is called a displaced vacuum state or a coherent
state [Wee12]. α = (x+ ip)/2 is called the complex amplitude and the coherent state
is denoted as |α〉, satisfying aˆ|α〉 = α|α〉 [Gla63]. Hence, the coherent state is an
eigenstate of the annihilation operator.
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A squeezed state [Bar97] is generated by
d =
(
0
0
)
, Ssqz(r) =
(
e−r 0
0 er
)
, (2.55)
where r ∈ R is the squeezing parameter. For r > 0 the state is squeezed in the
amplitude quadrature, while for r < 0 it is squeezed in the phase quadrature. Applying
Ssqz to a vacuum state yields a squeezed vacuum state, while applying it to a thermal
state it generates a squeezed (thermal) state. In the same manner Ssqz generates a
squeezed displaced vacuum state or squeezed coherent state, when applied to a coherent
state. The generation of squeezed states is described in Chapter 3.3.
2.8 Linear Optical Elements
In this section we will introduce two passive optical elements that keep Gaussian states
Gaussian, namely a (static) phase shifter and a beam splitter. Based on the trans-
formation caused by a beam splitter we will be able to describe two-mode squeezed
vacuum states and optical loss.
Phase Shifts A phase shift, or phase rotation, of a mode with respect to another
mode is usually introduced by changing its propagation length. The phase shift by an
angle θ is described in phase space by the transformation
d =
(
0
0
)
, Srot(θ) =
(
cos(θ) − sin(θ)
sin(θ) cos(θ)
)
. (2.56)
So far we have only given the symplectic maps from Eqs. (2.54), (2.55) and (2.56) on
1-mode systems. Applying such a transformation to a submode of an N -mode system
can be described by
d = (0, 0, . . . , d′1, d
′
2, . . . , 0, 0)
T , S = 12 ⊗ · · · ⊗ S ′ ⊗ · · ·12 , (2.57)
where (d′ = (d′1, d
′
2)
T , S ′) is a symplectic transformation according to Eq. (2.53) and
12 denotes the 2× 2 identity matrix.
Beam Splitters and Two-Mode Squeezed Vacuum States A beam splitter
is an optical element which combines two modes with a ratio given by the power
transmissivity τ ∈ [0, 1] yielding two output modes. Let γ be a 4 × 4 covariance
matrix which describes the input fields prior to the combination by a beam splitter.
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For example these modes are given by
x = 0 , (2.58)
γ =
(
Ssqz(r) 0
0 Ssqz(−r)
)
14
(
Ssqz(r)
T 0
0 Ssqz(−r)T
)
=

e−2r 0 0 0
0 e2r 0 0
0 0 e2r 0
0 0 0 e−2r
 ,
(2.59)
which describes two squeezed vacuum modes squeezed with squeezing parameters r
and −r.
The symplectic map (d, S) of a beam splitter is defined by
d = 0 , SBS(τ) =
(√
1− τ12
√
τ12
−√τ12
√
1− τ12
)
, (2.60)
where τ is the power transmissivity. It transforms Eqs. (2.58) and (2.59) according to
Eq. (2.53) for τ = 0.5 into
x′ = 0 , (2.61)
γ′ =

cosh(2r) 0 sinh(2r) 0
0 cosh(2r) 0 − sinh(2r)
sinh(2r) 0 cosh(2r) 0
0 − sinh(2r) 0 cosh(2r)
 . (2.62)
This state is called a two-mode squeezed vacuum state. In general we call all states
“two-mode squeezed vacuum states” that are generated by superimposing two squeezed
vacuum states with possibly different squeezing parameters r1 and r2, at a beam split-
ter with arbitrary power transmissivity. We include into this definition states which
have either r1 = 0 or r2 = 0 and are, hence, generated by superimposing a squeezed
vacuum state with a vacuum state.
For an N -mode system a beam splitter combining modes k and l can be described
by the symplectic map
d = 0 , (2.63)(
Sk,lBS(τ)
)
i,j
=
{ √
1− τδi,j +
√
τ(δ2k−i,2l−j − δ2l−i,2k−j) i, j ∈M
δi,j i, j ∈ [1, 2N ] \M , (2.64)
where M = {2k − 1, 2k, 2l − 1, 2l}.
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Optical Loss Optical loss to a mode A with mean xA and covariance matrix γA
can be described by superimposing this mode with a vacuum mode at a beam splitter.
Thereby the beam splitter’s transmissivity τ describes the amount of optical loss  ∈
[0, 1]. The output modes of the beam splitter are given by(
xA
0
)
→ SBS()
(
xA
0
)
, (2.65)
γA ⊗ 12 → SBS()(γA ⊗ 12)SBS()T . (2.66)
Taking the partial trace over the mode that contains the loss yields
xA →
√
1− xA (2.67)
γA → (1− )γA + 12 . (2.68)
Often the optical efficiency η = 1−  instead of the optical loss  is given. Assuming
two different optical efficiencies η1 and η2 on mode A, the new state reads
xA → √η1η2xA (2.69)
γA → η1η2γA + (1− η1η2)12 , (2.70)
which can be derived by applying Eqs. (2.67) and (2.68) twice. Hence, subsequent
optical efficiencies can be multiplied to yield a total efficiency.
2.9 Williamson Form and Symplectic Eigenvalues
Every N -mode covariance matrix γ can be transformed by a symplectic transformation
S into its Williamson form [Wil36, Wee12]
SγST =

s1
s1
. . .
sN
sN
 , (2.71)
where s1, . . . , sN are positive, real values, called the N symplectic eigenvalues . The
symplectic eigenvalues can be determined by taking the modulus of the eigenvalues of
iΩγ.
Equation (2.71) describes that every N -mode Gaussian state γ can be obtained from
an N -mode thermal state with nµ =
1
2
(sµ − 1) , (µ = 1, . . . , N), cf. Eq. (2.52), by a
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symplectic transform S. Hereby, S can be decomposed into an appropriate sequence
of Ssqz, Srot and SBS. This means that γ can be obtained from a thermal state by
squeezing, phase rotating and combining modes.
As the covariance matrix of Eq. (2.71) has to describe physical thermal states, i.e.
∀µ : nµ ≥ 0, it follows ∀µ : sµ ≥ 1. Therefore the symplectic spectrum of a covariance
matrix can be used to check whether the covariance matrix is bonafide, i.e. whether
it describes a physical quantum state. Hence, in terms of covariance matrices the
Heisenberg uncertainty principle, cf. Eq. (2.10), is equivalent to
γ > 0 , iΩγ ≥ 1 , (2.72)
where A > x, with A ∈ R2N×2N symmetric, means that all eigenvalues of A − x12N
are larger than 0.
Symplectic eigenvalues are also useful to determine whether a state is inseparable or
separable, cf. Section 2.11.1, and to compute the entropy of a state, cf. Section 2.12.
2.10 Symplectic Invariants of Two-Mode Gaussian
States
Symplectic invariants are, as the name implies, quantities that do not change under
symplectic transformations. For a 2-mode state the covariance matrix reads in block
form
γ =
(
A C
CT B
)
. (2.73)
The symplectic invariants of this state are [Ser04, Buo10]
I1 = detA , (2.74)
I2 = detB , (2.75)
I3 = detC (2.76)
and
I4 = det γ . (2.77)
The symplectic invariants can be used to express certain quantities of the state. For
example the purity of a Gaussian state ρˆ can be evaluated by plugging Eq. (2.50) into
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Eq. (2.39) which yields
Tr ρˆ2 =
1√
det γ
= 1/
√
I4 , (2.78)
where in the last step Eq. (2.77) has been used.
2.11 Measures of Entanglement
In Section 2.8 we have introduced two-mode squeezed states which are bipartite en-
tangled states. In this section we will describe different measures of entanglement. In
general, we can distinguish between separable and inseparable (i.e. entangled) states.
Criteria for inseparability are described in Section 2.11.1. A subclass of all inseparable
states are the so-called Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) entangled states. EPR entan-
glement is a direction dependent property and will be described in Section 2.11.2. A
subclass of the EPR states which necessarily shows the EPR property in both direc-
tions, are states that violate a Bell inequality. A Bell inequality [Bel64] can never be
violated in the Gaussian setting, i.e. using exclusively Gaussian states and Gaussian
measurements [Bel86, Ban98]. Since this thesis deals with the Gaussian setting, we
will not consider Bell states here.
2.11.1 Inseparability Criteria
Inseparability of bipartite states can be certified using two independent criteria, the
positive partial transpose (PPT) criterion [Sim00] and the Duan criterion [Dua00].
PPT criterion The PPT criterion works by transposing one of the modes in the
covariance matrix of the bipartite system. If the new system after this transformation
is physical, the system is separable, while it is inseparable if the partially transposed
system is unphysical. The partial transposition of mode µ is described in terms of
covariance matrices by
γ → RµγRTµ =: γ(Tµ) µ = 1, 2 , (2.79)
where R1 = diag(1,−1, 1, 1) and R2 = diag(1, 1, 1,−1). The partial transposition
therefore flips the Wigner function describing the respective subsystem at the Pµ axis.
The physicality of γ(Tµ) can be checked by the Heisenberg uncertainty relation from
Eq. (2.72),
iΩγ(Tµ) ≥ 1 , (2.80)
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which is equivalent to computing the symplectic eigenvalues of γ(Tµ) which have to be
≥ 1.
The PPT criterion is also applicable for systems with more than two modes. How-
ever, only for bipartite systems it is necessary and sufficient inseparability criterion.
Duan criterion The Duan criterion directly employs the correlations of amplitude
quadrature measurements and the correlations of phase quadrature measurements at
both subsystems. It reads
Var
(
|a|XˆA + 1
a
XˆB
)
+ Var
(
|a|PˆA − 1
a
PˆB
)
≥ 2
(
a2 +
1
a2
)
, (2.81)
where we denoted the first subsystem by A and the second by B, and a is an arbitrary
nonzero real number. A violation of this inequality certifies inseparability of the quan-
tum state. To maximize the violation the optimal parameter a can be determined by
minimizing the left hand side of Eq. (2.81) which yields
a = ±
(
Var(XˆB) + Var(PˆB)− 2
Var(XˆA) + Var(PˆA)− 2
) 1
4
, (2.82)
where the sign of a is determined by the sign of Cov(XˆA, XˆB). Here, Cov denotes the
covariance. For symmetric states, i.e. for states with Var(XˆB)+Var(PˆB) = Var(XˆA)+
Var(PˆA), a = ±1 and Eq. (2.81) simplifies to
Var
(
XˆA ± XˆB
)
+ Var
(
PˆA ∓ PˆB
)
≥ 4 . (2.83)
Symmetric states are obtained when using a balanced beam splitter for entanglement
generation and by having the same optical loss in both output arms of the beam
splitter.
Note, that the Duan criterion is sufficient but not necessary for inseparability.
2.11.2 Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Entanglement Criteria
In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen formulated their famous Gedanken experi-
ment [Ein35] which led Schro¨dinger in his reply introduce the notion of entangle-
ment [Sch35]. EPR argued that quantum mechanics is not a complete theory. A
theory is said to be complete if “every element of the physical reality [has] a counter
part in the physical theory” [Ein35]. Their argument is based on the assumption of
“local realism” which means that “if, without in any way disturbing a system, we can
predict with certainty [...] the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element
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of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity” [Ein35]. In their Gedanken-
experiment EPR considered two spatially separated particles A and B, whose positions
and momenta are maximally correlated. Measuring the position of particle A yields
both particles to be in individual but correlated position eigenstates as the wave func-
tion collapses. Hence, the position of particle B can be predicted with certainty by
the position measurement of particle A. The position of particle B therefore has phys-
ical reality. Otherwise, measuring the momentum of particle A yields both particles
to be in individual but correlated momentum eigenstates. Thus, the momentum has
physical reality and can be predicted with certainty. Since the physical reality of a
quantity of particle B cannot depend on the choice of measurement at particle A due
to the assumption of local realism, both quantities, position and momentum, must
have physical reality. However, this leads to a contradiction in quantum mechanics
as position and momentum operators do not commute and thus cannot have physical
reality at the same time. This paradox was solved by EPR by dropping the assump-
tion that quantum mechanics is a complete theory as they strongly believed in local
realism. This was ruled out later by the violation of Bell inequalities [Bel64, Asp81],
showing that the EPR paradox can only be solved by dropping the assumption of local
realism. Using amplitude and phase quadrature measurements of light fields the EPR
paradox was first demonstrated by Ou et al., in 1992 [Ou92]. The criterion they used
was introduced by Reid in 1989 [Rei89] and will be discussed in the following.
Amplitude and phase quadratures of two-mode squeezed states are not maximally
correlated as this can only be the case for infinite squeezing which can only be reached
with infinite energy. Nevertheless, Reid showed that the EPR paradox can even be
realized for less than maximum correlations. Using the quantum mechanical Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality the correlation coefficient of the field quadratures xˆµ and xˆν can
be defined as [Rei89]
C(xˆµ, xˆν) =
Cov(xˆµ, xˆν)√
Var(xˆµ) Var(xˆν)
. (2.84)
Perfect correlations, as for the position and momentum operators of the correlated
particles, yield |C(XˆA, XˆB)| = |C(PˆA, PˆB)| = 1. As the field quadratures are not
maximally correlated the prediction of a measurement outcome at subsystem B of the
correlated system cannot be made with certainty after a measurement at subsystem
A. The uncertainty of the inference can be quantified as
∆2infXˆB = Var(XˆB − gXˆA) (2.85)
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for the amplitude quadrature and
∆2infPˆB = Var(PˆB − hPˆA) (2.86)
for the phase quadrature. g and h are thereby arbitrary scaling parameters that can
be used to maximize the inference accuracy. By requiring
∂∆2infXˆB
∂g
= 0 and
∂∆2infPˆB
∂h
= 0
we obtain
g =
Cov(XˆB, XˆA)
Var(XˆA)
(2.87)
and
h =
Cov(PˆB, PˆA)
Var(PˆA)
(2.88)
which yields
VarB|A(XˆA, XˆB) := min
g
∆2infXˆB = Var(XˆB)−
Cov(XˆB, XˆA)
2
Var(XˆA)
(2.89)
and
VarB|A(PˆA, PˆB) := min
h
∆2infPˆB = Var(PˆB)−
Cov(PˆB, PˆA)
2
Var(PˆA)
. (2.90)
Thus, a measurement of XˆA specifies a value of XˆB with an uncertainty of at least
VarB|A(XˆA, XˆB), and a measurement of PˆA specifies a value of PˆB with an uncertainty
of at least VarB|A(PˆA, PˆB). EPR’s concept of local realism leads to the conclusion
that values for both XˆB and PˆB must have been predetermined with the uncertainties
specified above as the physical reality of a quantity cannot depend on the choice of
measurement at the spatially separated subsystem A. However, as amplitude and
phase quadratures are non-commuting operators, the Heisenberg uncertainty relation
from Eq. (2.10) requires
VarB|A(XˆA, XˆB) · VarB|A(PˆA, PˆB) ≥ 1 . (2.91)
Thus, a demonstration of a violation of this inequality shows the EPR paradox. The
inequality (2.91) shows a directional dependence as swapping the roles of subsystems
A and B yields
VarA|B(XˆA, XˆB) · VarA|B(PˆA, PˆB) ≥ 1 . (2.92)
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The inequalities (2.91) and (2.92) do not have to be violated at the same time [Hae12]
as violating one of those is sufficient to demonstrate the EPR paradox. Note, that
the EPR paradox is also demonstrated if the Heisenberg uncertainty relation for the
inferred variances, ∆2infXˆB · ∆2infPˆB ≥ 1, is violated with a non-optimal choice of the
scaling parameters g and h.
Using the symplectic invariants from Section 2.10, the EPR criteria from Eqs. (2.91)
and (2.92) can be expressed as [Fra12]
VarB|A(XˆA, XˆB) · VarB|A(PˆA, PˆB) = I4
I2
, (2.93)
and
VarA|B(XˆA, XˆB) · VarA|B(PˆA, PˆB) = I4
I1
. (2.94)
2.12 Von Neumann Entropy and Mutual
Information
The von Neumann entropy of a quantum state ρˆ is defined as [Wil12]
H(ρˆ) := −Tr (ρˆ log2 ρˆ) . (2.95)
Assume that one party, called Alice, prepares quantum states |Ψx〉 with probability
p(x) and sends them to another party, called Bob. Bob does not know which quantum
state was sent to him, but what he knows is that it will be |Ψx〉 with probability
p(x). The density operator of Alice’s state as expected by Bob can then be written
as ρˆ =
∑
x p(x)|Ψx〉〈Ψx|. The von Neumann entropy H(ρˆ) quantifies the uncertainty
of Bob’s knowledge about Alice’s state or in other words it quantifies the information
Bob gains when he measures Alice’s state.
The von Neumann entropy has the following properties:
• H(ρˆ) ≥ 0 . H(ρˆ) = 0⇔ ρˆ is a pure state.
• H(ρˆ) = H(Uˆ ρˆUˆ †), where Uˆ is a unitary operator. Because a symplectic trans-
formation can be written as a unitary transformation of the density matrix, the
von Neumann entropy does not change under symplectic transformations.
• The von Neumann entropy is additive for tensor product states, i.e. H(ρˆ1⊗ ρˆ2) =
H(ρˆ1) +H(ρˆ2).
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• The von Neumann entropy is concave, i.e. H (
∑
x p(x)ρˆx) ≥
∑
x p(x)H(ρˆx). The
concavity property means that the entropy increases when mixing states.
In the following we assume a bipartite system with parties A and B. We denote
the density operator of the whole system as ρˆAB and the density operators of the
subsystems as ρˆA = TrB ρˆAB and ρˆB = TrA ρˆAB with the partial traces TrA and TrB
taken over the respective subsystem.
The joint entropy of the state is then given by
H(AB) := H(ρˆAB) = −Tr (ρˆAB log2 ρˆAB) (2.96)
and the marginal entropies by
H(A) := H(ρˆA) = −Tr (ρˆA log2 ρˆA) (2.97)
and
H(B) := H(ρˆB) = −Tr (ρˆB log2 ρˆB) . (2.98)
If ρˆAB is a pure state, the marginal entropies are equal, H(A) = H(B), which is also
true for multipartited systems, e.g. if ρˆABE is pure, H(AB) = H(E). This property is
called the self-duality property of the von Neumann entropy.
The conditional entropy is given by
H(A|B) := H(AB)−H(B) . (2.99)
H(A|B) can be smaller than zero, as for entangled states the uncertainty of the whole
system is smaller than for any subsystem, i.e. H(AB) < H(A). This can be seen for
the two-mode squeezed state from Eq. (2.62). H(AB) = 0 as the state is pure, but
H(B) = H(A) > 0 as the local subsystems are thermal states. After introducing the
mutual information, we will see how to calculate the entropy of arbitrary Gaussian
states.
The mutual information quantifies the amount of information, measured in bits,
which both subsystems share. It is given by
I(A : B) := H(A) +H(B)−H(AB) (2.100)
= H(A)−H(A|B) (2.101)
= H(B)−H(B|A) . (2.102)
Hence, the mutual information quantifies also how much the knowledge about a sub-
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system, e.g. about subsystem B, reduces the uncertainty H(A) about the other sub-
system.
In the following we will calculate the von Neumann entropy of an arbitrary N -mode
Gaussian state with covariance matrix γ [Ser04]. The Williamson form of γ is given
by
SγST = ⊗Ni=1si12
by means of a symplectic transformation S. si are the symplectic eigenvalues of γ.
As a symplectic transformation of a covariance matrix can be written as a unitary
transformation of the corresponding density matrix, the von Neumann entropy of the
state does not change. Hence, using the additivity property of the von Neumann
entropy for tensor product states, we can write
H(γ) =
N∑
i=1
H(si12) , (2.103)
which reduces the calculation of the entropy to the entropy of thermal states with
mean photon number ni =
1
2
(si − 1).
The density operator of a thermal state with mean photon number n is given
by [Bar97]
ρˆth =
∞∑
n=0
nn
(n+ 1)n+1
|n〉〈n| , (2.104)
cf. Eq. (2.51). Plugging this into the von Neumann entropy from Eq. (2.95) yields
H(ρˆth) = − 1
1 + n
∞∑
n=0
(
n
1 + n
)n
log2
nn
(1 + n)n+1
(2.105)
=
1
1 + n
(
−
∞∑
n=0
(
n
1 + n
)n
n log2 n+
∞∑
n=0
(
n
1 + n
)n
(n+ 1) log2 (1 + n)
)
.
(2.106)
Using the geometric series
∑∞
n=0
(
n
1+n
)n
= 1 + n and
∑∞
n=0
(
n
1+n
)n
n = n(1 + n)
simplifies H(ρˆth) to
H(ρˆth) = n log2
1 + n
n
+ log2(1 + n) . (2.107)
In terms of symplectic eigenvalues this is transformed into
H(ρˆth) = H(si12) = f(si) , (2.108)
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with
f(s) =
s+ 1
2
log2
(
s+ 1
2
)
− s− 1
2
log2
(
s− 1
2
)
. (2.109)
Hence, for an N -mode Gaussian state with symplectic eigenvalues si the von Neumann
entropy can be calculated by
H(γ) =
N∑
i=1
f(si) . (2.110)
Using this result all quantities given in this section can be calculated for Gaussian
states.
2.13 Partial Homodyne Measurement on a
Bipartite Gaussian State
Quadrature measurements can be performed by homodyne detection as we will see
in Chapter 3.4. We will now assume the situation where we perform a measurement
on subsystem B of a bipartite Gaussian system and we are interested in the state of
subsystem A after the measurement. We write the covariance matrix γ of the bipartite
state in block form as in Eq. (2.73). Performing a measurement in the X quadrature
on subsystem B leaves the subsystem A in the state [Wee12]
γ′A = A− C(MXBMX)MPCT , (2.111)
while performing a P quadrature measurement leaves A in the state
γ′A = A− C(MPBMP )MPCT . (2.112)
Here, MX = diag(1, 0) and MP = diag(0, 1). MP denotes the Moore-Penrose pseudo-
inverse since M{X,P}BM{X,P} are singular. The pseudo-inverse can be evaluated by
(MXBMX)
MP = B−111 MX and (MPBMPX)
MP = B−122 MP , where B is written as B =(
B11 B12
B21 B22
)
.
We will use this result later in Chapter 5 to calculate the key rates for quantum key
distribution.
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Experimental Techniques
Overview
In this chapter the experimental techniques used in this thesis are introduced. Sec-
tion 3.1 describes the preparation of the main laser beam and its source. Section 3.2
introduces the second-harmonic generation which generated the pump beam for the
squeezed-light source, which is described in Section 3.3. Balanced homodyne detection
was used for measurements of the field quadratures and is described in Section 3.4.
The reconstruction process of a state’s covariance matrix is introduced in Section 3.5.
Section 3.6 describes the data acquisition process used to obtain digitized samples from
the output of the balanced homodyne detection, and Section 3.7 gives an insight in
how lowpass filters, which were used for the preparation of signals for data acquisition,
introduce correlations between samples.
3.1 Coherent Light Preparation
The main light source of the experiments described in the following chapters, was a 1 W
fiber laser at a wavelength of 1550 nm from NKTPhotonics. Figure 3.1 shows the light
preparation, which the beam had passed before it was used for these experiments. The
laser beam from the source was coupled out of a polarization-maintaining fiber which
had a mode-field diameter of 10.5µm. The beam was collimated using an aspheric lens.
For spatial mode and noise filtering as well as for being a beam reference for the down-
stream experiment, the beam was fed through an impedance matched three-mirror
travelling-wave ring cavity, called mode cleaner (MC), which had a finesse of about
300. To keep the cavity on resonance a Pound-Drever-Hall (PDH) scheme [Bla01] was
used to generate an error signal for a control loop [Abr00] which actuated the position
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EOM
1550nm
Laser PD115 MHz
Figure 3.1: Coherent light preparation. The light from a 1550 nm fiber laser is coupled
out of the fiber. The free beam passes a mode cleaning ring cavity which is locked using a
Pound-Drever-Hall scheme. EOM: electro-optical modulator, PD: photo detector.
of one of the cavity’s mirrors with a piezo-electric transducer. The PDH scheme
employed phase modulation sidebands at 115 MHz which were imprinted on the laser
beam by an electro-optical modulator (EOM). The reflected light from the cavity
was detected by a resonant photo detector whose photo current was demodulated at
115 MHz and lowpass filtered. The electronic sinusoidal signal used for the generation
of the phase modulation and for the demodulation of the photo current was served by
a computer programmable AD9959 digital synthesizer.
3.2 Pump Beam Preparation for Parametric
Down-Conversion
Figure 3.2 shows the generation of the 775 nm pump beam for the parametric squeezed-
light sources described in the next Section. We used parametric up-conversion in a
periodically poled potassium titanyl phosphate (PPKTP) crystal for the generation of
the second harmonic of the fundamental beam at 1550 nm. To enhance the conversion
efficiency from 1550 nm to 775 nm the crystal with a length of 9.3 mm was placed in a
standing-wave cavity formed by the curved end-face of the crystal which was coated
high-reflective for both wavelengths, and an external coupling mirror with a reflectivity
of about 90 % for the fundamental and a small residual reflectivity for the harmonic.
The curved end-face of the crystal had a radius of curvature of 12 mm and the cou-
pling mirror had a radius of curvature of 25 mm. The plane end-face of the crystal
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Figure 3.2: Second harmonic generation using parametric up-conversion in PPKTP. The
linear cavity is locked to the fundamental beam using a Pound-Drever-Hall scheme. The
generated harmonic beam at 775 nm is separated from the fundamental by a dichroic beam
splitter. EOM: electro-optical modulator, PD: photo detector, DBS: dichroic beam splitter.
was coated anti-reflective for both wavelengths. To reach phase-matching the crystal
was covered by a copper housing whose temperature could be actuated by a Peltier
element. For thermal isolation the copper housing was encased by polyoxylmethylene
(POM). A resistor with negative temperature coefficient served as temperature sensor
and was used together with a servo controller and the Peltier element to keep the
crystal at a constant temperature. The cavity was kept on resonance by a control loop
which employed the same PDH scheme as described above. For the second-harmonic
generation the phase modulation sidebands were also at 115 MHz. The generated
775 nm beam was separated from the fundamental field by a dichroic beam splitter
(DBS).
Using the same scheme and the same wavelengths a conversion efficiency of about
95 % was reported in [Ast11]. Due to a lower fundamental light power the conversion
efficiency of the second-harmonic generation used in this thesis was about 85 %.
3.3 Squeezed-Light Generation
Figure 3.3 shows the experimental setup for squeezed-light generation. Squeezed vac-
uum states are generated by degenerate parametric down-conversion [Ger05] which
was implemented using PPKTP as nonlinear medium like for the second-harmonic
generation. Hence, the mechanical implementation of the squeezed-light source was
the same as described in Section 3.2, except for the reflectivity of the coupling mirror
which was 90 % for 1550 nm and 20 % for 775 nm. To lock the cavity on resonance
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Figure 3.3: Squeezed-light generation using degenerate type I parametric down-conversion
in PPKTP in a linear standing-wave cavity. The cavity length is locked using a control
beam with phase modulation sidebands coupled into the cavity from the left. The back
reflected light is separated from the incoming light with a Faraday rotator and a polarizing
beam splitter and detected by a resonant photo detector. The pump field is coupled into the
cavity from the right. Its phase is locked using an error signal generated by demodulating
the photo detector’s output out-of-phase to the demodulation of the output for the cavity
length error signal. The squeezed beam is separated from the pump by a dichroic beam
splitter. EOM: electro-optical modulator, FR: Faraday rotator, PD: photo detector, DBS:
dichroic beam splitter, PS: phase shifter.
we employed a control beam with a power of about 800µW which was coupled into
the cavity through the high-reflective mirror. The back reflected light was separated
from the incoming light by a Faraday rotator and a polarizing beam splitter and was
detected by a resonant photo detector. Phase modulation sidebands at 33.9 MHz im-
printed on the control beam were used to generate an error signal for the length of
the cavity. The pump beam at 775 nm was coupled into the cavity from the partial
reflective side. The phase of the pump with respect to the control beam was locked
using an error signal generated by demodulating the photo detector’s output. For
this purpose the electronic local oscillator for the demodulation was shifted by 90◦ in
phase to the electronic local oscillator used for the generation of the error signal for the
cavity length. In the figure this is indicated by cos and sin next to the demodulation
symbol. The phase of the pump was actuated by a mirror attached to a piezo and
controlled to a phase angle which yielded deamplification of the control beam. The
squeezed beam was separated from the pump by a dichroic beam splitter. To generate
squeezed vacuum states with this setup the control beam had to be shot-noise limited
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Figure 3.4: Principle of balanced homodyne detection. A strong optical local oscillator was
superimposed with the signal field at a balanced beam splitter. Both output beams were
detected by photo diodes whose photo currents were subtracted. The phase of the local
oscillator field with respect to the signal field defined the measured quadrature angle and
could be actuated by a phase shifter. PS: phase shifter, PD: photo detector.
in the frequency band of the measurement. This requirement limited the power that
could be used for the control beam as well as the lower end of the measured frequency
band because the control beam was only shot-noise limited above about 7 MHz for the
power we used. Indeed we were not able to use less power in the control beam as the
locks for the cavity length and the pump phase got unstable otherwise. The demod-
ulation of the photo detector’s signal with two electronic local oscillators which were
90◦ out of phase, was implemented on a single printed circuit board. The schematic
of this electronic circuit is shown in Appendix A, Fig. A.1.
3.4 Balanced Homodyne Detection
The measurement of the field quadratures was performed by balanced homodyne detec-
tion. The experimental setup for balanced homodyne detection is depicted in Fig. 3.4.
A bright local oscillator beam was superimposed with the signal field at a balanced
beam splitter. Both output beams were detected by photo diodes whose photo cur-
rents were subtracted. The phase of the local oscillator beam thereby defined the
measured quadrature angle and could be actuated by a mirror attached to a piezo.
Let us denote the mode of the local oscillator by bˆ and the mode of the signal field
by aˆ. The phase between these modes is denoted by ϕ. According to Eq. (2.2) we can
write the operators in vectorial form
xˆ = (bˆeiϕ, bˆ†e−iϕ, aˆ, aˆ†)T .
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Applying the symplectic form SBS(τ) from Eq. (2.60) with τ = 0.5 yields
SBS(0.5)xˆ =

1√
2
(
bˆeiϕ + aˆ
)
1√
2
(
bˆ†e−iϕ + aˆ†
)
1√
2
(
−bˆeiϕ + aˆ
)
1√
2
(
−bˆ†e−iϕ + aˆ†
)
 . (3.1)
The photo current of each photo diode is proportional to the number of detected
photons. Thus,
iˆ1 ∝ 1
2
(
bˆ†e−iϕ + aˆ†
)(
bˆeiϕ + aˆ
)
(3.2)
=
1
2
(
bˆ†bˆ+ bˆ†aˆe−iϕ + aˆ†bˆeiϕ + aˆ†aˆ
)
(3.3)
=
1
2
(
bˆ†bˆ+ (aˆ†bˆeiϕ)† + aˆ†bˆeiϕ + aˆ†aˆ
)
(3.4)
and
iˆ2 ∝ 1
2
(
−bˆ†e−iϕ + aˆ†
)(
−bˆeiϕ + aˆ
)
(3.5)
=
1
2
(
bˆ†bˆ− (aˆ†bˆeiϕ)† − aˆ†bˆeiϕ + aˆ†aˆ
)
. (3.6)
By subtracting the photo currents we obtain
iˆ1 − iˆ2 ∝ (aˆ†bˆeiϕ)† + aˆ†bˆeiϕ , (3.7)
where we assumed that the photo diodes have the same gain and, hence, the pro-
portionality factor is the same. We now rewrite both modes by aˆ = |α| + δαˆ and
bˆ = |β| + δβˆ Here, |α| and |β| describe a coherent excitation of the field and δαˆ and
δβˆ are the noise contributions. We assume δαˆ and δβˆ to be small und thus take only
first order noise terms into account. With this linearization of the modes, Eq. (3.7)
can be written as
iˆ1 − iˆ2 ∝ 2|β||α| cosϕ+ |β|
(
δαˆ†eiϕ + δαˆe−iϕ
)
+ |α|
(
δβˆ†e−iϕ + δβˆeiϕ
)
. (3.8)
Generalizing the definition of the quadrature operators from Eq. (2.6) and (2.7) to an
arbitrary angle ϕ,
Xˆaˆk(ϕ) := aˆke
−iϕ + aˆ†ke
iϕ , (3.9)
where the X quadrature operator from Eq. (2.6) is reproduced with ϕ = 0 and the
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P quadrature operator from Eq. (2.7) is reproduced with ϕ = pi
2
, the equation of the
subtracted photo currents takes the form
iˆ1 − iˆ2 ∝ 2|β||α| cosϕ+ |β|Xˆδaˆ(ϕ) + |α|Xˆδbˆ(ϕ) . (3.10)
To measure only Xˆδaˆ(ϕ) the local oscillator power |β| has to be much larger than
|α|. Indeed for squeezed vacuum states |α| = 0. As described in Section 3.3 we use
a control beam for locking purposes of the squeezed-light source, thus, |α| 6= 0, and
the requirement |β|  |α| has to hold. The first term of Eq. (3.10) describes the beat
between the local oscillator and the control beam and can be used as an error signal
for a lock of the local oscillator’s phase to pi
2
, i.e. to the phase quadrature. Arbitrary
quadratures can be measured by locking the local oscillator’s phase to an appropriate
value using other techniques [DiG07, Ebe13b].
3.5 Tomographic Reconstruction of the Covariance
Matrix
For the characterization of our generated state we reconstructed the full covariance
matrix according to a protocol presented and experimentally demonstrated in [DiG07].
Assuming the two modes of a bipartite states are possessed by Alice and Bob, the
protocol works as follows:
1. Alice and Bob both measure simultaneously the amplitude quadrature.
2. Alice and Bob both measure simultaneously the phase quadrature.
3. Alice measures the amplitude quadrature, whereas Bob simultaneously measures
the phase quadrature.
4. Alice measures the phase quadrature, whereas Bob simultaneously measures the
amplitude quadrature.
5. Alice and Bob both measure a linear combination of the amplitude and phase
quadrature. In our case we chose the 45◦ angle for both parties.
Including a vacuum noise measurement for reference, the covariance matrix can be
reconstructed using the measurements given above by
γ =

〈Xˆ2A〉 12〈XˆAPˆA + PˆAXˆA〉 〈XˆAXˆB〉 〈XˆAPˆB〉
〈Pˆ 2A〉 〈PˆAXˆB〉 〈PˆAPˆB〉
〈Xˆ2B〉 12〈XˆBPˆB + PˆBXˆB〉
〈Pˆ 2B〉
 . (3.11)
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Here, we omitted the lower part of the covariance matrix for readability as the matrix
is symmetric. 1
2
〈XˆPˆ + Pˆ Xˆ〉 can be calculated by
1
2
〈XˆPˆ + Pˆ Xˆ〉 = 〈Xˆ(45◦)2〉 − 1
2
(
〈Xˆ2〉+ 〈Pˆ 2〉
)
(3.12)
using the 45◦ measurement. This can be seen by using the definition of the quadrature
operators Xˆ and Pˆ given in Eqs. (2.6) and (2.7) and the definition of the generalized
quadrature operator in Eq. (3.9). A detailed calculation can be found for instance
in [Sam12].
3.6 Data Acquisition
While the measurement of noise variances can be performed by using a spectrum
analyzer, for quantum cryptography we are interested in the correlated homodyne
signals between Alice and Bob in the time domain. For this purpose we used an analog-
to-digital converter (ADC) that converts the analog output signal of the homodyne
detector’s electronics into a time series of samples.
Let us assume that the signal we would like to digitize is of the form
x(t) = sin(2pif0t) .
An analog-to-digital converter which samples this signal with frequency fs, converts
this into
x(n) = sin(2pif0n/fs) ,
where n is the sample number. This situation is displayed in Fig. 3.5. fs is called the
sampling frequency and is usually given in samples per second. Sampling at a certain
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Figure 3.5: Sampling of a continuous time signal.
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Figure 3.6: Ambiguity of the sampled values when sampling with fs = 4f0. Blue: sin(f0),
red: sin(5f0).
rate might lead to ambiguities in the frequency domain as shown in Fig. 3.6, where we
sampled the continuous time signal from above with a sampling frequency of fs = 4f0.
Sampling a sinusoidal signal with frequency 5f0 with the same sampling frequency
would lead to exactly the same samples. Indeed, while sampling with frequency fs we
cannot distinguish between signals of frequency f0 and signals of frequency f0 +kfs for
any integer k [Lyo04]. Thus, the signal at 5f0 in the example is aliased to a signal at
f0. The aliasing effect in frequency domain is depicted in Fig. 3.7a. From 0 to
fs
2
the
digital frequency is the same as the physical frequency. Higher physical frequencies
are aliased into the digital frequency band from 0 to fs
2
, where fs
2
is called the Nyquist
frequency. However, not only the frequency of signals with frequencies larger than
the Nyquist frequency changes after digitalization, the phase of these signals also
changes [Smi03]. This is shown in Fig. 3.7b. For frequencies between fs
2
and fs the
phase of the sampled signal is shifted by pi
2
.
The resolution of an ADC is given by the number of bins the range of the converter
is divided into. Using a pre-amplifier the range of the signal can usually be adjusted
to fit well within the ADC range. The ADCs used throughout this thesis both have
a resolution of n = 14 bits, yielding 2n = 16384 different conversion outcomes. The
resolution voltage, i.e. the voltage span of a single bin, is given for an n bit ADC by
Vres =
Vmax − Vmin
2n
,
where Vmax − Vmin is the voltage range of the ADC. Assuming a symmetric voltage
swing around zero, i.e. Vmax = −Vmin, we obtain
Vres =
Vmax
2n−1
.
To avoid aliasing the amplitude of a sinusoidal signal at a frequency larger than fs
2
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Figure 3.7: Frequency and phase of sampled signals versus their physical frequency before
sampling. The grey shaded area illustrates where the sampled signals correspond to the
physical ones, while the white area illustrates where signal frequencies are aliased to the
digital frequency band.
needs to be attenuated by a lowpass filter to have an amplitude smaller than the
resolution voltage. The maximum possible amplitude of a signal that is within the
signal range and therefore does not saturate the ADC, is Vmax. Hence, the amplitude
of such a signal has to be attenuated by
20 · log10
Vmax
Vres
= 20 · log10(2n−1) ≈ 6(n− 1)[dB] .
Thus, for our 14 bit ADCs the attenuation of a lowpass filter has to be at least 78 dB at
the Nyquist frequency. In practice smaller attenuation values than the one calculated
above might be sufficient, depending on the signal range compared to the range of the
ADC, the frequency content of the analog signal and the noise of the ADC. Lowpass
filters are discussed in detail in Section 3.7.
Usually, we are only interested in a measurement of signals within a certain fre-
quency band. As we already discussed in Section 3.3 the control beam used to lock
the squeezed-light source is only shot-noise limited above 7 MHz. Hence, only mea-
surements at Fourier frequencies above 7 MHz are not deteriorated by additional ex-
cess noise. To achieve such a measurement two different methods were implemented
within this thesis depending on the properties of the used ADC. The first one is de-
picted in Fig. 3.8 and uses a slow ADC with a sampling frequency of fs = 500 kHz.
To map the desired measurement frequency band to the frequency band of the ADC,
the output of the homodyne detector’s circuit was demodulated at the measurement
frequency, e.g. 8 MHz, using a double-balanced mixer. Subsequently the output of the
double-balanced mixer was lowpass filtered to achieve the necessary attenuation of fre-
quencies above the Nyquist frequency of the sampling process. Thus, the bandwidth
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Figure 3.8: Data acquisition of the homodyne detector’s output using a slow ADC. The
output signal of the homodyne detector is electronically demodulated at a frequency of 8 MHz
and lowpass filtered before it is sampled by the ADC. PS: phase shifter, PD: photo detector,
ADC: analog-to-digital converter.
of the measurement was determined by the -3 dB cutoff frequency of the lowpass filter.
The second method used a fast ADC with a sampling frequency of 256 MHz. This
setup is shown in Fig. 3.9. The output of the homodyne detector’s circuit was lowpass
filtered to attenuate frequencies above the Nyquist frequency of 128 MHz and sampled
by the fast ADC. After sampling, the samples were digitally mixed with a sinusoid at,
for instance, 8 MHz and lowpass filtered with a digital finite impulse response filter
(FIR filter). Such filters are described in Section 3.7. Afterwards the samples were
down-sampled to a lower sampling frequency. Here, the FIR filter had to be designed
such that it sufficiently attenuates frequencies above the new Nyquist frequency. Due
to the digital mixing process the resolution of the post processed samples is larger
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Figure 3.9: Data acquisition of the homodyne detector’s output using a fast ADC. The
output signal of the homodyne detector is lowpass filtered and sampled with a high sampling
frequency of, for instance, 256 MHz. The demodulation is performed digitally in a post
processing step. PS: phase shifter, PD: photo detector, ADC: analog-to-digital converter.
39
Chapter 3: Experimental Techniques
than the resolution of the ADC.
The advantage of the second method in comparison to the first is that less analog
electronic components are needed. In particular when sampling more than one channel,
analog filters have the disadvantage that the frequency responses of two copies is
never exactly the same. Furthermore a higher bandwidth of the demodulated signal is
easier to achieve with the second method. On the contrary the digital post processing
needed for the second method is quite demanding concerning computing power. For
the quantum cryptography experiment described in Chapter 5, the second method is
a necessary ingredient as the lowpass filter for anti-aliasing purposes of the first, has
a cutoff frequency below the frequency of the measurement intervals.
3.7 Filters and Sample Correlations
As we have seen in the last section, (lowpass) filters are unavoidable for data acquisi-
tion. In this section we briefly introduce the response functions of analog and digital
filters and how the filters correlate formerly uncorrelated signals or samples. A more
detailed introduction to digital filters can be found for instance in [Lyo04] and [Smi03].
The response of a filter can be described equivalently by its impulse, step and
frequency response. Figure 3.10a shows the impulse response of an exemplary digital
finite impulse response filter. The impulse response is the output of a filter on an input
signal that describes a short impulse, i.e. an input signal that is zero except for one
sample. After filtering the impulse is broadened and shows ringing. By integrating the
impulse response we obtain the step response which is shown in Fig. 3.10b. The step
response is the response of a filter to a sharp step in the input signal. The figure shows
that the slope of the step decreased after filtering and that the output signal shows
overshoot and ringing. By calculating the Fourier transform of the impulse response
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Figure 3.10: Impulse and step response of an exemplary finite impulse response filter.
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Figure 3.11: Frequency response of an exemplary finite impulse response filter.
the frequency response of the filter as depicted in Fig. 3.11 is obtained. The frequency
response is displayed as a Bode plot expressing both the magnitude and phase of the
filter versus frequency. Here, the frequency axis is plotted in units of the sampling
frequency.
From the frequency response we can calculate the autocorrelation function of the
filter. The autocorrelation function of a continuous function in time f(t) is defined as
Autocorr(τ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
dtf(t)f ∗(t− τ) , (3.13)
where f ∗(t) is the complex conjugate of f(t). It can easily be computed using the
Fourier transform F
Autocorr(τ) = F−1 [|F(f)|2] , (3.14)
which also works for sampled data using the Fast Fourier Transform algorithm. The
autocorrelation function of sampled data describes the amount of correlation between
one sample and its neighbours. The autocorrelation of our exemplary finite impulse
response filter is shown in Fig. 3.12. From this figure we see that formerly uncorrelated
samples that are filtered with a lowpass filter, get correlated as the autocorrelation
is not zero for lags between 1 and about 15. In fact this is always true for any non-
uniform frequency response. Measuring for instance a vacuum state with a homodyne
detector and sampling the output of the detector with the data acquisition method that
uses an analog mixer and a lowpass filter for anti-aliasing purposes, yields correlated
samples despite the fact that vacuum state measurements are uncorrelated in time.
This has to be taken into account for the quantum key distribution experiment, cf.
Chapter 5, where samples obtained from subsequent measurements are not allowed to
be correlated. While the filter used in the example above has an autocorrelation which
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Figure 3.12: Autocorrelation function of an exemplary finite impulse response filter.
shows ringing, a filter with linear phase in the passband like a Bessel type filter, does
not, and therefore reduces the number of correlated samples. Reducing the order of
the filter as much as possible also reduces the number of correlated samples.
3.7.1 Analog Filters
Analog filters are implemented using resistors, capacitors and coils, and for active
designs also include operational amplifiers. Specific topologies of implementations of
such filters can be found in [Hor89]. Three main types of frequency responses of analog
filters exists, namely, Bessel, Butterworth and Chebyshev filters. All of them differ
in the flatness of the passband magnitude, the phase, and the roll-off at frequencies
larger than the cutoff frequency. Bessel filters are designed to have a maximally linear
phase response in the passband, Butterworth filters to have maximally flat magnitude
in the passband and Chebyshev filters to have a much steeper roll-off at the expense
of passband or stopband ripples. The frequency response of Bessel filters implemented
with analog electronics depends much less on the actual component values as for
Butterworth or even Chebyshev filters, making them preferable when two or more
filters with exactly the same frequency response are needed.
As an example the frequency responses of 4th order lowpass filters of all three types
with a cutoff frequency of 1 Hz are shown in Fig. 3.13.
The corresponding autocorrelation functions are depicted in Fig. 3.14. Note, that
the x-axis in the figure scales with the sampling frequency, while the shape stays the
same. The sampling frequency used here is fs = 40 Hz. The autocorrelation function
of the Bessel filter drops fast towards 0 and shows no ringing, while for a Butterworth
filter some ringing occurs. For a Chebyshev filter the ringing is much worse, yielding
many correlated samples. Hence, a Bessel filter used as anti-aliasing filter is the best
choice concerning the correlation of samples. To reach the same attenuation at the
Nyquist frequency however, a higher order is needed for the Bessel filter than for the
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Figure 3.13: Frequency responses of 4th order Bessel, Butterworth and Chebyshev type
lowpass filters with a cutoff frequency of 1 Hz.
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Figure 3.14: Autocorrelation functions of a 4th order Bessel, Butterworth and Chebyshev
filter with a cutoff frequency of 1 Hz. Note, that the x-axis depends on the actual sampling
frequency.
other types.
3.7.2 Digital Filters
Finite impulse response filters (FIR filters) are filters with a finite impulse response
as their name implies, i.e. they are filters with an impulse response that becomes zero
after a finite number of samples. The order of a FIR filter is given by its number of
coefficients h, called taps. Denoting the input samples by x(n), the output y(n) of an
M -tap FIR filter is defined as [Lyo04]
y(n) =
M−1∑
k=0
h(k)x(n− k) . (3.15)
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This equation shows that a FIR filter computes weighted averages over the input
samples both for low- and highpass filters. Hence, this gives an intuition for why a
filter correlates samples. For the determination of the filter’s taps, i.e. for the design
of the filter to match a certain requirement, we refer to the literature, e.g. [Lyo04].
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Generation of EPR Entanglement at
1550 nm
Overview
Since the foundation of quantum mechanics, entanglement has proven to be a valuable
resource in quantum information tasks and has spread a variety of applications [Hor09]
ranging from teleportation [Bou97, Fur98] and quantum dense coding [Ben92, Bra00]
to quantum dense metrology [Was10, Ste12] and quantum cryptography [Wee12]. It
is also an important ingredient to quantum repeaters [Bri98] and quantum computa-
tion [DiV95].
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 describes the characterization of
the squeezed-light source and presents the first ever measurement of stably locked
squeezed states with more than 10 dB squeezing at the telecommunication wavelength
of 1550 nm. An introduction and overview about generation of continuous variable en-
tanglement is given in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 describes the concept of EPR steering
which goes back to Schro¨dinger. The first experimental demonstration of the EPR
paradox and EPR steering using bipartite states generated from a single squeezed
vacuum mode is described in Section 4.4. The results of this section were published
in [Ebe11, Ebe13a]. Section 4.5 is about entanglement generated by two squeezed
vacuum modes. There, more than 10 dB two-mode squeezed states were generated
with a setup that was fully locked in all degrees of freedom. The experiment demon-
strated the feasibility of demanding applications like a recently published quantum
information protocol about superactivation of zero-capacity channels [Smi11], and like
finite-size continuous variable quantum key distribution with security against most
general attacks, cf. Chapter 5 and the following and [Fur12b]. The results of this
experiment were published in [Ebe13b].
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4.1 Experimental Results of Squeezed-Light
Generation at 1550 nm
Using the devices described in Chapter 3 the following presents a characterization
of the squeezed-light source. For the lock of the squeezed-light source the control
beam had a power of 800µW. The phase-matching temperature of the nonlinear
crystal was about 50 ◦C. For the homodyne measurement the local oscillator power was
10 mW. The phase of the local oscillator could be locked to the phase and amplitude
quadrature, respectively. It was locked to the phase quadrature which corresponds to
the anti-squeezed quadrature, using the direct-current (DC) output of the homodyne
detector’s electronics as an error signal. As shown in Eq. (3.10) the output has the form
|β||α| cosϕ, where |β| is the local oscillator’s power, |α| is the power of the control beam
transmitted through the nonlinear cavity and ϕ is the phase between the beams. To
lock to the amplitude quadrature and thus to measure the squeezed quadrature, phase
modulation sidebands imprinted on the control beam were employed. To generate
an error signal, the alternating current (AC) output of the homodyne detector was
demodulated at the modulation frequency and lowpass filtered subsequently.
Figure 4.1 shows the results. For each pump power of the parametric down-con-
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Figure 4.1: Measurement of the squeezed and anti-squeezed quadrature noise variances
normalized to the noise variance of a vacuum state. The solid lines show a theoretical model
fitted to the data, see Eq. (4.1).
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version process the quadrature angle of the homodyne detector was locked to the
squeezed quadrature first and then to the anti-squeezed quadrature. At both quadra-
ture settings we measured the noise variance at a Fourier frequency of 8.5 MHz with
a bandwidth of 300 kHz using a spectrum analyzer. Prior to the measurement the
signal port of the homodyne detector was blocked and the noise variance of a vacuum
state was measured for reference. Both squeezing and anti-squeezing noise variances
were normalized to this reference measurement of a vacuum state. The error bars in
the abscissa of the graph are due to the systematic error of the power meter used
for the pump power measurement which was assumed to be 3 %. For a pump power
of 235 mW a nonclassical noise reduction of 11.1 dB compared to the vacuum noise
variance was achieved. The corresponding anti-squeezed noise variance was 16.3 dB
above noise variance of the vacuum.
The solid lines in the figure show a theoretical model fitted to the data. The squeezed
(sqz) and anti-squeezed (asqz) quadrature variances of the field can be described as a
function of the pump power P by [Tak07]
Varsqz,asqz = 1± η 4
√
P/Pth
(1∓√P/Pth)2 + 4K(f)2 , (4.1)
where η is the detection efficiency, Pth is the threshold power and K(f) = 2pif/κ the
ratio between Fourier frequency f = 8.5 MHz and the cavity decay rate κ = (T +L)c/l
with the output coupler transmission T , the intra-cavity loss, the speed of light in
vacuum c and the cavity’s optical round trip length l = 79.8 mm. The model fits best
with a total optical loss of 1 − η = 5.8 %, a threshold power of Pth = 268 mW and
T + L = 0.1018.
The results above represent the first generation and measurement of more than
10 dB squeezed vacuum states with a setup that was locked in all degrees of freedom.
In [Ebe11] squeezed vacuum states with 9.9 dB were presented, generated at the same
experiment, but with another squeezed-light source that had more optical loss, but
was also fully locked. Squeezed vacuum states with more than 10 dB nonclassical noise
reduction with a manual control of the source’s resonance condition and a manually
controlled phase of the local oscillator for homodyne detection were first reported
in [Vah08] using lithium niobate as nonlinear medium at 1064 nm. Using PPKTP
this result was later improved to 12.7 dB [Ebe10]. At 1550 nm 12.3 dB were reported
in [Meh11] using a similar setup but also without locks. Squeezed vacuum states in
the audio band which are not accessible with our locking scheme due to the bright
control beam at the carrier frequency, are for instance reported in [Vah10, The11].
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4.2 Generation of Entanglement
XP
XP XP
XP
τ:(1-τ)
ϕent
ϕA
ϕB
Figure 4.2: Principle of generating and detecting Gaussian continuous-variable entangle-
ment. Two squeezed vacuum modes, here represented by their Wigner functions, are super-
imposed with phase ϕent = pi/2 at a beam splitter with power transmissivity τ . The two
output modes are entangled and measured by balanced homodyne detection. The detected
quadratures are determined by the phase ϕA and ϕB of the local oscillators.
Bipartite Gaussian continuous variable entanglement can be generated by super-
imposing two squeezed vacuum modes at a beam splitter with power transmissivity
τ [Fur98, Bow03]. This principle is depicted in Fig. 4.2. As described in Chapter 3.3
the squeezed vacuum modes in the experiment were squeezed in the amplitude quadra-
ture X and anti-squeezed in the phase quadrature P . Prior to the superposition of
the modes the phase of one of them is shifted with respect to the other by ϕent. In the
figure we chose ϕent =
pi
2
and a power transmissivity of the beam splitter of τ = 0.5.
The output modes of the beam splitter are quadrature entangled and can be measured
by homodyne detection. Using the formalism presented in Chapter 2 and allowing the
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squeezing parameters r1 and r2 for the squeezed modes to be different, the covariance
matrix of the bipartite state after the superposition reads
γ = SBS(τ)(Ssqz(r1)⊗ Ssqz(r2))14(STsqz(r1)⊗ STsqz(r2))STBS(τ) . (4.2)
Since we consider only modes without coherent excitation, the first statistical moments
vanish. In the model we allow to set either r1 or r2 to 0, yielding a bipartite state that
is generated by splitting a squeezed vacuum mode at a beam splitter. This special type
of entanglement will be the topic of Section 4.4, while the case for r1 6= 0 and r2 6= 0
will be described in Section 4.5. As experimental settings are never lossless, a full
theoretical description of the output modes has to include optical loss, cf. Chapter 2.8.
The verification of entanglement is described in Chapter 2.11.
Continuous variable entanglement was first observed by Ou et al. [Ou92] using type
II parametric down-conversion and by Furusawa et al. [Fur98] using type I parametric
down-conversion as we do in this thesis. Further observations of CV entanglement
using these schemes were reported for instance in [Zha00, Sch02, Lau05, Kel08, Wan10]
with type II parametric down-conversion, in [Bow03, Tak06, DiG07, Hag11, Ebe11,
Ste13] with type I parametric down-conversion and in [Sil01] with the optical Kerr
effect.
4.3 Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Steering
In his reply to the seminal EPR paper [Ein35] Schro¨dinger coined the concept of
steering [Sch35]. His findings were that if the finest description of a quantum system
is its decomposition into pure states, quantum mechanics has a process that violates
local realism. The modern view of steering, which gave rise to a new interest in
this phenomenon, was introduced by Wiseman et al. in [Wis07]. In their paper
they showed that for Gaussian states steering is equivalent to the demonstration of
the EPR paradox by the violation of inequality (2.91) or (2.92) introduced by Reid,
cf. Section 2.11.2. While there is also a description of steering in terms of classical
and quantum models of states [Fra12], we will consider steering here as the question
whether there is a common refinement of quantum states. The argument given here
was published in [Hae12] and is equivalent to the description in [Fra12] and [Wis07].
We start with the same situation as in Section 2.11.2, namely, Alice and Bob share
the subsystems A and B of a two-mode squeezed state. Bob locally observes a mixed
state, which can be decomposed into a convex combination of purer states. This
decomposition yields a more precise description of Bob’s quantum system. Using
any information Alice has on the state gives a decomposition into conditional states,
i.e. into states that are conditioned on Alice’s measurement outcomes. Indeed these
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Figure 4.3: Illustration of EPR steering. Bob’s locally mixed state can be decomposed
using two distinct sets of states that are conditioned on Alice’s measurement outcomes and
are purer than Bob’s mixed state. Here, the blue ellipse at Bob depicts a state conditioned
on Alice X quadrature measurement outcome X1. Similarly the green ellipse shows a state
conditioned on the P quadrature measurement outcome P1. According to local realism the
set used to decompose Bob’s state cannot depend on Alice’s choice of measurement. Hence,
the blue and the green conditional state should have a common refinement. Such a refined
state is displayed in the inset by the red circle. The black dashed circle shows a pure state
for reference. Thus, no common refinement exists as the red circle depicts an unphysical
state.
conditional states are purer than Bob’s mixed state. This situation is shown in Fig. 4.3,
where exemplary measurement outcomes X1 and P1 for Alice measuring the amplitude
quadrature and phase quadrature, respectively, are depicted by the blue and green lines
on the left hand side. The related conditional states on Bob’s system are indicated by
the accordingly colored ellipses on the right hand side of the figure. For all outcomes
Alice can obtain for an amplitude quadrature measurement, the conditional states on
Bob’s side have the same shape but have different position along the X-axis. Similarly,
for all outcomes she can obtain by measuring the phase quadrature, the conditional
states have the same shape but have different position along the P -axis. Both sets
of conditional states form a decomposition of Bob’s mixed state. According to EPR’s
argument of local realism the set of conditional states used for decomposing Bob’s
mixed state cannot depend on Alice’s choice of measurement. Hence, there must exist
a common refinement of both sets. As such a decomposition is required to be of purer
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states than the conditional states for X and P , a state belonging to the common
refinement must have a noise variance in the X quadrature smaller than the noise
variance of the X-conditional states and a noise variance in the P quadrature smaller
than the P -conditional states. Such a state is depicted in the inset of the figure by
the red circle. For reference a pure state is shown by the black dashed ellipse. Hence,
the common refinement of the conditional states is unphysical and does therefore not
exist. The bipartite entangled state is thus called steering from Alice to Bob.
Like EPR entanglement, steering has a directional dependence. Steering from Alice
to Bob does not imply steering from Bob to Alice and vice versa [Hae12]. Non steering
is certified in the picture given above by the red, refined state being physical.
4.4 EPR Entanglement Generation Using a Single
Squeezed Vacuum Resource
The EPR paradox was first demonstrated by Ou et al., in 1992 [Ou92] using two-
mode squeezed states generated by type II parametric down-conversion. As shown by
Bowen et al., in 2003 [Bow03], the total optical loss induced to those states has to
be lower than 50 % to observe the EPR paradox. In this section we will demonstrate
the EPR paradox, and hence EPR steering, for the first time using states generated
by superimposing a squeezed vacuum and a vacuum mode. As we will see, for such
states the maximal allowable loss to still observe the EPR paradox is more severe. The
applicability for quantum key distribution of the EPR states described in this section
will be analyzed in Chapter 6.1.
4.4.1 Theoretical Description
Starting with a squeezed vacuum mode, entanglement can be generated by splitting
it at a beam splitter, i.e. superimposing it with a vacuum mode. In terms of the
description given in Section 4.2, r2 = 0. For a perfect setup without optical loss, the
bipartite state is always EPR entangled for any squeezing parameter r := r1 6= 0 as
we will see in the following. Assuming the amplitude quadrature to be squeezed, the
covariance matrix of the bipartite state reads for a balanced beam splitter
γ =
1
2

1 + e−2r 0 1− e−2r 0
0 1 + e2r 0 1− e2r
1− e−2r 0 1 + e−2r 0
0 1− e2r 0 1 + e2r
 . (4.3)
51
Chapter 4: Generation of EPR Entanglement at 1550 nm
 0
 0.25
 0.5
 0.75
 1
 1.25
 1.5
 1.75
 2
 0  2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18  20
C
on
di
tio
na
l V
ar
ia
nc
es
C
on
di
tio
na
l V
ar
ia
nc
e 
P
ro
du
ct
 (E
P
R
)
Squeezed Variance [dB]
VarB|A(XA,XB)
VarB|A(PA,PB)
EPR
Figure 4.4: Conditional variances for amplitude and phase quadratures and the EPR crite-
rion calculated for a pure bipartite entangled state generated by superimposing a squeezed
vacuum mode with a vacuum mode. On the X-axis the variance of the squeezed quadrature
of the squeezed vacuum mode normalized to the variance of a vacuum state is shown.
Hence, the conditional variances from Eqs. (2.89) and (2.90) take the form
VarB|A(XˆA, XˆB) = VarA|B(XˆA, XˆB) =
2
1 + e2r
, (4.4)
VarB|A(PˆA, PˆB) = VarA|B(PˆA, PˆB) =
2
1 + e−2r
. (4.5)
Using this results, the conditional variance product, i.e. the criterion for EPR entan-
glement, reads
VarB|A(XˆA, XˆB) · VarB|A(PˆA, PˆB) = VarA|B(XˆA, XˆB) · VarA|B(PˆA, PˆB) = 2
1 + cosh 2r
,
(4.6)
which is smaller than 1 for all r 6= 0.
The conditional variances and the EPR conditional variance product for the pure
bipartite state are plotted in Fig. 4.4 versus the squeezed noise variance of the in-
put state which is connected to the squeezing parameter r by Vsqz = e
−2r. While for
increasing squeezing VarB|A(PˆA, PˆB) increases up to the bound of 2, VarB|A(XˆA, XˆB)
decreases towards 0. The EPR criterion also decreases for increasing squeezing to-
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Figure 4.5: Simulation of the EPR conditional variance product of a bipartite entangled
state generated by superimposing a squeezed mode with a vacuum mode at a balanced beam
splitter, versus symmetrical optical loss. The different curves were calculated for 3 dB, 6 dB
and 10 dB squeezed vacuum.
wards 0. Hence, the achievable EPR conditional variance product is only limited by
the variance of the squeezed quadrature of the squeezed input state.
However, as experimental implementations are never lossless the optical loss of a
setup has to be taken into account. Let us denote the amount of optical loss induced
by the setup by  and the covariance matrix describing the state prior to entanglement
generation by γ. Since
SBS(τ) [(1− )γ + 14]STBS(τ) = (1− )SBS(τ)γSTBS(τ) + SBS(τ)STBS(τ) (4.7)
= (1− )SBS(τ)γSTBS(τ) + 14 , (4.8)
optical loss introduced to the squeezed mode before the superposition with a vacuum
mode at a beam splitter with power transmissivity τ is the same as applying the loss
to both output modes of the beam splitter. Hence, symmetrical loss introduced to the
entangled modes can be modeled by applying the loss to the squeezed mode.
The EPR conditional variance product versus the amount of symmetrical optical
loss is shown in Fig. 4.5 for an initially pure squeezed vacuum state with a squeezed
noise variance of 3 dB, 6 dB and 10 dB below the vacuum noise variance. In the
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calculation the beam splitter was balanced. Independent of the squeezed variance of
the squeezed input state, the optical loss is allowed to be at most 33.3 % to observe
EPR entanglement. Indeed, EPR entanglement can be observed with this scheme if
(1− Vsqz)2(1− )
(
1
3
− 
)
> 0 (4.9)
holds [Ebe11]. Here, Vsqz is the variance of the squeezed state normalized to the
variance of a vacuum state.
4.4.2 Experimental Setup
The experimental setup to demonstrate EPR entanglement is shown in Fig. 4.6. The
coherent light preparation, the pump beam generation and the squeezed-light source,
including its locking scheme, used in this setup has been described in Chapter 3.
The squeezed output mode of the squeezed-light source was split at a balanced beam
splitter and thus superimposed with a vacuum mode. Both output modes of the
beam splitter were detected by homodyne detection. Homodyne detection has been
introduced in Chapter 3.4. For the lock of the phase of both local oscillators a single
sideband technique was employed. For this purpose a small fraction of about 15 mW
of the main laser beam was frequency shifted using an acousto-optical modulator
(AOM) and superimposed with the squeezed beam at the dichroic beam splitter that
separated the squeezed vacuum mode from the pump. To become a reference for
the squeezed quadrature, the single sideband was phase locked to the control beam.
The frequency shifted light field reflected by the dichroic beam splitter and the small
fraction of about 500 ppm of the control beam leaking through it were detected by
a resonant photo detector in transmission of another dichroic beam splitter which
was highly reflective for the pump and highly transmissive for the fundamental. The
output of the photo detector was demodulated at the single sideband’s frequency of
80 MHz and fed back to a phase shifter in the path of the single sideband using a servo
controller. Since the AOM introduced also an amplitude modulation at the AOM’s
frequency, the demodulation phase for the error signal generation should have been
set to the phase quadrature. Due to the large phase noise of our fiber laser this was
not possible as the generated error signal was very noisy. Thus, we measured the
amplitude quadrature instead and stabilized the power of the frequency shifted beam
to have a more stable offset caused by the amplitude modulation. To generate error
signals for the homodyne detectors’ local oscillator phases at Alice’s and Bob’s side, the
AC outputs of their respective detectors were demodulated with an electronic 80 MHz
sinusoid, called electronic local oscillator. By changing the phase of the electronic local
oscillator, the phase of the optical local oscillator could be locked to arbitrary values.
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Figure 4.6: Experimental setup of EPR entanglement generation by superimposing a
squeezed mode with a vacuum mode. At the source a squeezed mode was generated by
parametric down-conversion and then split at a balanced beam splitter. Both outputs of the
beam splitter were detected by homodyne detection. To lock the local oscillators’ phases at
Alice and Bob we employed a single sideband technique. A fraction of the main laser beam
was frequency shifted by 80 MHz using an acousto-optical modulator (AOM) and phase
locked to the control beam of the squeezed-light source. The beat of the single sideband and
the local oscillator was detected by the homodyne detector whose high frequency output
was demodulated at 80 MHz to generate an error signal for the phase of the local oscillator.
Both homodyne detectors’ outputs were recorded simultaneously by a data acquisition sys-
tem. AOM: acousto-optical modulator, PS: phase shifter, DBS: dichroic beam splitter, PD:
photo detector.
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To record data the AC outputs of both homodyne detectors were plugged into the
slow data acquisition system described in Chapter 3.6 which sampled with a sampling
frequency of 500 kHz.
4.4.3 Results
For each quadrature combination of the tomographic reconstruction protocol, cf. Chap-
ter 3.5, we recorded 5× 106 samples. Furthermore, we recorded 5× 106 samples of a
vacuum state measurement by blocking the signal ports of Alice’s and Bob’s homo-
dyne detectors. For a pump power of 235 mW the reconstructed covariance matrix
reads
γ =

0.541 0.135 0.459 −0.095
0.135 24.633 −0.037 −23.293
0.459 −0.037 0.548 0.264
−0.095 −23.293 0.264 23.840
 . (4.10)
One can directly see certain properties of the state from the entries in the matrix.
The values on the principal diagonal are the variances for the amplitude and phase
quadrature measurements at Alice’s and Bob’s detector. The diagonal entries of the
two 2×2 blocks in the upper right and lower left give the strengths of the correlations
in the amplitude quadrature and the anti-correlations in the phase quadrature between
both detectors, respectively. In a perfect orthogonal measurement the remaining en-
tries should turn out to be zero since they give the covariance between amplitude and
phase quadratures. The small deviations from zero show that the measurements were
not perfectly orthogonal but close.
Figure 4.7 shows the EPR covariance product for the Alice to Bob direction versus
the pump power used to pump the squeezed-light source. For each pump power setting
the recorded data was divided into 10 chunks. For each chunk the covariance matrix
was reconstructed and the EPR-Reid criterion from Eq. (2.91) was calculated. The
standard deviation of these 10 values are shown as error bars. For the pump power a
systematic error of the power meter of 3 % was assumed. All states generated during
the measurement were EPR entangled and for a pump power of 235 mW an EPR
conditional variance product of 0.31 was reached. The solid line in the figure shows
a theoretical model fitted to the data. The simulation is based on the model from
Eq. (4.1) for the noise variances of the squeezed and anti-squeezed quadratures of a
squeezed vacuum state versus pump power. The fitting parameters of this model were
obtained from the characterization of our squeezed-light source in Section 4.1. Using
this model the covariance matrix of the bipartite entangled state was simulated taking
into account additional optical loss which was a free parameter in the fit. The model
fitted best with an additional optical loss of 0.9 % in both arms which could be due
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Figure 4.7: Conditional variance product versus pump power for the squeezed-light source.
EPR entanglement was certified for all pump powers we used and an EPR-value of 0.31 was
reached for 235 mW. The red solid line shows a theoretical model fitted to the data.
to additional anti-reflective coatings compared to the measurement of the squeezed
state. Hence, the total optical loss introduced to our state was 6.6 %. Calculating
the EPR-Reid criterion for the direction from Bob to Alice yielded similar values as
expected for a state with symmetrical optical loss.
The modulus of the correlation coefficients from Eq. (2.84) for the state generated
with 235 mW pump power was about 0.84 for the amplitude and 0.96 for the phase
quadrature. In comparison maximally entangled states as considered by EPR in their
1935 paper [Ein35] have a correlation coefficient of 1.
The measurement presented here is an improved version of the first demonstration
of EPR entanglement and steering for an entangled state generated by involving only
one squeezed mode, which was presented in [Ebe11]. The setup described here was
improved to get rid of the excess noise observed in [Ebe11] which was due to an
imperfect data acquisition process. Entanglement generated from a single squeezed
mode was formerly generated for instance in [DiG07], however, no EPR entanglement
was observed due to too high optical loss.
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4.5 Entanglement Generation Using Two Squeezed
Vacuum Resources
Recently a continuous variable quantum key distribution protocol which provides com-
posable security against most general attacks with a finite number of samples was
proven to be secure [Fur12b]. To perform such an experiment with a positive key rate,
the protocol requires a high degree of two-mode squeezing, low channel loss and a
large number of samples in the order of 108. To achieve these requirements not only
more than 10 dB entanglement measured by the Duan criterion is necessary but also
a stable control of the entanglement generation. This section describes an experiment
providing both, a high degree of entanglement and a stable control in all degrees of
freedom. A quantum key distribution experiment using these state is described in
Chapter 5.
The principle of the entanglement generation by superimposing two squeezed vac-
uum modes was discussed in Section 4.2. As shown in Fig. 4.2 we denote the phase
between the squeezed vacuum modes by ϕent. The output modes of the beam splitter
were detected by homodyne detection, cf. Chapter 3.4, where the phases of the local
oscillators ϕA and ϕB determined the measured quadrature angle. While the setup
presented in [Ste13] was intrinsically stable for about 500 ms without lock, our setup
had to be stable for more than 15 min to make an application of the entanglement in
the quantum key distribution experiment described in Chapter 5 possible. This was
achieved by locking all degrees of freedom, including ϕent. In particular ϕent was diffi-
cult to lock, since the control and auxiliary beams were only allowed to have low power
as they had to be shot-noise limited in the measurement frequency band. Otherwise,
to achieve highly entangled states, the induced optical loss for locking purposes could
only be small.
4.5.1 Experimental Realization and Locking Scheme
The second squeezed-light source implemented for the entanglement generation was
build identically to the one described in Chapter 3.3, but had a slightly lower pump
power threshold of about 190 mW, which might be due to slightly different outcoupling
efficiencies, see below. The locking scheme used to lock ϕent, ϕA and ϕB involved two
single sidebands generated by frequency shifting a fraction of the main laser beam.
A schematic of the identical experimental setups for both squeezed-light sources is
depicted in Fig. 4.8. The lock of the cavity length and the pump phase worked ex-
actly as described in Chapter 3.3. While for the first squeezed-light source the phase
modulation sidebands had a frequency of 33.9 MHz, we used 35.5 MHz for the second
one. In the figure the frequencies for the second squeezed-light source are denoted in
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Figure 4.8: Locking scheme of the squeezed-light source and introduction of the single side-
band. The cavity length and the pump phase were locked as described in Chapter 3.3. The
single sideband was superimposed with the control beam in front of the cavity. A Faraday
isolator in the path prevented parasitic cavities. PD78,SSB was used to generate an error
signal for the phase lock of the single sideband to the control beam. The frequencies writ-
ten in parentheses are the modulation frequencies used for the second squeezed-light source,
while the frequencies without parentheses were used for the first one. EOM: electro-optical
modulator, PD: photo detector, FI: Faraday isolator, AOM: acousto-optical modulator, PS:
phase shifter, DBS: dichroic beam splitter, PPKTP: Periodically Poled Potassium Titanyl
Phosphate.
parentheses. The single sideband, at 78 MHz for the first and 82 MHz for the second
squeezed-light source, respectively, was generated by an AOM and had a power of
about 30µW. In contrast to the setup described in Section 4.4 for the entanglement
generation involving only one squeezed vacuum mode, the single sideband was super-
imposed with the control beam before entering the cavity. A resonant photo detector,
in the figure called PD78,SSB, was used to generate an error signal for the phase lock
of the single sideband to the control beam. The advantage of this setup over the
previous one was, that the amplitude modulation of the single sideband was no longer
important. Thus, the set point of the phase lock was much more stable.
Figure 4.9 shows schematically the experimental setup for the superposition of the
squeezed modes and the phase lock of ϕent. The fringe visibility of the superposition
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Figure 4.9: Locking scheme for the phase ϕent between the squeezed vacuum modes. A
small fraction of one of the output modes of the balanced beam splitter was superimposed
with an auxiliary local oscillator whose beat with the 78 MHz single sideband was detected by
the photo detector PD78. To generate an error signal for ϕent the output signal of this photo
detector was demodulated at 78 MHz. To lock the phase of the auxiliary local oscillator, the
beat with the 82 MHz single sideband was detected at the other output port. The phase of
the electronic local oscillator used to demodulate the output signal of PD78 determined the
set point for the lock of ϕent. PS: phase shifter, PD: photo detector.
of the squeezed vacuum modes was 99.5 %. The output modes are labeled mode A and
mode B in the figure. A fraction of 1 % of mode B was tapped-off and superimposed
with an auxiliary local oscillator with a power of about 5 mW at a balanced beam
splitter. One of the outputs was detected with a resonant photo detector at 82 MHz
and used to generate an error signal for the phase of the auxiliary local oscillator.
The other output was detected with a photo detector resonant at 78 MHz to generate
an error signal for ϕent. The phase of the electronic local oscillator used for the
demodulation of the photo detector’s signal determined the angle of ϕent. While
the usage of an auxiliary local oscillator involved an additional phase lock, the beat
between the single sidebands at 4 MHz was too weak to be detectable.
Figure 4.10 shows a schematic of the homodyne detectors used to measure the field
quadratures of both entangled modes A and B. At each homodyne detector a local
oscillator field with a power of 10 mW was superimposed with an entangled mode
at a balanced beam splitter with a fringe visibility of 99.5 %. The phase of each
local oscillator was locked using an error signal generated by demodulating the output
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Figure 4.10: Schematic of the homodyne detection of both entangled modes A and B. The
phases of the local oscillators were locked using error signals generated by demodulating the
output signals of the respective homodyne detector’s electronic circuit.
signal of the homodyne detector’s electronics at 82 MHz. By tuning the phases of the
electronic local oscillators used for the demodulation processes, the set points for the
lock of ϕA and ϕB could be independently set to any angle.
Both output signals of the homodyne detectors were recorded simultaneously with
the fast data acquisition system described in Chapter 3.6.
4.5.2 Results
A two-mode squeezed vacuum state was generated with a pump power of about
200 mW for the first and 150 mW for the second squeezed-light source. ϕent was
controlled to an angle of pi
2
. The vacuum noise reference was measured by blocking the
signal ports of the homodyne detectors. By controlling ϕA and ϕB to the amplitude
or phase quadrature we made a partial tomographic measurement, cf. Chapter 3.5.
For each quadrature setting we recorded 106 data points from which we partially re-
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Figure 4.11: Histogram of the Duan inseparability criterion from Eq. (2.81) obtained by
bootstrapping the measured samples. The solid line shows a fit of a Gaussian curve to the
histogram.
constructed the covariance matrix
γ =

21.813 (0) −21.725 −0.010
(0) 25.750 −0.140 26.120
−21.725 −0.140 21.801 (0)
−0.010 26.120 (0) 26.685
 . (4.11)
Here, the values given in brackets could not directly be measured as they correspond
to non-commuting operators. In principle, these entries of the covariance matrix can
be calculated from additional measurements at a linear combination of the amplitude
and phase quadrature, cf. Chapter 3.5. Since ϕent was precisely controlled to
pi
2
, as well
as the phases of the homodyne detectors’ local oscillators were precisely controlled to
the amplitude and phase quadratures, the covariances, which were not determined,
should be close to 0 [Ste13].
Figure 4.11 shows a histogram of the Duan inseparability criterion from Eq. (2.81).
The histogram was calculated by bootstrapping the measured 106 samples into 104
chunks of 2×105 length [Efr86, Bic08]. A Gaussian function was fitted to the histogram
yielding 0.360±0.001 for the Duan criterion. This corresponds to 10.45±0.01 dB below
the threshold to separability.
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Figure 4.12: Histogram of the EPR entanglement criterion by Reid from Eq. (2.91) obtained
by bootstrapping the measured samples. The solid line shows a fit of a Gaussian curve to
the histogram.
Figure 4.12 shows a histogram of the EPR criterion by Reid in the direction from
Alice to Bob from Eq. (2.91). The histogram was computed the same way as for the
Duan criterion. The Gaussian fit yielded an EPR value of 0.0309 ± 0.0002. For the
other direction similar results were obtained. In Ref. [Ste13] 0.41 for the Duan criterion
and 0.04 for the EPR criterion were measured at 1064 nm, already outperforming all
previous experiments on continuous variable entanglement.
The correlation coefficients from Eq. (2.84) for our state read
C(XˆA, XˆB) ≈ C(PˆA, PˆB) ≈ 0.996 . (4.12)
This demonstrates that our states are quite close to the maximally entangled states
considered in the original EPR paper [Ein35].
To demonstrate the stability of the active control loops, Fig. 4.13 shows the variance
of the sum of the amplitude quadrature operators, Var(XˆA + XˆB), and the variance
of the difference of the phase quadrature operators, Var(PˆA − PˆB), versus time. Both
variances were normalized to a joint measurement of vacuum states at the homodyne
detectors, Var(XˆvacA + Xˆ
vac
B ) and Var(Pˆ
vac
A − Pˆ vacB ), respectively. Over the measurement
time of 10 s the noise variances were stable at about 10.0 dB and at about 10.9 dB for
the amplitude and phase quadrature, respectively. Without our active control loops
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Figure 4.13: Stability of the phase locks. The noise variances Var(XˆA+ XˆB) and Var(PˆA−
PˆB) normalized to the variance of the sum or difference of the quadratures for a vacuum
state are plotted versus time. The noise traces are stable over the measurement time.
the noise suppression would reach the same values, however, only stable over short
time scales. For instance, in Ref. [Ste13], where ϕent was not locked, the measurement
time was only 200µs. The stability of our phase lock was not limited to the 10 s being
presented in the figure. Indeed, we observed the stable production of our entangled
states for more than 15 min, cf. Chapter 6. In principle, our active control loops allow
an extension of the measurement time to arbitrary duration if the dynamic ranges of
the used piezo actuators are large enough to compensate for thermal drifts.
The optical loss of our squeezed-light sources was slightly asymmetric with an out-
coupling efficiency of about 96 % for the first and about 97.5 % for the second source.
The fringe visibility at the entangling beam splitter was about 99.5 %. Taking into
account the 1 % optical loss introduced by the tap-off in one arm for the phase lock
at the entangling beam splitter, the fringe visibility of about 99.5 % at the homodyne
detectors’ beam splitters, the quantum efficiency of the homodyne detector’s photo
diodes of about 99 % and propagation loss of about 1 %, the observed values for the
Duan and EPR-Reid criterion are reproduced quite well. We observed no evidence for
phase noise, showing the good performance of the implemented control scheme.
64
4.6 Summary
4.6 Summary
To summarize, a characterization of squeezed vacuum states at the telecommunication
wavelength of 1550 nm was presented. The states were the first actively stabilized
squeezed states with a noise variance in the squeezed quadrature of more than 10 dB
below the vacuum noise. The generated states revealed 11.1 dB non-classical noise
reduction in the squeezed quadrature and a corresponding anti-squeezed noise variance
of 16.6 dB compared to the vacuum noise.
Futhermore, the observed squeezed vacuum states were used to demonstrate both
the EPR paradox and EPR steering by superimposing them with a vacuum mode.
This was possible since the experimental setup induced an optical loss of only 6.6 %,
which is much less than the threshold of 33.3 % below which EPR entanglement can be
observed for such bipartite states. Using a squeezed vacuum mode with a noise variance
in the squeezed quadrature which was 11.1 dB below the vacuum noise variance, an
EPR conditional variance product of 0.31 < 1 was reached.
Using instead two squeezed vacuum modes which were superimposed at a bal-
anced beam splitter, 10.45 ± 0.01 dB entanglement certified by the Duan insepara-
bility criterion was observed. The EPR conditional variance product for this state was
0.0309±0.0002. Both values represent the largest entanglement strength ever observed
so far in the continuous variable regime. Since the correlation coefficients for the am-
plitude and phase quadratures were with about 0.996 very close to 1, the generated
states were a good approximation for the states considered by Einstein, Podolsky and
Rosen in their famous Gedanken experiment. Furthermore, the entanglement gener-
ation and detection process was locked in all degrees of freedom and was stable over
more than 15 min which was the necessary measurement time to record 108 samples
for the QKD experiments as described in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER5
Theory of Gaussian Finite-Size Quantum
Key Distribution
Overview
This chapter describes the protocols for entanglement-based quantum key distribution
under collective and general attacks, respectively, as used in the implementations pre-
sented in Chapters 6 and 7. The security proofs of the protocols take, in particular, the
finite key size into account as in real implementations an infinite number of measure-
ments cannot be performed. The security proofs which are used in this chapter, were
developed by F. Furrer et al. [Fur12b]. For collective attacks the security proof was
extended to states with an asymmetry in the field quadrature variances in [Ebe13a].
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 introduces the definition of com-
posable security. A generic protocol for quantum key distribution is described in
Section 5.2. The secure key length of this generic protocol is given in Section 5.3.
Section 5.4 is devoted to quantum key distribution with the restriction on an adver-
sary to collective attacks. Here, the generic protocol is adapted to a more specific
protocol that provides security against collective attacks, and the secure key length is
given. The protocol and the secure key length for quantum key distribution without
restrictions on the eavesdropper are given in Section 5.5.
5.1 Security
Quantum key distribution is the task of distributing keys between two parties in
such a way that the keys are only known by them and completely unknown to an
adversary. We call the two parties among which the key is distributed, Alice and
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Bob, and the adversary Eve. As resource for the key distribution we use a bipartite
entangled state whose density operator is denoted by ρˆAB. If ρˆAB is in a pure state, it
is completely detached from the environment. Hence, outcomes from measurements
performed on this state are uncorrelated to any other system and thus secret. Since
distributed continuous variable quantum states, as considered in the previous chapters,
are affected by optical loss, e.g. when transmitted through optical fibers, the states
are not pure. Let ρˆABE describe a pure quantum state with TrE(ρˆABE) = ρˆAB. ρˆABE
is then called a purification of ρˆAB. As the ABE system is pure it is uncorrelated
with its environment and hence, the E system contains all correlations of ρˆAB with its
environment. Thus, all optical loss of a state is contained by the E system.
5.1.1 Universally Composable Security
Key distribution is usually part of a larger cryptographic system. For example it is
often used in combination with the one-time pad algorithm for encrypting messages.
The notion of universally composable security [Can01] describes that the security of a
cryptographic system is not compromised when it is composed with an other arbitrary
system. If, for example, a part of a secret key is compromised by an adversary,
universal security implies that any other bit remains secure [Ren05a, Koe07].
Definitions of universal composable security are based on the idea to compare the
distance of a key S generated by a real cryptographic system, to a perfectly secure key
U generated by an ideal system which is independent of any knowledge of potential
adversaries. S is then said to be secure if it is close to U , where the distance measure
has to be chosen appropriately [Ren05a].
Let S be a key distributed according to a probability distribution PS. We will
describe the classical key values s by orthogonal quantum states |s〉 on the Hilbert
space HS. The state ρˆS is then given by
ρˆS =
∑
s∈S
PS(s)|s〉〈s| . (5.1)
ρˆS might be part of a quantum system ρˆSE on HS ⊗HE, where the state ρˆsE on HE is
a quantum state depending on the classical value s. ρˆSE is then given by
ρˆSE =
∑
s∈S
PS(s)|s〉〈s| ⊗ ρˆsE , (5.2)
which we call a classical-quantum state (cq-state).
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Using this definition a key S is s-secure if [Ren05a, Fur11]
1
2
‖ρˆSE − ρˆU ⊗ σˆE‖ ≤ s , (5.3)
where ρˆU =
∑
s∈S
1
|S| |s〉〈s| describes a perfectly secure key U which is separable to
an arbitrary quantum state σˆE possessed by an adversary. The perfectly secure key
U is thereby uniformly distributed, i.e. each key value has a probability of 1|S| . The
distance between the real key and the perfect key, including a quantum adversary
E, is measured with the trace norm ‖·‖ and bounded by 2s. This means that if
ρˆSE fulfills Eq. (5.3), the key S is identical to the secure key U with probability
(1− s). In [Ren05a] it was shown that S keeps indeed secure if composed with other
cryptographic systems as required by the definition of universally composable security.
5.2 Generic Protocol
This Section describes the protocol we will use to establish a secure key. The protocol
is the same whether considering collective or coherent attacks, except for the parameter
estimation phase.
Preliminaries For the classical post-processing Alice and Bob need an authenti-
cated channel to communicate. So in a first step Alice and Bob need to establish such
a channel and have to make sure that they prove to each other that they really are
who they claim to be. This can be for instance realized by a pre-shared secret key. We
will not go into detail of authentication but assume that Alice and Bob have such an
authenticated channel. Further details can be found in [Sti94, Gem94]. Furthermore,
Alice and Bob make sure that they both share the same parameters of the quantum
key distribution protocol.
Distribution of Quantum States and Homodyne Measurements Alice pre-
pares entangled states with her EPR source, keeps one subsystem and sends the other
to Bob. Both parties simultaneously perform homodyne measurements in either the
X or P quadrature which is chosen at random. An outcome of such a synchronous
measurement is called a sample. This process is repeated until 2N measurements were
performed on 2N quantum states, forming two strings of length 2N .
Check of Abort Conditions and Sifting After having performed 2N measure-
ments Alice and Bob check possible abort conditions of the generic protocol’s actual
implementation and abort if necessary. If they do not abort, they perform sifting, i.e.
69
Chapter 5: Theory of Gaussian Finite-Size Quantum Key Distribution
they communicate which quadrature they measured. Samples measured with a differ-
ent choice of quadrature are discarded leaving Alice and Bob with strings of length N
in average. For collective attacks the discarded data can later be used for parameter
estimation.
Parameter Estimation To perform parameter estimation Alice and Bob randomly
choose a common subset of length k from the sifted data which they reveal. The actual
procedure of the parameter estimation depends on whether collective or general attacks
are considered. The details are therefore described in the respective Sections below.
The output of the parameter estimation procedure is the number of secret bits `, they
can generate from their data.
Binning, Error Correction and Privacy Amplification Alice and Bob generate
the raw key from their unrevealed measurement outcomes. For this purpose they map
their samples to bins which were negotiated prior to the run of the protocol. For each
sample they remember the index of the bin the sample was mapped to. Details will be
given in the description of the respective protocol for security against collective and
general attacks. The number of bins will be finite in both cases.
After binning, Alice and Bob have to make sure that they share the same raw key
strings they proceed with. Because of the finite correlations between the two parts of
the bipartite EPR state, errors are indispensable and have to be corrected by error
correction algorithms. Error correction can either be processed by correcting Bob’s
data to match Alice’s, which is called direct reconciliation or by correcting Alice’s
data to match Bob’s which is called reverse reconciliation. When transmitting Bob’s
state through an optical fiber, reverse reconciliation enables larger distances as the
eavesdropper’s guess about Bob’s state is worse than about Alice’s as Bob’s state
is noisier [Gro03]. To check that they share the same string after error correction
they perform a correctness test. This test is implemented by Alice and Bob each
hashing their error corrected strings to a certain hash length using two-universal hash
functions [Sti94] and comparing the outcomes.
Finally, Alice and Bob perform privacy amplification [Sti02, Ren05b, Ass06]. Using
two-universal hash functions they reduce their raw key strings to the length calculated
in the parameter estimation step. The correlations of the key to an eavesdropper are
thereby removed from the strings, leaving Alice and Bob with a secret key.
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5.3 Secure Key Length
In Section 5.1.1 we have already introduced s-secrecy of a protocol to ensure univer-
sally composable security. In the following we will extend the security definitions to
the protocol given above and then calculate the secret key rate.
5.3.1 Security Definitions
The security definitions follow the ones given in [Ren05a, Fur12b].
Robustness We call a protocol robust if it does not abort when no eavesdropper is
present. This ensures that the protocol is not trivial.
Correctness Denoting Alice’s key as SA and Bob’s key as SB, a protocol is c-correct
if
Probability(SA 6= SB) ≤ c .
Secrecy As introduced in Section 5.1.1, a protocol is s-secret if
1
2
ppass‖ρˆSAE − ρˆU ⊗ σˆE‖ ≤ s . (5.4)
Here, ppass denotes the probability that the protocol does not abort.
Security We call a protocol -secure if it is c-correct and s-secret with c + s ≤ .
5.3.2 Smooth Min-Max Entropies
In this section we will briefly introduce the formalism of smooth min- and max-
entropies as they play a crucial role in calculating the secure key length. Although
the smooth min- and max-entropies in the infinite dimensional case are defined using
von Neumann algebras, we will stick here for the ease of presentation to the tradi-
tional approach using density operators on Hilbert spaces as the results will look the
same. For the finite dimensional case we refer to [Ren05a], whereas for the extension
to infinite dimensions we refer to [Fur11, Ber11, Fra12, Fur12a].
Let H be a Hilbert space. We define by P(H) the set of non-negative operators on
H. ρˆ is a density operator acting on H, if ρˆ ∈ P(H) and Tr ρˆ = 1.
The conditional min-entropy of a bipartite state ρˆAB ∈ P(HA ⊗ HB) with respect
to σˆB ∈ P(HB) is defined by
Hmin(ρˆAB|σˆB) = − log2 inf{λ ∈ R|λ1⊗ σˆB ≥ ρˆAB} , (5.5)
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with Hmin(ρˆAB|σˆB) = −∞, if λ1 ⊗ σˆB ≥ ρˆAB cannot be fulfilled for any λ. The
min-entropy with respect to the subsystem B is defined as
Hmin(ρˆAB|B) = sup
σˆB∈P(HB)
Hmin(ρˆAB|σˆB) . (5.6)
The min-entropy has the interpretation of being the logarithm of the guessing proba-
bility of a classical variable X. The guessing of X is thereby assisted by a quantum
state on Eve’s system E depending on the classical value x [Fur11]. The density
operator describing this cq-state is given by
ρˆXE =
∑
x∈X
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρˆxE
with PX(x) being the probability distribution of X. The guessing probability is defined
as the probability that Eve correctly guesses x by performing an optimal measurement
on her state.
pguess = max
{Eˆx}
∑
x∈X
PX(x) Tr(ρˆ
x
EEˆx) , (5.7)
where {Eˆx} is the set of all possible measurements on Eve’s system. The conditional
min-entropy is then given by
pguess = 2
Hmin(X|E) . (5.8)
The max-entropy of ρˆAB conditioned on subsystem B is dual to the min-entropy and
defined as
Hmax(ρˆAB|B) = −Hmin(ρˆAE|E) , (5.9)
where ρˆABE is a purification of ρˆAB.
The smoothed versions of the min- and max-entropies take all states into account
that are -close to ρˆAB,
Hmin(ρˆAB|B) = sup
ˆ˜ρAB∈B(ρˆAB)
Hmin(ˆ˜ρAB|B) , (5.10)
Hmax(ρˆAB|B) = inf
ˆ˜ρAB∈B(ρˆAB)
Hmax(ˆ˜ρAB|B) , (5.11)
where B(ρˆAB) is the set of all states that are -close to ρˆAB. Hence, the smoothed
versions describe the min- and max-entropy of a state when we know the state only
approximately. The duality condition of Eq. (5.9) is also valid for the smoothed
versions, i.e.
Hmax(ρˆAB|B) = −Hmin(ρˆAE|E) . (5.12)
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An important property of the (smooth) min- and max-entropies is that they coincide
with the von Neumann entropy in the limit of infinite identical but independed repe-
titions. For a state ρˆAB ∈ P(HA ⊗ HB) the state after n identical and independend
repetitions is described by ρˆ⊗nAB. The asymptotic equipartition property of the smooth
min- and max-entropies states that for any  > 0 and n ≥ 8
5
log2
2
2
1
n
Hmin(A
n|Bn) ≥ H(A|B)− 1√
n
∆ (5.13)
and
1
n
Hmax(A
n|Bn) ≤ H(A|B) + 1√
n
∆ , (5.14)
if H(A) <∞. Here,
∆ = 4 log2
(
2−
1
2
Hmin(A|B) + 2
1
2
Hmax(A|B) + 1
)√
log2
2
2
. (5.15)
With this property the desired behaviour for the smooth min- and max-entropies can
be seen
lim
→0
lim
n→∞
1
n
Hmin(A
n|Bn) = H(A|B) = lim
→0
lim
n→∞
1
n
Hmax(A
n|Bn) . (5.16)
Another useful relation is the entropic uncertainty relation. For a state ρˆABE ∈
P(HA ⊗HB ⊗HE) it reads
Hmin(X|B) +Hmax(Y |E) ≥ − log2 c , (5.17)
where ρˆXB is the cq-state after measuring EˆA at Alice’s subsystem, and ρˆY E is the cq-
state after measuring FˆA at the same subsystem. c is a constant describing the overlap
between the measurement operators Eˆ and Fˆ . It is given by c = maxx,y‖(EˆxA)
1
2 (Fˆ yA)
1
2‖2.
The entropic uncertainty relation can be used to estimate Hmin by H

max. The quality
of the estimation is given by the constant c. This property will later be used to
estimate the secure key length in the case of general attacks, cf. Section 5.5.
5.3.3 Privacy Amplification
Assume that Alice and Bob have already performed error correction and have obtained
two identical raw key strings. As these strings still contain information possessed by
Eve they have to perform so-called privacy amplification to remove her information.
The result of this procedure is a new but shorter string that is uniformly distributed
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and uncorrelated to Eve. As Alice and Bob share the same strings we can reduce
the description of privacy amplification to the bipartite problem involving only Alice
and Eve in the following. Privacy amplification is implemented using a family of
two-universal hash functions.
A hash function is a function f : X → K which maps a finite bit string X with
length |X| to a bit string K with length |K| < |X|. A set of such functions F = {f}
is called a family of two-universal hash functions if any two distinct elements of X
collide with probability of at most 1|K| when the hash function f is drawn from F at
random, i.e. [Sti94]
Probability
f∈F
(f(x) = f(y)) ≤ 1|K| ∀x, y ∈ X, x 6= y .
The leftover hash lemma states that using an input with sufficiently high entropy,
the output of such a family of two-universal hash functions suffices the conditions
of privacy amplification. Indeed the lemma was e.g. shown in [Ben95] for classical
side-information and in [Tom11, Fur09, Fur12a] for quantum side-information. Hence,
no matter whether Eve possesses classical or quantum side-information, applying a
two-universal family of hash functions yields privacy amplification.
Given a cq-state ρˆXE which describes Alice’s raw key string and Eve’s side-informa-
tion, the leftover hash lemma is given by
〈‖Tˆf (ρˆXE)− 1|K| ρˆU ⊗ σˆE‖〉F ≤
√
|K| · 2−Hmin(X|E) , (5.18)
where Tˆf implements the hash function f , ρˆU =
∑
k∈K
1
|K| |k〉〈k| is the density operator
describing the uniformly distributed keys, σˆE is the reduced state on Eve’s subsystem
and 〈·〉F is the expectation value over the hash functions f . The left hand side of
Eq. (5.18) describes the distance of Alice’s raw key given Eve’s side information after
hashing to a uniformly distributed string which is independent of Eve. The leftover
hash lemma states that this distance can be made arbitrarily small by choosing |K|
appropriately small.
This result can be generalized to the smooth min-entropy by [Fur12a]
〈‖Tˆf (ρˆXE)− 1|K| ρˆU ⊗ σˆE‖〉F ≤
√
|K| · 2−Hmin(X|E) + 4 , (5.19)
Using this result we can now derive a formula for the secure key length.
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5.3.4 Finite-Key Length
We assume that Alice and Bob have already performed the quantum part of the
protocol, checked the abort conditions and parameter estimation tests and binned their
data to retrieve the raw key strings XA and XB. In the next step of the protocol they
perform error correction. We will assume direct reconciliation, i.e. Alice communicates
`EC bits to Bob who changes his key XB to match Alice’s. After error correction Alice
and Bob check whether their keys are the same. For this purpose Alice draws a
hash function from a family of two-universal hash functions at random and sends
Bob both, the hash of her raw key string and the hash function. The hash function
she uses maps the whole raw key string to a string of length log2
1
c
according to the
correctness definition. Bob then checks whether he gets the same hash by applying
the hash function to his raw key string and aborts the protocol if he does not. The
correctness test leaks log2
1
c
bits to Eve through the public communication. In the
following we denote the random variable which corresponds to the communication
due to error correction, by M . The number of revealed bits is thereby assumed to be
log2|M | = `EC + log2 1c .
To derive the secret key length we start at the secrecy definition (5.4) which can be
bounded by the privacy amplification result of Eq. (5.19) by applying a hash function
drawn from a two-universal family of hash functions at random to the raw key string
XA. Thereby we denote the cq-state shared by Alice and Eve after successful parameter
estimation by ρˆXAE. Substituting K with the alphabet SA, which has a length of
` = log2|SA|, yields [Fur12a]
1
2
‖ρˆXAE − ρˆU ⊗ σˆE‖ ≤
√
2`−Hmin(XA|EM)−2 + 2 ≤ s
ppass
, (5.20)
where the bound on the right is given by Eq. (5.4). This condition is fulfilled for
` ≤ Hmin(XA|EM)− 2 log2
ppass
1
+ 2 , (5.21)
where 1 is defined by  ≤ (s − 1)/(2ppass).
This can be further simplified by using [Fur12a]
Hmin(XA|EM) ≥ Hmin(XAM |E)− log2|M | ≥ Hmin(XA|E)− log2|M | ,
and − log2 ppass ≥ 0 which yields
` ≤ Hmin(XA|E)− `EC − log2
1
421c
. (5.22)
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In Sections 5.4 and 5.5 we will see how to estimate Hmin(XA|E) in the case of collective
and coherent attacks.
5.3.5 Estimation of the Error Correction Leakage Term
In a real implementation of the quantum key distribution protocol given above, the
number of bits `EC communicated from Alice to Bob or from Bob to Alice used to
perform error correction can be exactly determined after each run. But for the theo-
retical analysis of possible key rates, `EC has to be estimated. In the case of infinite
repetitions, i.e. n→∞, a lower bound for `EC is given by [Sle73, Sca09]
`EC = λH(XA|XB) , (5.23)
where we assumed direct reconciliation, i.e. communication from Alice to Bob. Here,
the parameter λ ≥ 1 reflects that existing error correction algorithms do not achieve
the theoretical bound of H(XA|XB). An intuitive interpretation of Eq. (5.23) can be
gained from the interpretation of the conditional entropy that describes the uncertainty
about XA in the case XB is known. Hence, Alice has to send H(XA|XB) bits to
Bob to enable him to know Alice’s string with certainty. More often instead of the
leakage parameter λ, the error correction efficiency β is used. The number of perfectly
correlated bits that can be extracted from partially correlated strings XA and XB is
given by their mutual information [Sca09]. The efficiency of an algorithm to achieve
this, is described by β with 0 < β ≤ 1. Hence,
number of extractable bits = βI(XA : XB) . (5.24)
Using this, the leakage term can be written as
`EC = λH(XA|XB) (5.25)
= λ (H(XA)− I(XA : XB)) (5.26)
= H(XA)− βI(XA : XB) , (5.27)
which connects the leakage parameter λ and the error correction efficiency β by
λ =
H(XA)− βI(XA : XB)
H(XA|XB) . (5.28)
For our simulations in the following Chapters we will assume that the leakage term is
close to the optimum for infinite repetitions.
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5.3.6 Key Rate in the Regime of Infinite Samples
Taking Eq. (5.22) the key rate r = `
n
in the limit of n→∞ and → 0 becomes
r = lim
n→∞
lim
→0
`
n
(5.29)
= lim
n→∞
lim
→0
1
n
(
Hmin(XA|E)− `EC − log2
1
421c
)
(5.30)
= H(XA|E)−H(XA|XB) (5.31)
= I(XA : XB)− I(XA : E) , (5.32)
where we have used Eq. (5.16), and Eq. (5.23) for the error correction leakage term
with perfect error correction, i.e. λ = 1. Assuming imperfect error correction yields
r = βI(XA : XB)− I(XA : E) . (5.33)
This result is the Devetak-Winter bound for the secure key rate [Dev05, Sca09]. I(XA :
E) is thereby known as the Holevo bound, usually written as χ(XA : E).
5.4 Collective Attacks
We will now use the results of the last section to calculate the secure key length with
the restriction of Eve to collective attacks. Collective attacks are attacks where Eve
possesses a quantum memory and measures her states collectively. However, all states
are measured with the same operation. Although Eve is restricted to this type of
attacks, these attacks are rather powerful. Due to Eve’s restriction to perform the
same attacks on each quantum state, the distributed entangled states can be assumed
to be identical and not correlated to each other. This is exactly the situation where
the asymptotic equipartition property of Eq. (5.13) can be applied. The calculation
presented in this section was first carried out in [Fur12b] and later extended to states
with asymmetries in the field quadrature variances in [Ebe13a].
5.4.1 Protocol
The protocol for security against collective attacks is almost the same as the generic
protocol described in Section 5.2.
Preliminaries Prior to executing the protocol Alice and Bob negotiate the binning
intervals, the number of measured samples, the number of samples k used for parameter
estimation and the security parameters.
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Distribution of Quantum States and Homodyne Measurements This step
is performed as described in the generic protocol.
Sifting Alice and Bob communicate the quadratures they used to measure their
samples. Samples measured in different quadratures are discarded from the sample
strings but are later used for parameter estimation. The discarded samples are there-
fore publicly announced.
Parameter Estimation Alice and Bob choose randomly a common subset of k
samples from their sample strings which they reveal. From this data and the data
discarded during sifting they reconstruct the covariance matrix as described in Chap-
ter 3.5. In particular, they estimate a confidence set Cpe with the property that with
probability 1− pe the real covariance matrix lies within Cpe .
Discarding Samples from X or P Quadrature (Optional) When using en-
tangled states that are generated from a single squeezed-light source, the samples
measured in the anti-squeezed quadrature might be discarded and then publicly an-
nounced for use in the parameter estimation step. To take into account the three
possibilities, namely discarding samples measured in the X quadrature, discarding
samples measured in the P quadrature and discarding nothing at all, we introduce a
parameter pX which describes the probability of a remaining sample being measured
in the X quadrature. This yields pX = 0 for discarding X measurements, pX = 1
for discarding P measurements and pX ≈ 0.5 for discarding none of them. For the
latter the actual value of pX depends on the run as we assume a finite number of
measurements.
Binning To generate the raw key Alice and Bob map their unrevealed samples to
bins I0 =
(−∞,−α{X,P} + δ{X,P}], I1 = (−α{X,P} + δ{X,P},−α{X,P} + 2δ{X,P}], . . . ,
I 2α
δ
−1 =
(
α{X,P} − δ{X,P},∞
)
. Each sample is assigned the index of the bin the sample
fell into, i.e. the alphabets of the raw keys are given by χX =
{
0, 1, . . . , 2αX
δX
− 1
}
and
χP =
{
0, 1, . . . , 2αP
δP
− 1
}
. In practice, we always choose α such that no sample exceeds
α. In that sense, only δ is a free parameter in the protocol.
Post Selection (Optional) To reduce errors Alice and Bob can perform a simple
post selection step. After binning Alice searches her data for samples which were
mapped to a certain bin and sends Bob a remove flag for those samples. The two
parties then remove the flagged samples from their sample strings. This procedure
can be performed for more than one bin and also from Bob to Alice.
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Error Correction After binning Alice and Bob have to ensure that they both pro-
ceed with the same raw key. To achieve this they sacrifice `EC bits by classical com-
munication. The size of `EC will be estimated for the simulations as described in
Section 5.3.5. For an actual run of the protocol, `EC can be directly measured. After
the run of the error correction algorithm Alice and Bob perform a correctness test as
in the generic protocol.
Estimation of the Secret Key Length Alice and Bob compute the secret key
length ` taking into account the number of bits used for error correction. If the key
length is lower than zero they abort. Otherwise they proceed with the next step.
Privacy Amplification To obtain bit strings only known to Alice and Bob, both
parties map the alphabet χ to a binary representation. Afterwards privacy amplifica-
tion is implemented in the way described in the generic protocol.
5.4.2 Secure Key Length
For the calculation of the secure key length we start at the key length formula of
Eq. (5.22) for the generic protocol but assume reverse information reconciliation, i.e.
classical communication from Bob to Alice. Let us denote the classical variable corre-
sponding to the n measurement outcomes of Alice and Bob after binning but before
error correction and privacy amplification by XnA and X
n
B. We denote by ρˆXnAXnBEn the
corresponding cq-state conditioned on the event that the protocol passes, where En is
the (infinite dimensional) quantum system of the eavesdropper. Under the assumption
of collective attacks ρˆXnAXnBEn has tensor-product structure, hence, ρˆXnAXnBEn = ρˆ
⊗n
XAXBE
.
Applying the asymptotic equipartition property from Eq. (5.13) yields
Hmin(XB|E) ≥ nH(XB|E)−
√
n∆ , (5.34)
where ∆ is given by [Fur12b]
∆ = 4 log2
(
2
1
2
Hmax(XB)+1 + 1
)√
log2
8
(s − 1)2 . (5.35)
To compute H(XB|E) we use that the classical-quantum state ρˆXBE has the form
ρˆXBE = pX |X〉〈X|θ ⊗ ρˆXXBE + (1− pX)|P 〉〈P |θ ⊗ ρˆPXBE where ρˆXXBE and ρˆPXBE are the
states obtained when Alice and Bob measured the X or P quadrature, respectively.
Thereby the classical variable θ describes the system which keeps track of the measured
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quadrature angle and is known by the eavesdropper, [Ebe13a]
H(XB|Eθ) = H(XBEθ)−H(Eθ)
= H(θ) +
∑
θ
pθH(XBE)θ −H(θ)−
∑
θ
pθH(E)θ
= pXH(XB|E)X + (1− pX)H(XB|E)P .
Assuming Gaussian attacks we introduce a confidence set Cpe which contains all co-
variance matrices compatible with the k samples used for parameter estimation. We
assume that the parameter estimation is performed such that the real covariance ma-
trix lies within Cpe with probability of at least 1 − pe. The length of the secure key
length can then be bounded by
` ≤ n · inf
γ∈Cpe
∑
θ
pθH(XB|E)γ,θ −
√
n∆− `EC − log2
1
2sc
. (5.36)
The infimum is thereby taken over the confidence set and we have chosen 1 =
s
2
,
because for large enough n the logarithm is neglegible small. As Eve’s system purifies
the state shared by Alice and Bob we can use the self-duality property of the von
Neumann entropy, H(E)γ = H(AB)γ. Thus,
H(XB|E)γ,θ = H(E|XB)γ,θ +H(XB)γ,θ −H(AB)γ . (5.37)
Using partial homodyne detecion, cf. Chapter 2.13, and results from [Fur12b] yields
H(E|XB)γ,X ≥ H(E)γ(X=0) = H
(
A− C(MXBMX)MPCT
)
γ
and
H(E|XB)γ,P ≥ H(E)γ(P=0) = H
(
A− C(MPBMP )MPCT
)
γ
,
where H(E)γ({X,P}=0) is the post-measurement state at the eavesdropper’s side when
Bob measured X = 0 or P = 0. The bipartite covariance matrix is written in block
form as in Eq. (2.73), MX and MP are defined as in Chapter 2.13 and MP denotes
the Moore-Penrose inverse.
The Shannon entropy of the classical variable XB, H(XB)γ,θ, is given by
H(XB)γ,θ = pXH(XB)γ,X + (1− pX)H(XB)γ,P (5.38)
with
H(XB)γ,X = −
∑
y
pXXB(y) log2 p
X
XB
(y) , (5.39)
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where pXXB(y) is the probability that a measurement outcome from Bob, measured in
the X quadrature, falls into bin y. Given the boundaries of this bin, xyB and x
y+1
B ,
pXXB(y) can be calculated by
pXXB(y) =
∫ xy+1B
xyB
dx
1√
2piγ3,3
exp
(
− x
2
2γ3,3
)
=
1
2
(
erf
(
xy+1B√
2γ3,3
)
− erf
(
xyB√
2γ3,3
))
,
in the case that no post selection was performed. Here, γ3,3 denotes the entry in the
covariance matrix corresponding to the X quadrature variance of Bob’s subsystem,
and erf is the error function.
Similarly Hmax(XB), which is part of ∆, can be estimated by [Fur11]
Hmax(XB) ≤ 2 log2
(
√
pX
∑
y
√
pXXB(y) +
√
(1− pX)
∑
y
√
pPXB(y)
)
. (5.40)
In a real run of this protocol both H(XB) and Hmax(XB) can be calculated directly
from Bob’s measurement outcomes. Thus, the infimum is only taken of
H(E)γ({X,P}=0) −H(AB)γ .
Plugging it all together, the key rate, defined as r = `
n
, has the form
r =
`
n
= inf
γ∈Cpe
pX [H(E|XB)γ,X +H(XB)γ,X ]
+ (1− pX) [H(E|XB)γ,P +H(XB)γ,P ]−H(AB)γ
− 1√
n
∆− `EC
n
− 1
n
log2
1
2sc
.
(5.41)
5.4.3 Parameter Estimation
To calculate the secure key rate we need to construct the confidence set Cpe , which is
defined such that the covariance matrix describing the real state lies within Cpe with
probability 1 − pe. As our states are two-mode squeezed vacuum states, only the
second order moments do not vanish and the state is fully described by its covariance
matrix. It is reconstructed during the parameter estimation step from the discarded
samples and the revealed common subset of length k using a maximum likelihood
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estimator. The sample covariance matrix is estimated by
γ˜µν =
1
nµν
nµν∑
i=1
xµi x
ν
i ,
where xµi and x
ν
i are the samples measured simultaneously by Alice and Bob in µ
and ν quadrature, respectively. nµν is the number of samples used for the covariance
estimation. The distribution of the sample covariance matrix γ˜ is given by [Joh07]
nγ˜ ∼ W4(γ, n− 1) ,
where W4(γ, n − 1) is the Wishart distribution. Hence, the standard deviation for a
single entry of the covariance matrix takes the form
σµν ≈
√
γ˜2µν + γ˜µµγ˜νν
nµν
.
For a sufficiently large number of samples the confidence set is constructed by
Cpe =
{
γ|γ˜µν − zpeσµν ≤ γµν ≤ γ˜µν + zpeσµν
}
, (5.42)
where zpe is chosen such that
1− erf
(
zpe√
2
)
≤ pe
is fulfilled.
5.5 General Attacks
While collective attacks are relatively easy to analyse, the security when we make
no assumptions on the attacks of the eavesdropper, is hard to proof in the continu-
ous variable regime. The following protocol allows to distill a key which cannot be
eavesdropped even with general attacks. It was published in [Fur12b].
5.5.1 Protocol
The protocol for security against general attacks is almost the same as the generic
protocol described in Section 5.2.
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Preliminaries Prior to executing the protocol Alice and Bob negotiate the binning
interval length δ and the cut-off value α, the number of measured samples 2N , the
number of samples k used for parameter estimation, and the security parameters.
Distribution of Quantum States and Homodyne Measurements This step
is performed as in the generic protocol.
Check of Abort Condition and Sifting Alice and Bob check their measurement
results whether they are within the allowed region [−α, α]. If they find a value outside
this interval, they abort the protocol. Otherwise they perform sifting as in the generic
protocol.
Binning After sifting Alice and Bob map their remaining samples to the bins I0 =
(−∞,−α+δ], I1 = (−α+δ,−α+2δ], . . . , I2α
δ
−2 = (α−2δ, α−δ], I2α
δ
−1 = (α−δ,∞).
For each sample they remember the index of the bin the sample was mapped to, i.e.
the outcome range is χ =
{
0, 1, . . . , 2α
δ
− 1} with |χ| = 2α
δ
.
Parameter Estimation For parameter estimation Alice and Bob choose randomly
a common subset of length k from the sifted and binned data which they reveal. The
parameter estimation test is performed by calculating the (generalized) Hamming
distance
dpe(X
pe
A , X
pe
B ) =
1
k
k∑
µ=1
|(XpeA )µ − (XpeB )µ| , (5.43)
where XpeA and X
pe
B are the revealed binned sample strings from Alice and Bob, re-
spectively.
Error Correction By performing error correction Bob corrects his binned data to
match Alice’s. During the run of the algorithm they track the number of communicated
bits. Reverse reconciliation is currently not supported by the security proof of the
protocol [Fur12b]. After error correction the correctness is determined as in the generic
protocol.
Estimation of the Key Length With the number of bits communicated during
error correction Alice and Bob can calculate the number of secret bits.
Privacy Amplification Using almost two-universal hash functions Alice and Bob
reduce their raw keys to the length calculated in the last step. This procedure provides
Alice and Bob a secret key which is unknown to the eavesdropper.
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5.5.2 Secure Key Length
We recall the secure key length for the generic protocol from Eq. (5.22) which reads
` ≤ Hmin(XA|E)− `EC − log2
1
421c
. (5.44)
Since we do not restrict the eavesdropper to a certain class of attacks, we cannot, for
instance, use the asymptotic equipartition theorem as it was possible for the restriction
to collective attacks. While the smooth min-entropy cannot be calculated for impure
two-mode squeezed states, it can be estimated using the entropic uncertainty relation
from Eq. (5.17). Its application yields [Fur12a]
` ≤ n · log2
1
c(δ)
−H′max(XA|XB)− `EC − log2
1
421c
, (5.45)
where we have used that the overlap of a sequence of n measurements is cn. The
overlap c(δ) is thereby given by
c(δ) =
δ2
2pi
S
(1)
0
(
1,
δ2
4
)2
, (5.46)
where S
(1)
0 is the radial prolate spheroidal wave function of the first kind. For small δ
it can be approximated by S
(1)
0
(
1, δ
2
4
)
≈ 1.
The remaining smooth max-entropy can be estimated by
H
′
max(XA|XB) ≤ n log2 γ(dpe + µ) , (5.47)
where
γ(t) = (t+
√
1 + t2)
(
t√
1 + t2 − 1
)t
(5.48)
and
µ =
2α
δ
√
N(k + 1)
nk2
ln
1
s − 1 − 2
√
2g(pαX , p
α
P , N)
. (5.49)
Remember, that N is the number of samples left after sifting, k is the number of
samples used for parameter estimation and n = N − k. g(pαX , pαP , N) is the pass
probability, i.e. the probability that no sample in the amplitude and phase quadrature
is outside of [−α, α]. Thereby, pαX and pαP are the probabilities that the modulus of a
single sample measured in the amplitude and phase quadrature, respectively, does not
exceed α. Thus,
g(pαX , p
α
P , N) = 1− (pαXpαP )
N
2 . (5.50)
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CHAPTER6
Realization of Quantum Key
Distribution under Collective Attacks
Overview
This chapter describes the realization of a table-top continuous-variable QKD system
under collective attacks using the EPR entangled states characterized in Chapter 4.
Collective attacks are a certain type of attacks that are, although a restriction to
an eavesdropper, experimentally difficult to implement. For a collective attack the
eavesdropper has a quantum memory and measures all his states collectively using
the same operation. The employed protocol for collective attacks was introduced in
Chapter 5 and takes the finite key size into account.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.1 presents simulation results of the se-
cure key rate for EPR entangled states generated by superimposing a squeezed vacuum
mode with a vacuum mode. The generation and characterization of such entangled
states is described in Chapter 4.4. By omitting samples measured in the anti-squeezed
quadrature, which are less correlated than samples measured in the squeezed quadra-
ture, reasonable distances between Alice and Bob can be achieved when sending one
of the entangled modes through an optical fiber. While the necessary resources to
generate entanglement are reduced to a minimum by using such states, EPR entan-
gled states generated by superimposing two squeezed vacuum states, cf. Chapter 4.5,
provide better key rates. Simulations for such states are shown in Section 6.2. The
experimental implementation of a setup which is able to perform many measurements
that are randomly chosen between the amplitude and phase quadrature, is presented
in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 describes the generation of quantum random numbers by
measuring the field quadratures of a vacuum state. The random numbers were uti-
lized for the random choice of quadratures by Alice and Bob. Section 6.5 describes
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the results of the performed table-top QKD. The first part of this section is devoted to
the verification of some of the simulation results, while the second part describes the
generation of a secret key using a post selection technique, cf. Chapter 5. Section 6.6
proposes an experimental setup of a synchronized remote detector which can be used
to place Bob at another location. Expected secure key rates for a distribution of a se-
cret key between the Institute for Gravitational Physics and the Institute of Quantum
Optics in Hanover, are presented. Section 6.7 summarizes the results.
6.1 Secure Key Rates for Entanglement Using a
Single Squeezed Vacuum Resource
In this section the secure key rate is investigated that can be obtained when performing
the protocol described in Chapter 5.4 using entanglement generated by superimposing
a squeezed vacuum mode with a vacuum mode at a balanced beam splitter. The
experimental setup used to generate such entangled states is described in Chapter 4.4.
The starting point for the investigation is the reconstructed covariance matrix of the
measured states given in Eq. (4.10).
Figure 6.1 shows the key rate given in secure bits normalized to the number of
measured samples versus the number of measured samples. Only samples from the X
quadrature were taken into account for raw key generation (pX = 1). The security
parameters were chosen to be c = s = pe = 10
−16 and α was chosen as 8 times the
standard deviation of theX quadrature sample distribution, cf. Chapter 5.4. The num-
ber of samples k revealed for parameter estimation was optimized to yield a maximal
number of secure bits in the key. To improve the parameter estimation we assumed the
diagonal entries of the covariance matrix to be computed from all measured samples
in the respective quadratures and the covariances to be computed from the omitted
samples or from the k revealed samples, respectively. The error correction efficiency
was assumed to be β = 0.9. The different curves in the figure are plotted for a different
number of intervals 2nbits , yielding interval lengths of δ = 2α/2nbits . From the figure
we read that the maximal key rate is achieved with nbits ≥ 6. For 109 samples the key
rate is about 0.16 bits/sample and even for 108 samples it is not much less with about
0.13 bits/sample.
Figure 6.2 shows the same simulations as Fig. 6.1 but this time with the X quadra-
ture measurements omitted (pX = 0). Due to the lower correlations in the P quadra-
ture the key rate drops below 0.08 bits/sample, reaching its maximum for nbits ≥ 8.
The number of samples necessary to reach a positive key rate is about the same as
when omitting the P quadrature samples.
As the key rates for both quadratures alone are positive, a key can, in principle, be
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Figure 6.1: Secure key rate in secure bits per measured sample versus the number of
measured samples. Here, only X quadrature measurements are included, i.e. pX = 1. The
number of samples k used for parameter estimation was optimized for each curve and each
number of measured samples to yield a maximal number of secure bits.
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Figure 6.2: Secure key rate in secure bits per measured sample versus the number of
measured samples. Here, only P quadrature measurements are included, i.e. pX = 0. The
number of samples k used for parameter estimation was optimized for each curve and each
number of measured samples to yield a maximal number of secure bits.
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Figure 6.3: Number of secure bits per measured sample versus the number of measured
samples. Here, both X and P quadrature measurements are included, i.e. pX = 0.5. nbits = 6
for the X quadrature and nbits = 8 for the P quadrature. The number of samples k used for
parameter estimation was optimized for the black solid curve to yield a maximal number of
secure bits. The other curves are plotted with a fixed k.
generated from the X and P quadrature samples independently by first considering
only samples from the X quadrature and then considering only samples from the
P quadrature. The security analysis above allows us to simplify this process and
to generate a key from both quadratures simultaneously. For this purpose we set
pX = 0.5. The key rate for this situation is shown in Fig. 6.3 with nbits = 6 for the X
quadrature and nbits = 8 for the P quadrature as determined from the previous two
figures. The black curve in the figure shows the key rate with an optimized number
of samples k used for parameter estimation. To see the effect of k also curves with a
fixed number of k = 106, 107 and 108 are plotted. As the number of secure bits per
sample with about 0.20 bits/sample at 109 samples is larger than when omitting the
P quadrature samples, it is advantageous to draw a key from both quadratures in a
table-top setup.
Figure 6.4 shows the key rate for nbits = 6 versus the distance between Alice and
Bob when both parties are connected with an optical standard telecommunication
fiber with an attenuation of 0.2 dB/km. For the calculation we assumed that the
entanglement source is located at Alice’s site and that the eavesdropper only has
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Figure 6.4: Secure key rate versus distance when sending one part of the entangled beam
through an optical fiber. The key rate is given as the number of secure bits per measured
sample, i.e. before sifting. We assumed a coupling efficiency of 95 % into the optical fiber
and an optical loss of 0.2 dB/km. The curves are plotted for different number of measured
samples.
access to the subsystem which is transmitted to Bob through the fiber and is therefore
affected by optical loss of the transmission line. In addition to the optical attenuation
of the fiber we assumed a coupling efficiency of the free beam to the fiber of 95 % as
measured in [Meh10]. According to [Lod05], who considered a similar system, no excess
noise is introduced by the fiber. Excess noise introduced by the homodyne detector’s
electronic dark noise instead is already included in the covariance matrix given in
Eq. (4.10). Furthermore, we assumed that phase noise is not present in the setup
as the local oscillator for homodyne detection could be served by an auxiliary laser
at Bob’s site which is phase locked to the control beam accompanying the entangled
mode. Besides using reverse information reconciliation, all samples measured in the
P quadrature were omitted (pX = 1). Taking into account only samples from the P
quadrature would yield a maximum transmission line length for an infinite number
of measurements of 3 km and taking into account both would yield about 9 km in
comparison to about 37.5 km when only samples from the squeezed quadrature are
considered. The curves in the figure are calculated for different numbers of measured
samples, including a curve calculated for an infinite number of samples, which is
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shown for reference, and which was also calculated with the assumption of 90 % error
correction efficiency. For 108 number of samples the maximal possible transmission
line has a length of about 9 km and for 109 samples the transmission line can have
a length of up to 17.5 km. As shown in [Jou13] the measurement of 109 samples is
challenging but experimentally feasible.
So far we assumed pe = 10
−16. Figure 6.5 shows the dependence of the key rate,
and thus the maximal length of the transmission line, on pe for a number of measured
samples of 2N = 108 and 109. The key rate for an infinite number of measurements
is shown for reference. For 109 samples the maximal length of the transmission line
increases from about 17.5 km for pe = 10
−16 to about 19 km for pe = 10−10. The
figure also shows that the key rate for a fiber link of about 5 km length does not
depend significantly on pe for 10
9 samples.
Figure 6.6 shows the secure key rate for an infinite number of samples for different
error correction efficiencies β. As it is clearly visible in the figure the error correction
efficiency becomes more crucial for increasing length of the transmission line between
Alice and Bob. While for short transmission lines the achievable key rate only drops
by no more than 50 %, for long transmission lines the maximal achievable distance
ranges from about 25 km for 70 % error correction efficiency to about 41.5 km for
95 % efficiency. Nowadays the best available binary codes have an error correction
efficiency of up to 95 % [Jou11, Jou13]. Non-binary codes [Dav98], as used here for the
calculation of the key rate, are also under active development [Ulr57, Sas10, And12].
Note, that the achievable efficiency of error correction codes is crucially dependent on
the signal-to-noise ratio and therefore the code that works best for each distance has
to be found. Note further, that the given key rates in the figure are for an infinite
number of samples. The effect of the finite number of the measured samples on the
key rate was shown above for an error correction efficiency of 90 %.
We have seen that entanglement-based quantum key distribution under the restric-
tion of the eavesdropper to collective attacks is possible within a reasonable distance
between Alice and Bob and for a reasonable number of measurements that have to
be performed, despite the fact that a vacuum mode was involved in the entanglement
generation process. In comparison to the full scheme involving two squeezed modes
which will be analysed in the next Section, the scheme investigated here, reduces the
complexity of the source as no phase lock at the beam splitter that generates the
entanglement, is necessary. To address the fact that we have to omit the samples
measured in the P quadrature, one could tune the probability with which Alice and
Bob measure X or P to have only as much samples measured in the P quadrature as
are needed to have a reasonably small confidence set. With more samples measured
in the X quadrature the overall key length increases for the same number of total
measurements.
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Figure 6.5: Secure key rate versus distance like in Fig. 6.4, but for different parameter
estimation parameters pe. The array of curves are plotted for a total number of measured
samples of 108 and 109. For reference the key rate is also plotted for an infinite number of
samples.
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
 0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45  50
S
ec
ur
e 
B
its
/S
am
pl
e
Distance [km]
β = 0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1.0
Figure 6.6: Secure key rate versus distance between Alice and Bob for an infinite number
of samples for different assumed error correction efficiencies.
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6.2 Secure Key Rates for Entanglement Using Two
Squeezed Vacuum Resources
In comparison to entanglement generated by superimposing a squeezed vacuum mode
with a vacuum mode, entanglement generated by two squeezed vacuum modes is
much stronger according to entanglement measures such as the Duan inseparability
criterion or the EPR-Reid entanglement criterion, cf. Chapter 2.11. In this section
the secure key rate for such states is investigated. The experimental setup and a
characterization of the entanglement is given in Chapter 4.5. The starting point for
the following analysis is the reconstructed covariance matrix of the measured states
given in Eq. (4.11). It was shown that in a table-top setup the key rates are about 3
times larger for 109 samples than with entanglement generated from a single squeezed
vacuum resource. Furthermore, the achievable distance for 109 samples is about 1.5
times larger for 90 % error correction efficiency. However, for small error correction
efficiencies the achievable distances are smaller and it is beneficial to use only a single
squeezed vacuum resource.
The analysis is started by assuming a table-top setting for which the secure key rate
is investigated which can be achieved by the states from Chapter 4.5. The security
parameters were chosen as c = s = pe = 10
−16 if not stated otherwise. α was
chosen 8 times the standard deviation of the respective quadrature sample distribution.
For parameter estimation we used the same procedure as in Section 6.1. The error
correction efficiency was assumed to be β = 0.9.
Figure 6.7 shows the secure key rate, i.e. the number of secure bits per measurement
(before sifting), which can be extracted when the P quadrature measurements were
discarded (pX = 1). The different curves in the figure are plotted for different number
of intervals 2nbits . From the figure we read that at least nbits = 8 are needed to
extract the most bits. While for a total of 108 samples about 0.19 bits/sample can be
extracted, about 0.29 bits/sample can be extracted for 109 samples.
The secure key rate which can be achieved when the samples measured in the X
quadrature are discarded instead, is shown in Fig. 6.8. The curves in the figure look
quite similar to the ones in Fig. 6.7 as the state is almost symmetric. The number of
samples needed to reach a positive key rate is a little smaller than when discarding sam-
ples from the X quadrature. Also the number of extractable bits per sample is higher.
This is due to the state’s better correlations in the P than in the X quadrature. For
108 samples 0.28 bits/sample can be extracted and for 109 samples 0.37 bits/sample.
To increase the number of secure bits per sample a key can be extracted from
both quadratures. Figure 6.9 shows this situation for nbits = 8 for both quadratures.
The green solid line shows the key rate with an optimized number of samples k for
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Figure 6.7: Secure key rate versus the number of measured samples. Here, only X quadra-
ture measurements were included, i.e. pX = 1. The number of samples k used for parameter
estimation were optimized to yield a maximal key rate.
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Figure 6.8: Secure key rate versus the number of measured samples. Here, only P quadra-
ture measurements were included, i.e. pX = 0. The number of samples k used for parameter
estimation were optimized to yield a maximal key rate.
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Figure 6.9: Secure key rate versus the number of measured samples. Here, both X and P
quadrature measurements were included, i.e. pX ≈ 0.5. For the green solid line the number
of samples k used for parameter estimation was optimized to yield a maximal key rate. For
comparison the key rates for k=106, 107 and 108 are shown.
parameter estimation. To make the effect of k on the key rate visible curves for
k = 106, 107 and 108 are also shown. For 108 samples a maximum of 0.35 bits/sample
can be extracted. Here, the blue solid line shows that the optimal k is about 107. In
comparison, for 109 samples 0.57 secret bits/sample are possible to extract. Compared
to the key rates when omitting samples measured either in the X quadrature or in the
P quadrature, the secret bits per sample are not twice as large. This penalty is due to
the larger confidence set, cf. Chapter 5.4.3, for keys extracted from both quadrature
settings since Cov(XˆA, XˆB) and Cov(PˆA, PˆB) have to be estimated from only about
k
2
samples each. If omitting the samples from one of the quadratures, the respective
covariance can be estimated with about N
2
samples instead.
Figure 6.10 shows the secure key rate versus the distance between Alice and Bob
when sending Bob’s part of the state through an optical standard telecommunication
fiber. For the calculation an optical coupling efficiency of the free-space mode into the
optical fiber of 95 % and an optical loss of 0.2 dB/km was assumed, cf. Section 6.1.
Figure 6.10a shows the number of secure bits when only samples from theX quadrature
were taken into account, while for Fig. 6.10b only samples from the P quadrature
were used. The different curves in the figures were plotted for a different number of
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(a) For the simulation only samples measured in the X quadrature were taken into ac-
count, i.e. pX = 1.
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(b) For the simulation only samples measured in the P quadrature were taken into account,
i.e. pX = 0.
Figure 6.10: Secure bits per measured sample versus distance when sending one part of the
entangled beams through an optical fiber. We assumed a coupling efficiency of 95 % into the
optical fiber and an optical loss of 0.2 dB/km. The curves are plotted for different number
of measured samples.
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Figure 6.11: Secure bits per measured sample versus the distance between Alice and Bob
when sending one part of the entangled beams through an optical fiber. We assumed a
coupling efficiency of 95 % into the optical fiber and an optical loss of 0.2 dB/km. For each
distance and each curve the number of samples k used for parameter estimation was opti-
mized to achieve the largest number of secure bits. The curves are plotted for different total
number of measured samples. Samples from both quadratures were used in the simulation
to generate a key.
total samples. To maximize the number of secret bits the number of samples used
for parameter estimation was optimized for each distance and each number of total
samples. For comparison the number of secure bits for an infinite number of samples
is shown. Here, the error correction efficiency was also assumed to be 90 %. The
difference in the achievable distance between both figures are due to the different
squeezing in both quadratures. For 108 samples a distance of about 16.5 km can be
achieved, while for 109 samples the transmission line length can be up to about 28 km.
The same calculation is shown in Fig. 6.11 for a key generated from both quadratures.
While the achievable distances are about the same, the number of secure bits per
sample are larger as more samples exist from which a key can be generated. Hence, it
is preferable to generate a key from both quadratures.
The dependence of the secure key rate and the achievable distance on the parameter
estimation security parameter pe is shown in Fig. 6.12 for a total number of samples
of 108 and 109. While for short distances the number of secure bits is only slightly
increased with a larger security parameter the achievable distance increases for about
96
6.3 Implementation of Random Amplitude and Phase Quadrature Measurements
2 km for both 108 and 109 samples when relaxing pe to 10
−10.
Figure 6.13 shows the effect of the error correction efficiency β on the achievable
distance. For the calculation an infinite number of samples was assumed as this gives
an upper limit to the achievable distance. When assuming a finite number of samples,
the distances reduce as shown above. The effect of the error correction efficiency is
severe as for 70 % a distance of only about 10 km is reached. For 90 % efficiency which
was assumed for the simulations above, about 40 km are possible. The best available
codes for a binary alphabet have 95 % efficiency [Jou13]. If such an algorithm would
be available for a non-binary alphabet as used in our protocol, up to 67 km would be
possible. With a perfect error correction, even a distance of 177 km could be bridged.
To briefly summarize Section 6.1 and Section 6.2, entanglement generated by two
squeezed vacuum resources performs better in terms of key rate and communication
distance than entanglement generated by a single squeezed vacuum resource with
a realistic number of samples in the order of 108 and 109 for high error correction
efficiencies. For low error correction efficiencies, however, larger communication dis-
tances between Alice and Bob can be achieved with entanglement generated by a single
squeezed vacuum resource. Since the achievable key rate and also the achievable dis-
tance between Alice and Bob depend strongly on the error correction efficiency, large
effort has to be put into these algorithms.
6.3 Implementation of Random Amplitude and
Phase Quadrature Measurements
To implement the quantum key distribution protocol for collective or general attacks,
Alice and Bob have to choose randomly the quadrature in which they measure a
sample. The security proof requires that the quadratures are identically and indepen-
dently distributed (i.i.d.). This is accomplished by using a quantum random number
generator, which is described in Section 6.4. This section describes the experimen-
tal implementation of the switching process of the local oscillator used for homodyne
detection. The presented scheme was developed in the framework of this thesis.
Figure 6.14 shows the experimental setup of the homodyne detection process that
allows to measure the amplitude and phase quadratures randomly with a rate much
higher than the usual unity gain frequencies of about 1 kHz of phase locks with piezo
mounted mirrors used as actuators. The local oscillator was phase locked to the signal
by employing the locking scheme described in Chapter 4.5 using a low frequency
actuator. The output of the servo controller was lowpass filtered by an analog filter
with a cutoff frequency of about 100 kHz with a sufficiently high order. We applied
phase shifts of 0 or pi
2
to a fast fiber-coupled electro-optical phase modulator to measure
97
Chapter 6: Realization of Quantum Key Distribution under Collective Attacks
 0.0001
 0.001
 0.01
 0.1
 1
 0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45
S
ec
ur
e 
B
its
/S
am
pl
e
Distance [km]
2N
=1
08
2N
=1
09
in
fin
ite
εpe=10-16
10-14
10-12
10-10
Figure 6.12: Secure bits per measured sample versus distance in dependence of the param-
eter estimation security parameter pe.
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Figure 6.13: Effect of the error correction efficiency β on the achievable distance. The key
rates are calculated for an infinite number of samples.
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Figure 6.14: Experimental setup for a fast random choice of measuring amplitude or phase
quadrature. A piezo driven mirror is used to phase lock the local oscillator to the signal.
The servo controller for this lock has a high order lowpass filter to average over the actual
phase of the local oscillator which is driven to 0 or pi2 by a fiber-coupled electro-optical phase
modulator (EOM) using a digital pattern generator PCI Express card with programmable
high voltage level.
either the amplitude or phase quadrature. The fiber-coupled phase modulator had a
half-wave voltage of about 3.5 V and was connected to a digital pattern generator PCI
Express card, which had a programmable voltage for the high level. If the rate of
switching between amplitude and phase quadrature is high enough, the phase lock’s
servo controller averages over the phase of the local oscillator. If the average is stable
over time the local oscillator can be locked to measure exactly the amplitude and
phase quadrature. Here it is important that the local oscillator phase lock can be set
to arbitrary values as the average is somewhere between both quadratures.
In practice, measuring the amplitude and phase quadrature randomly, usually yields
an unstable average over time as long sequences of, for instance, the amplitude quadra-
ture are not unlikely. To circumvent this problem we used a scheme shown in Fig. 6.15.
For both Alice and Bob, a possible choice of quadratures is plotted versus time. For
each quadrature choice phase shifts are applied to the fiber-coupled phase modulator.
For a choice of an amplitude quadrature measurement (X), we first apply a phase
shift to the local oscillator of pi
2
which is followed by a phase shift of 0 with respect
to the signal beam. For a choice of a phase quadrature measurement (P ) instead, a
phase shift of 0 is followed by a phase shift of pi
2
. This scheme allows the average over
the local oscillator’s phase to be constant in time as it can only happen that the local
oscillator has the same phase for the time of a whole interval. This can be seen in the
figure when for instance Alice chooses to measure first X and then P . If she chooses
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Figure 6.15: Measurement process with random quadrature choice. For an X quadrature
choice a phase shift of the local oscillator by pi2 , followed by a phase shift of 0, is applied.
For a P quadrature choice instead a phase shift of 0 is followed by a phase shift of pi2 . A
measurement of length ∆t is performed synchronously in the second half of the interval.
Using this scheme the mean phase of the local oscillator is independent of the quadrature
choices.
to measure X twice instead, the phase of the local oscillator switches between X and
P after half an interval.
While in this thesis the probabilities of measuring X or P were always 50 %, the
presented scheme provides the possibility to use unequal probabilities without any
modification.
Both parties agree on synchronous measurements in the second half of the interval.
In particular they wait some time between the step of the phase of the local oscillator
and the start of the measurement as the classical control signals at DC and at the
single sideband frequencies give rise to overshoot and ringing in the homodyne detec-
tor’s output. To not saturate the front-end of the analog-to-digital converter card we
implemented a sample-and-hold circuit that holds the homodyne detector’s output at
a constant level during a certain time interval around phase changes. The implemen-
tation of the homodyne detector’s electronics including a sample-and-hold circuit can
be found in the Appendix, Fig. A.2.
To record both homodyne detectors’ output signals simultaneously, we used a PCI
Express card, Signatec PX14400A, with a fast analog-to-digital converter with two
channels. For this purpose the outputs of the homodyne detectors were anti-alias
filtered with a 4th-order Butterworth filter with a cutoff frequency of 50 MHz. The
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Figure 6.16: QQ-plot of a homodyne measurement of a vacuum state and a thermal state
with Alice’s homodyne detector to test the Gaussianity of the measurement outcomes. The
thermal state was part of an entangled state. For the thermal state the measured quadra-
tures where chosen at random and samples measured in the P quadrature were omitted.
The quadrature variances of both states were normalized to 1. The figures show that the
implemented scheme with a randomly chosen quadrature for each measured sample does not
change the Gaussian distribution of the measurement outcomes. Thus, no significant phase
noise was introduced.
recording was triggered by an output signal of the pattern generator which also drove
the fiber-coupled phase modulators. 256 samples were recorded with a sampling fre-
quency of 256 MHz at each trigger event, yielding a measurement time of 1µs. The
repetition rate of the trigger events was 100 kHz. For each channel the samples were
digitally mixed at 8 MHz, lowpass filtered with a 200-tap FIR filter with 200 kHz cutoff
frequency and down sampled by taking only the 200th sample.
To check whether the fast switching process between the quadratures caused any un-
desired non-Gaussian effects in the homodyne detector’s output signal, we determined
the Gaussianity of the measured samples. For reference we blocked the input port of
Alice’s homodyne detector and recorded 105 samples of a vacuum state measurement.
The Gaussianity was checked with a QQ-plot which is shown in Fig. 6.16a. A QQ-
plot compares the quantiles of the measured samples to the theoretical quantiles of a
Gaussian distribution. Samples drawn from a Gaussian distribution therefore follow a
straight line in the QQ-plot. More details about checking the Gaussianity of samples
can be found in [Sam12]. Figure 6.16b shows a QQ-plot for 105 measured samples
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Figure 6.17: Autocorrelation function of 105 samples measured with blocked signal port
of Alice’s homodyne detector. The inset represents a zoom into the first 40 data points.
The autocorrelation function shows that the measurement process does not introduce any
correlations between subsequent samples.
from a thermal state in the X quadrature. Here, the measured quadrature was chosen
at random as described above and measurements performed in the P quadrature were
omitted. For comparison we normalized the thermal state’s X quadrature variance to
1. The QQ-plot does not show a significant deviation from a straight line for both
the vacuum and the thermal state. Hence, the switching process does not introduce
non-Gaussian effects which cannot be described by the first two statistical moments.
QQ-plots of the P quadrature data and also of Bob’s homodyne measurement look
similar to the ones in Fig. 6.16.
A prerequisite for quantum key distribution is that subsequently measured samples
are independent of each other. This was checked by calculating the autocorrelation
function of the samples recorded when measuring a vacuum state. Figure 6.17 shows
the autocorrelation of 105 samples measured with Alice’s homodyne detector with
blocked signal port. The measurement was performed and timed as described above.
As it is clearly visible from the inset which shows a zoom into a lag between 0 and 40,
subsequent samples were independent of each other. This shows that the measurement
apparatus does not introduce correlations.
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6.4 Quantum Random Number Generation
Random numbers have a wide range of applications like gambling, simulations and
cryptography. Nowadays mostly pseudo-random numbers (PRNs) are used which
employ deterministic numeric algorithms, called generators, to produce numbers that
appear random to outsiders who do not know the algorithm [Jam90]. The randomness
of random numbers is tested with a large number of complicated statistical tests.
Accepted test suites are TestU01 [Lec07], NIST [Ruk01] and dieharder [Bro12]. Even
though PRNs are easy to calculate, generators with good statistical properties are
hard to find [Hel98].
In this thesis random numbers are utilized in the quantum cryptography exper-
iment by Alice and Bob independently to determine the quadrature, amplitude or
phase, they measure. Pseudo-random numbers, even those produced by good gen-
erators, weaken the protocol as an adversary knows, by definition, which generators
were used and therefore only has to find out the so-called seed, the start value for
the deterministic numeric algorithm. Hence, the number of bits the adversary needs
knowledge about to gain information about the measured quadratures is rather lim-
ited. Therefore, we used a quantum random number generator (QRNG) to generate
these random numbers. QRNGs, also called truly random number generators, rely on
random physical processes making the generated numbers random and unpredictable.
Perfectly suitable for this task are quantum mechanical systems as measurement out-
comes of non-eigenstates of the measurement observable are postulated to be truly
random and unpredictable. While quantum mechanics ensures the randomness of the
measurement results, the measured quantum states have to be carefully chosen as
they also need to be uncorrelated with some adversary. For example using one part
of a bipartite entangled state yields random results, but as long as the adversary has
access to the other subsystem the random numbers are no longer unique. Hence, the
quantum state, which the random number generator processes, has to be pure (which
is indeed not the case for a subsystem of a bipartite entangled state). In this thesis
we used field quadrature measurements on a vacuum state. Such a QRNG was first
implemented by [Gab10] and [Sym11]. Quantum random number generators exhibit-
ing also the randomness feature of quantum mechanics, but using different quantum
systems are for example [Jen00, Ste00, Dyn08, Bro09, Fue10, Wah11, Xu12].
The following protocol to generate random numbers from field quadrature measure-
ments on a vacuum state relies on the protocol published by Gabriel et al., in [Gab10].
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Figure 6.18: Experimental setup for quantum random number generation by exploiting
the randomness of quadrature field measurements on a vacuum state. The laser’s output
was attenuated by a variable beam splitter and used as local oscillator beam for homodyne
detection of a vacuum mode. To make sure that really a vacuum mode was measured, the
signal port of the homodyne detector was blocked with a beam dump. PBS: Polarizing Beam
Splitter, PD: Photo Diode.
6.4.1 Experimental Setup
The experimental setup is shown in Fig. 6.18. We used a homodyne detector, as
described in Chapter 3.4, to measure a field quadrature of a vacuum state. The
homodyne detector’s local oscillator was served by an NP Photonics, Inc., fiber laser
at 1550 nm with an output power of about 25 mW which was reduced to about 6 mW
by a combination of a half-waveplate and a polarizing beam splitter. The beam was
split at a 50 : 50 beam splitter and detected by two FCI-InGaAs-300 photo diodes.
To ensure measurements on a vacuum state and to prevent a possible adversary from
injecting an entangled state, the signal port was blocked. The photo current of the two
photo diodes was subtracted and converted to a voltage by a transimpedance amplifier.
The output of the homodyne detector electronics was anti-alias filtered by a 50 MHz
forth-order Butterworth filter and sampled with a sampling frequency of 256 MHz by
a Signatec PX14400A data acquisition card. The sampled data was digitally highpass
filtered to remove the DC offset, mixed with a sinusoidal at 8 MHz, lowpass filtered
at 5 MHz with a 200-tap FIR filter and downsampled to 2 MHz. This undersampling
removed all correlations between the samples introduced by the lowpass filtering after
the mixing process, cf. Chapter 3.7. The output of this postprocessing procedure is the
raw data for the random number generation. It shows a white power spectral density
and an autocorrelation indicating that the samples are independent, as depicted in
Fig. 6.19. The electronic dark noise clearance was measured to be about 18 dB.
The whole setup was placed on a portable 30 × 30 cm2 breadboard to allow for
transportation to future experiments which need quantum random numbers. The
breadboard features a fiber coupler for the input beam. Hence, the laser serving the
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Figure 6.19: Linear spectral density and autocorrelation of a quadrature measurement of a
vacuum state. The inset in the right figure shows a zoom into the first 20 data points. The
linear spectral density shows a white spectrum and the autocorrelation that the measured
samples were uncorrelated.
local oscillator is not part of the breadboard and can be replaced easily.
6.4.2 Random Number Generation
The measurement of the vacuum fluctuations is distorted by the electronic dark noise of
the measurement device, the homodyne detector electronics. Since we want to extract
the inherent randomness of the vacuum state measurement and not the randomness of
the electronic dark noise, the amount of information which can be extracted is given
by
Sextractable = S(Xvac)− S(Xdark noise) , (6.1)
where S is the Shannon entropy and X describes the classical distribution of the
measurement outcomes of the field quadratures of the vacuum state, Xvac, and the
electronic dark noise, Xdark noise, respectively. For this purpose we divide the mea-
surement outcomes of the homodyne detection of the vacuum state into N distinct
intervals with same probability p. S(Xvac) is then given by
S(Xvac) = −
N∑
k=1
p log p = logN , (6.2)
where the logarithm is taken to basis 2, and where we used the fact that N · p = 1.
The Shannon entropy of the electronic dark noise is calculated by
S(Xdark noise) = −
N∑
k=1
pk log pk , (6.3)
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where pk is the probability of an electronic dark noise measurement outcome to be
within the kth interval. Assuming the electronic dark noise to follow a Gaussian
distribution, pk can be calculated by
pk =
∫ xk+1
xk
dx
1√
2piσ2
exp
(
− x
2
2σ2
)
(6.4)
=
1
2
(
erf
(
xk+1√
2σ2
)
− erf
(
xk√
2σ2
))
, (6.5)
where σ2 is the variance of the electronic dark noise normalized to the variance of
the vacuum and erf is the error function. xk and xk+1 are the boundaries of the kth
interval which can be derived iteratively, starting with x1 = −∞, by evaluating
xk+1 =
√
2 erf−1
(
2
N
+ erf(xk/
√
2)
)
. (6.6)
Here, the variance of the vacuum is assumed to be 1.
Taking the number of intervals N as a power of 2, each interval can be assigned a
unique bit combination of n bits, where there is no bit combination belonging to no
interval. The Shannon entropy of the vacuum is then given by S(Xvac) = logN =
n. Figure 6.20 shows the extractable amount of information Sextractable given in bits
versus the number of bits n for an electronic dark noise clearance of 18 dB, i.e. σ2 =
10−18 dB/10. From the figure we deduce an optimal n of 5 bits, yielding Sextractable =
2.51 bits.
Assigning each measurement outcome a bit combination of n bits yields a string of
raw random numbers. To remove the residual information from the electronic dark
noise, we use randomness extraction by hash functions [Sti02, Tom11]. A hash function
is a mathematical one-way function projecting an arbitrary number of bits to a fixed
number of bits, called the message digest, in such a way that small changes in the
input string changes the output string dramatically. In our particular implementation
we use SHA512 [RFC11] which was developed by the National Security Agency (NSA)
and published in 2001 by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
The message digest of SHA512 has a size of 512 bits. Hence, to reduce 5 bits to 2.51 bits
we put several measurements into a single bit string of (5/2.51) ·512 bits length which
was reduced to 512 bits by a single run of SHA512.
While in principle the speed of the random number generation would be about
5 MBit/s, limited by the bandwidth of the homodyne detector, our setup is limited
by the speed of the post processing. Indeed our setup reached about 1.5 MBit/s.
Implementing the post processing, in particular the mixing and down sampling process,
using a field programmable gate array (FPGA) this can easily be improved.
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Figure 6.20: Extractable information in bits given by the Shannon entropy Sextractable
versus the number of bits n assigned to a measured sample.
6.4.3 Statistical Tests of the Generated Random Numbers
We tested our quantum random numbers with three different statistical test suites.
The results of the Crush battery of the TestU01 test suite are shown in Tab. 6.1. Since
most tests were run many times with different parameter sets, the results are given as
the number of test runs passed per the number of total test runs.
The test results of the NIST test suite are summarized in Tab. 6.2. Here also most
tests were run with different parameter sets. Each statistical test was run 1000 times
and is indicated as passed if the minimum pass rate was reached. More detailed results
can be found in Appendix B.
Table 6.3 shows the summarized results of the dieharder test suite. Detailed results
can be found in Appendix B.
To summarize, all tests of all test suites were passed, indicating that the generated
random numbers were really random.
Test Result Test Result
Serial Over 2/2 Collision Over 8/8
Birthday Spacings 7/7 Close Pairs 3/3
Close Pairs Bit Match 2/2 Simp Poker 4/4
Coupon Collector 4/4 Gap 4/4
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Run 2/2 Permutation 2/2
Collision Permut 2/2 Max Oft 4/4
Sample Prod 2/2 Sample Mean 1/1
Sample Corr 1/1 Appearance Spacings 2/2
Weight Distrib 4/4 Sum Collector 1/1
Matrix Rank 6/6 Savir 2 1/1
GCD 2/2 Random Walk 1 6/6
Linear Comp 2/2 Lempel Ziv 1/1
Fourier 3 2/2 Longest Head Run 2/2
Periods in Strings 2/2 Hamming Weight 2 2/2
Hamming Corr 3/3 Hamming Indep 6/6
Run 2/2 Auto Cor 4/4
Table 6.1: Results of the TestU01 Crush test suite.
Test Passed Test Passed
Frequency 1/1 Block Frequency 1/1
Cumulative Sums 2/2 Runs 1/1
Longest Run 1/1 Rank 1/1
FFT 1/1 Non Overlapping Template 148/148
Overlapping Template 1/1 Universal 1/1
Approximate Entropy 1/1 Random Excursions 8/8
Random Excursion Variants 18/18 Serial 2/2
Linear Complexity 1/1
Table 6.2: Summarized test results of the NIST test suite.
Test Passed Test Passed
diehard birthdays 1/1 diehard operm5 1/1
diehard rank 32x32 1/1 diehard rank 6x8 1/1
diehard bitstream 1/1 diehard opso 1/1
diehard oqso 1/1 diehard dna 1/1
diehard count 1s str 1/1 diehard count 1s byt 1/1
diehard parking lot 1/1 diehard 2dsphere 1/1
diehard 3dsphere 1/1 diehard squeeze 1/1
diehard sums 1/1 diehard runs 2/2
diehard craps 2/2 marsaglia tsang gcd 2/2
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sts monobit 1/1 sts runs 1/1
sts serial 30/30 rgb bitdist 12/12
rgb minimum distance 4/4 rgb permutations 4/4
rgb lagged sum 32/32 rgb kstest test 1/1
dab bytedistrib 1/1 dab dct 1/1
dab filltree 2/2 dab filltree 2 2/2
dab monobit 2 1/1
Table 6.3: Summarized test results of the Dieharder test suite.
6.5 Experimental Quantum Key Distribution
Results
This section describes the experimental results of the implemented QKD system. In
the first part some of the simulation results from Section 6.5.1 are verified. Since no
non-binary error correction algorithm was available, Section 6.5.2 describes the key
generation using a post selection procedure and a binary error correction algorithm.
6.5.1 Verification of Simulation Results
Using the entangled states generated by superimposing two squeezed vacuum states,
cf. Chapter 4.5, and the random measurement of amplitude and phase quadratures
described in Section 6.3, we recorded 2N = 108 samples. Assuming a non-binary
error correction algorithm with 90 % efficiency, Fig. 6.21 shows the number of secure
bits per sample versus the number of intervals 2nbits when taking samples from both
quadratures to generate a key (pX ≈ 0.5). The two curves are plotted for k = 1× 107
and k = 2 × 107 samples used for parameter estimation, respectively, which were
chosen at random. α was chosen 6 times the standard deviation of the respective
quadrature, which is just above the modulus of the largest measured sample. The
security parameters were chosen c = s = pe = 10
−16. For nbits ≥ 8 the maximal key
rate was achieved. For less than nbits = 5 the key rate was zero and no secure key
could be extracted.
Figure 6.22 shows the secure key rate for nbits = 8 versus the number samples k
used for parameter estimation. For each value of k, k samples were chosen at random
from the total of N ≈ 5×107. The random choice explains the noisy curve which gets
less noisy for larger k. In the range of k = 6 × 106 to k = 107 the maximum number
of secure bits is achieved.
Both nbits = 8 and k = 10
7 are in good agreement with the optimal values obtained
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Figure 6.21: Secure key rate for 2N = 108 measurements for two different number of sam-
ples k used for parameter estimation. For nbits ≥ 8 the number of secure bits is maximized.
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Figure 6.22: Secure key rate versus the number of samples k used for parameter estimation
for nbits = 8.
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from the simulations described in Section 6.2. With this choice the length of the secure
key generated from a total of 108 samples, is 0.355 × 108 bits which is also in good
agreement with the value obtained from Fig. 6.9.
6.5.2 Generation of a Secret Key using Post Selection
With the measured 2N = 108 samples we generated a secure key from both quadratures
using the post selection feature introduced in Chapter 5.4 and a binary error correction
algorithm. To be able to use an error correction algorithm that works on a binary
alphabet instead of a non-binary one as assumed in the simulations, the obtained
bit error rate needs to be reduced. This is accomplished by the post selection. The
protocol parameters we used were α as 6 times the standard deviation of the respective
quadrature, nbits = 6, s = c = 10
−16, pe = 10−10 and k = 107. The non-optimal
choice of nbits was devoted to the fact that with an increasing number of intervals
the number of bit errors after binning increases. However, better error correction
efficiencies are achieved with less errors.
Parameter Estimation From the k revealed samples the covariance matrix of the
state was estimated. It reads
γ =

19.696 (0) −19.678 (0)
(0) 23.311 (0) 23.708
−19.678 (0) 19.817 (0)
(0) 23.708 (0) 24.314
 , (6.7)
where the numbers in parentheses were not determined.
Binning and Post Selection Enumerating the 64 intervals like in the proto-
col description in Section 5.4.1 from the left to the right, we omitted the intervals
27, 29, 31, 33, 35 and 37 by post selecting both Alice’s and Bob’s data. The effect of
the post selection is shown in Fig. 6.23. Figure 6.23a shows a scatter plot of the
amplitude quadrature measurement outcomes of simultaneous measurements at Alice
and Bob. A scatter plot for phase quadrature outcomes at both parties is shown in
Fig. 6.23b. While without post selection a histogram of the measurement outcomes
would follow a Gaussian distribution, the pattern visible in the middle of the plots is
caused by the post selection. The plots indicate not only the width of the remaining
intervals in the middle but also the reduction of the error rate. Note, that because of
the equal width of the intervals most samples belong into the inner intervals.
To obtain a bit representation of the raw key, each interval is assigned a unique
bit combination of 6 bits. Thus, each of the remaining samples after post selection is
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Figure 6.23: Scatter plots of the outcomes of Alice and Bob simultaneously measuring
amplitude or phase quadrature. The figure shows the effect of the post selection procedure.
The interval width can clearly be seen by the five small squares in the middle.
assigned a bit string representing the interval the sample is mapped to. Since the error
correction works best for small bit error rates and a uniform distribution of zeros and
ones, special care has to be taken of the bit assignment to the intervals. For the bit
assignment we used a modification of a common Gray code, where the modification
was developed in collaboration with Jo¨rg Duhme. A Gray code [Gra53] is designed
such that the bit representation of intervals next to each other differ only in one bit.
This design keeps the error rate small as it is quite likely that a measurement outcome
of one of the two parties falls into an adjacent interval of the one the outcome of the
other party has fallen into. A part of a 6 bit Gray code is shown in Fig. 6.24a.
Figure 6.24b shows a part of the modified Gray code we used. The gray shaded
intervals are the intervals that are removed by post selection. The bit representations
of these intervals are not important and thus not shown. The code is designed such
that the bit strings of the intervals that are next to each other without the removed
ones again differ only in one bit. To obtain an as uniform bit distribution as possible,
however, the two most inner intervals are represented by bit strings that are bit flipped.
Even though this two intervals do not have exactly the same probability, the proba-
bilities are similar as the interval width is small. Since at this interval the structure of
the Gray code is broken, the bit error rate increases. However, the uniformity is more
important for a high efficiency error correction algorithm than the error rate. The
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Figure 6.24: Illustration of a Gray code and the modified Gray code we used in our exper-
iment. The gray shaded areas on the right indicate the intervals removed by post selection.
complete modified Gray code used in the experiment can be found in Appendix C.
With the modified Gray code we calculated the bit error rate versus measurement
time which is shown in Fig. 6.25. For this purpose the remaining samples after post
selection and parameter estimation were converted into two bit strings, one belonging
to Alice and one belonging to Bob. The bit error rate was calculated by splitting
Alice’s and Bob’s available bits into chunks of 105 bits and comparing them. The bit
error rate showed only small drifts between 3.75 % and 3.90% during the measurement
time which demonstrates the stability of the system.
Error Correction After raw key generation the unavoidable bit errors have to be
corrected. The error correction algorithm used in this experiment was a low-density-
parity-check (LDPC) code [Gal62]. An introduction to these codes can be found,
for instance, in [Sho03]. The LDPC code we used here was implemented by the
Austrian Institute of Technology (AIT). Since the algorithm worked on a block size
of 256 kBit, the binary raw key was split into 446 blocks. For each block 68,160
parity bits were communicated from Alice to Bob, who corrected his raw key to fit
Alice’s. With a total of 446 processed blocks, 30,399,360 bits ≈ 30 MBit were disclosed.
According to Chapter 5.3.5 the theoretical bound for the number of bits that have to
be communicated to correct the errors, is given by H(XA|XB). For the generated
raw key it is 27,192,821 bits. Hence, the leakage parameter λ is given by ratio of
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Figure 6.25: Bit error rate after post selection versus measurement time.
communicated bits and theoretical bound,
λ =
30,399,360
27,192,821
≈ 1.118 .
This corresponds to an error correction efficiency of β = 96.4 %, which is a remarkably
high efficiency.
In the confirmation Alice and Bob check whether the error correction succeeded.
For this purpose they both hashed their corrected raw key to 53 bits and compared
the outcome. The size of the hash is given by the correctness parameter c = 10
−16
via log2
1
c
. The correctness check was implemented by the software from the AIT.
Calculation of Secure Key Length Using the covariance matrix, which was re-
constructed in the parameter estimation step, and calculating the entropy and max-
entropy of the raw key from the measured samples (which includes the effect of the
post selection), the secure key length was calculated to 42,353,303 bit. ≈ 42 MBit.
From this the bits disclosed by the error correction had to be subtracted, however,
the bits disclosed by the confirmation have already been included. Hence, the overall
secure key length was 11,953,943 bit ≈ 11.95 MBit.
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Privacy Amplification Privacy amplification reduces the total raw key length of
116,916,224 bit to the secure length of 11,953,943 bit by two-universal hash functions,
cf. Chapter 5.4. This step was also implemented by the software from the AIT. With
a reduction rate of 0.1022, the final secure key size was 11,948,832 bit ≈ 11.95 MBit
or in bytes approximately 1.5 MB.
In Appendix D the first 7645 bits of the key are published.
6.6 Towards a Possible Local-Area Quantum Key
Distribution Link
While in this thesis Alice and Bob were located at the same optical table, placing Bob
somewhere else would demonstrate the feasibility of the protocol for real applications.
The Institute for Gravitational Physics in Hanover is located about 1 km apart from
the Institute of Quantum Optics. The two institutes are connected with two standard
telecommunication fibers. A measurement of the transmission of these fibers yielded
43 % and 56 % for a wavelength of 1550 nm. The low transmission is probably due to
the many fiber connectors as the transmission line is split into 8 pieces.
Polarization Control
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Figure 6.26: Proposed experimental setup for a remote detector. The local oscillator beam
and the entangled mode are polarization multiplexed and transmitted through a standard
telecommunication fiber. The two beams (red) are separated at a polarizing beam splitter
and recombined at a balanced beam splitter for homodyne detection after the transmis-
sion of the local oscillator beam through a fiber-coupled electro-optical modulator which
is used to apply phase shifts between both beams. For the synchronization of Alice’s and
Bob’s measurement an auxiliary 1310 nm beam can be employed (orange). DBS: Dichroic
Beam Splitter, PD: Photo Detector, PBS: Polarizing Beam Splitter, EOM: Electro-Optical
Modulator, PS: Phase Shifter.
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Figure 6.26 shows a possible implementation of a remote detector. The local os-
cillator, which is necessary for homodyne detection, is submitted through the fiber
together with the entangled subsystem by polarization multiplexing. To separate the
local oscillator beam from the entangled mode a polarizing beam splitter can be used.
Since standard telecommunication fibers are not polarization maintaining, the polar-
ization has to be controlled with a fiber-based polarization controller. To detect the
polarization state a small fraction of the light can be tapped-off from the beam and
detected by a polarization meter. Once the polarization is stabilized and the local os-
cillator is separated from the entangled mode, the local oscillator can be phase shifted
with respect to the entangled mode according to the scheme presented in Section 6.3.
For the locking of the local oscillator’s phase the single sideband fields accompanying
the entangled mode can be used. To be able to generate an error signal a phase-
locked electronic local oscillator will be necessary. Such a signal may be obtained
by frequency references used by the two parties which are locked to the global posi-
tioning system (GPS). To achieve synchronized measurements at Alice and Bob an
auxiliary laser beam at 1310 nm can be employed which can be separated from the
main 1550 nm beams by a dichroic beam splitter. By modulating the amplitude of
this laser with a square wave, a clock for the measurements can be transferred. To
close a possible loop-hole for an attacker, the power of the transmitted local oscillator
has to be monitored during the QKD run [Lo07, Ma13]. If the local oscillator power
is not monitored, an attacked could change the power and thereby the vacuum noise
reference of Bob’s balanced homodyne detector.
A simulation of the expected secure key rate is shown in Fig. 6.27. For the simulation
we started at the covariance matrix from Eq. (4.11) which already includes detection
loss. In the figure the secure key rates for different error correction efficiencies β
are plotted versus the transmission line’s optical loss. While for Fig. 6.27a the total
number of measurements was 108, it was 109 for Fig. 6.27b. The black dashed lines in
the figures indicate the expected total optical loss for the two available transmission
lines. Besides the measured transmission of the fiber, we further included an optical
coupling efficiency of 95 % of the free-space entangled mode to the optical fiber and
additional propagation loss of 10 % caused by the polarization controller and imperfect
optical components. For the simulation samples from both quadratures were taken
into account, i.e. pX = 0.5. Other simulation parameters were α as 8 times the
standard deviation of the respective quadrature, nbits = 8 for both quadratures and
s = c = pe = 10
−16. The number of samples k used for parameter estimation was
optimized to get the largest secure key rate.
For the available transmission line with the lower optical loss, a secure key can be
generated for 108 samples with an error correction efficiency of 90 %, whereas for the
transmission line with the higher optical loss no secure key is possible. Since a 90 %
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(a) Number of total measurements: 2N = 108.
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Figure 6.27: Secure key rate for different error correction efficiencies β versus optical loss.
The black dashed lines indicate the optical loss of the two transmission lines including addi-
tional propagation loss caused by the detection scheme.
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error correction efficiency might be difficult to achieve for the given parameter regime,
a measurement of 109 samples will be beneficial. Here, a secure key can already be
generated with an error correction efficiency of 80 % for the low loss transmission line,
and with 85 % efficiency for the lossier one.
6.7 Summary
To summarize, simulations have shown that QKD seems possible for the two EPR
entanglement types described in Chapter 4. In both cases feasible distances between
Alice and Bob are in the range of 10 to 20 km for reasonable numbers of measured
samples on the order of 108 to 109. While for high error correction efficiencies entan-
glement generated by superimposing two squeezed vacuum modes yields larger key
rates and distances for the same number of measured samples, for low error correction
efficiencies it is beneficial to use entanglement generated by only one squeezed vacuum
mode.
By the implementation of a sophisticated scheme for actively controlling all phases
and for fast measurements with a random choice of quadrature for each measurement,
108 samples could be recorded. With these a key of about 1.5 MB size, which was
secure under collective attacks, was generated. This was achieved by using a post
selection technique and a binary error correction with a high efficiency.
Furthermore, an experimental setup for Bob’s detector being at another location
was proposed. Simulations have shown that a QKD link between the Institute for
Gravitational Physics and the Institute of Quantum Optics in Hanover is feasible
using the existing fiber connections.
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Quantum Key Distribution under
General Attacks
Overview
The development of continuous-variable QKD began in the early 2000s, however, only
in 2012 a security proof providing composable security under general attacks with
a finite number of samples was published [Fur12b]. The protocol employs two-mode
squeezed vacuum states with highly entangled states and low optical loss. This chapter
experimentally demonstrates the feasibility of the generation of such a composable
secret key with the setup presented in Chapter 6 by following the protocol which was
introduced in Chapter 5.5.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.1 describes the experimental determi-
nation of the optimal protocol parameters. Using these optimal parameters Section 7.2
presents the execution of the QKD protocol up to the error correction step. It is shown
that the generation of a secret key is possible with an error correction code that has
an efficiency larger than 83.7 %. Finally, Section 7.3 summarizes the results.
7.1 Determination of Protocol Parameters
Using a pump power of about 200 mW and 150 mW for the two squeezed-light sources,
respectively, 2 × 108 samples were recorded measured with Alice’s and Bob’s homo-
dyne detectors with random quadrature choice according to the scheme presented in
Chapter 6.3. Furthermore, a vacuum noise reference was recorded prior to the run
of the protocol for normalization purposes by blocking the signal input ports of the
homodyne detectors. To determine the optimal parameters of the protocol, which
are the cut-off value α, the scaling factors and the number of samples k used in the
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parameter estimation step, a characterization of the quantum states in a trusted envi-
ronment is helpful. A trusted environment means that Alice and Bob are sure that no
eavesdropper is present. If that is not possible, the protocol can still be executed with
non-optimal parameters, which reduces the key rate. However, security can still be
guaranteed. In a trusted environment Alice and Bob are able to characterize the quan-
tum states by state tomography. For the state used here, the reconstructed covariance
matrix reads
γ =

21.932 (0) −22.092 (0)
(0) 24.891 (0) 25.229
−22.092 (0) 22.436 (0)
(0) 25.229 (0) 25.772
 , (7.1)
where the numbers in the parentheses were not measured since they are unimportant
for the characterization of the protocol’s parameters. Due to a slight asymmetry of the
field quadrature variances of Alice’s and Bob’s state, they have to scale their samples
with the scaling factors given in Tab. 7.1 to yield the same variance. The asymmetries
might have been arisen due to an imperfect balance of the beam splitter used for the
generation of entanglement or due to asymmetric optical loss.
Quadrature Alice Bob
Amplitude 1.00569 0.99434
Phase 1.00873 0.99134
Table 7.1: Scaling parameters for Alice’s and Bob’s measured samples to yield a symmetric
variance of the field quadratures.
From the covariance matrix we simulated the secure key rate under general attacks
assuming an error correction efficiency of β = 95 %. Figure 7.1 shows the results
given as secure bits per number of measured samples versus the number of measured
samples. The security parameters were set to s = c = 10
−6. For each value on
the x-axis the cut-off parameter α and the number of samples k used for parameter
estimation were optimized to yield a maximal key rate. The different curves are shown
for different interval widths δ defined by α and the number of intervals 2nbits by the
relation δ = 2α
2nbits
. The optimal key rate is achieved using nbits ≥ 10. Positive key
rates are expected for more than 2.8 × 107 measured samples. For 2 × 108 samples
the expected key rate from the simulation is about 0.14 bits/sample. For this value
the optimal cut-off parameter is α = 50.2 and the optimal number of samples for
parameter estimation is k = 2 × 107. From the simulation we expect the security
parameter dPE, which is determined in the parameter estimation step of the protocol,
to be approximately 3.54 for nbits = 10.
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Figure 7.1: Simulated secure key rate under general attacks versus the number of measured
samples. The different curves are plotted for a different number of intervals 2nbits . The cut-
off parameter α and the number of samples k used for parameter estimation were optimized
to yield a maximal key rate.
7.2 Demonstration of the Feasibility of Secret Key
Generation
After the determination of the protocol’s optimal parameters the protocol was executed
and 2 × 108 samples were recorded by homodyne measurements. Due to the lack
of an error correction algorithm, we analyzed the measured samples to demonstrate
the feasibility of extracting a secret key. In a first step the abort condition has to
be checked, namely that no sample exceeded α. Table 7.2 shows the maximal and
minimal values of the scaled data measured by Alice and Bob. Hence, α = 50.2 is by
far not exceeded and the protocol was not aborted.
Alice Bob
Min -30.0505 -30.4676
Max 30.5348 29.7306
Table 7.2: Minimal and maximal measurement outcomes of Alice and Bob after scaling to
check the abort conditions.
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Figure 7.2: Secure key rate versus the number of samples k used for parameter estimation
for nbits = 10. For each value of k, k samples were chosen at random from the samples left
after sifting and the secure key rate was determined.
After sifting 100,001,118 samples remained which were binned into intervals as given
in the protocol description, cf. Chapter 5.5. Here, we used nbits = 10.
To determine the effect of the number of samples k used for parameter estimation,
we calculated the secure key rate for nbits = 10 assuming an error correction efficiency
of 95 %. The curve in Fig. 7.2 was calculated by drawing k samples at random from
the samples left after sifting and by determining the security parameter dPE according
to Eq. (5.43). The maximal key rate of 0.16 bits/sample is achieved for k = 1.87× 107
samples.
Using this value for k we calculated a histogram of the security parameter dPE which
is shown in Fig. 7.3. The histogram was computed by drawing 3,000 times k samples
at random and calculating dPE for each set of samples. The histogram shows the
narrow distribution of dPE. A fit of a Gaussian distribution, shown as the red solid
line in the figure, revealed dPE = 3.5386± 0.0006.
Figure 7.4 shows the dependence of the secret key rate under general attacks on
the error correction efficiency. A secret key can be extracted with an error correction
efficiency larger than 83.7 %. This shows that even though we assumed an error
correction efficiency of 95 % to calculate the secure key rates above, a secret key can
even be distilled with lower efficiencies which are more likely to be achieved.
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Figure 7.3: Histogram of security parameter dPE calculated by drawing 3,000 times k =
1.87 × 107 samples at random from the samples left after sifting. The red curve shows a
Gaussian distribution fitted to the data.
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Figure 7.4: Secure key rate versus error correction efficiency.
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7.3 Summary
To summarize, it was experimentally demonstrated for the first time that a contin-
uous-variable QKD system, which is secure under general attacks, is feasible. By mea-
suring 2×108 samples of two-mode squeezed vacuum states with a random quadrature
choice an error correcting code with an efficiency larger than 83.7 % would be neces-
sary to distill a secret key. Assuming an error correction efficiency of 85 % this would
yield a secret key of 4 MBit size. The size of the secret key can be increased by a
factor of 10 if an error correction with 95 % efficiency will be used instead.
Since error correction codes with high efficiencies are available for binary alpha-
bets, cf. Chapter 6.5, and error correction codes working on a non-binary alphabet
exist [Ulr57], it seems feasible that a code which fulfills the requirements set here, can
be developed.
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Summary and Outlook
The demonstration of a complete implementation of a continuous-variable QKD sys-
tem which is secure under general attacks, and whose keys have a finite size, is one
of the most desired goals in the field of quantum cryptography. The first quantitative
security analysis [Fur12b] of such a protocol is based on EPR entangled states with
challenging but feasible parameters. Its realization requires 10 dB squeezed vacuum
states, low optical loss and a measurement of at least 108 samples.
In this thesis the feasibility of such a continuous-variable QKD system with security
under general attacks was demonstrated by an execution of the protocol up to the
error correction step. Simulations have shown that the error correction efficiency
which is at least necessary to distill a secret key is 83.7 %. While a non-binary error
correction code with the required performance does not exist yet, this result provides
a high motivation for the development of such an algorithm. Existing binary error
correction codes can reach efficiencies of more than 95 % [Jou13] as demonstrated by
the code provided by the AIT used in this thesis for another experiment. Thus, it seems
feasible that non-binary codes might reach the required efficiency in the given setting
by optimizing existing codes for Gaussian distributed values. Since the experimental
data recorded for this thesis can be used to distill a secret key when an error correction
code, which fulfills the requirements, becomes available, the results of this thesis pave
the way for the first demonstration of a complete continuous-variable finite-size QKD
system which is secure under general attacks.
The feasibility demonstration required a stable setup with strong EPR entangled
states and a measurement of each of the 2 × 108 samples in either the amplitude or
phase quadrature. The latter was achieved by a detection scheme developed in this
thesis, which enabled homodyne measurements with random choice of quadrature at
a rate of 100 kHz. The strong EPR entanglement was generated by superimposing
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two squeezed vacuum modes whose squeezed quadrature variances were more than
10 dB below the variance of the vacuum state. The observed entanglement at the
telecommunication wavelength of 1550 nm exceeded 10 dB for the Duan inseparability
criterion and represents the strongest EPR entanglement ever observed. The stable
operation could be achieved by a new phase locking scheme, which was developed in
this thesis. The observed entanglement and its stability will also make new highly
demanding quantum information protocols possible, like the superactivation of zero-
capacity channels [Smi11].
This thesis also presented the first demonstration of the EPR paradox for entangled
states generated by superimposing a squeezed vacuum mode with a vacuum mode.
Despite this vacuum contribution, remarkably strong EPR entanglement could be ver-
ified. This result might simplify the implementation of (future) quantum information
protocols. One of them is continuous-variable QKD with the restriction of the ad-
versary to collective attacks. Since an implementation of a collective attack requires
quantum memories, collective attacks are, although a restriction, difficult to achieve
experimentally. Simulations in this thesis have shown that QKD distances between
Alice and Bob of up to 20 km are feasible with such states.
With the restriction to collective attacks a complete QKD protocol was implemented
using the entangled states generated by two squeezed vacuum resources. With 108
measurements, a secret key of 1.5 MB size was distributed in a table-top setup. Since
simulations in this thesis have shown that distances between Alice and Bob of up
to 30 km are reasonable using these states and state-of-the-art fiber technology, a
possible implementation of Bob’s remote detector was proposed. By measuring 109
samples, a QKD link between the Institute for Gravitational Physics and the Institute
of Quantum Optics in Hanover seems feasible with existing fiber links.
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CHAPTERA
Electronics
In the following you will find the schematic of a resonant photo detector which was used
to lock the squeezed-light source’s cavity length and the pump phase. This circuit was
developed in collaboration with Sebastian Steinlechner. You will also find a schematic
of the homodyne detector which was developed for the QKD experiments within the
framework of this thesis.
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Figure A.1: Schematic of a resonant photo detector whose photo current is demodulated
with two electronic local oscillators which are 90◦ out of phase. This circuit was developed
in collaboration with Sebastian Steinlechner.
128
129
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Figure A.2: Schematic of the homodyne detector electronics used for the quantum key
distribution experiments. The electronic circuit was developed in the framework of this
thesis. The AC output of the detector can be set to hold with a sample-and-hold circuit to
prevent the analog-to-digital converter’s front-end to saturate during phase steps.
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CHAPTERB
Random Number Test Results
In Tab. B.1 more detailed results of the NIST test suite testing the random numbers
generated in Chapter 6.4 are given. The minimum pass rate is approximately 980 for
1000 test runs and approximately 591 for 605 test runs. The p-value gives the result
of the uniformity test of the p-values of the statistical tests of the random numbers.
Test Passed p-value
Frequency 990/1000 0.422638
BlockFrequency 994/1000 0.26093
CumulativeSums 992/1000 0.478839
CumulativeSums 991/1000 0.402962
Runs 995/1000 0.202268
LongestRun 988/1000 0.518106
Rank 992/1000 0.5221
FFT 983/1000 0.120909
NonOverlappingTemplate 989/1000 0.820143
NonOverlappingTemplate 984/1000 0.572847
NonOverlappingTemplate 993/1000 0.285427
NonOverlappingTemplate 987/1000 0.846338
NonOverlappingTemplate 988/1000 0.890582
NonOverlappingTemplate 993/1000 0.980341
NonOverlappingTemplate 991/1000 0.721777
NonOverlappingTemplate 990/1000 0.607993
NonOverlappingTemplate 986/1000 0.903338
NonOverlappingTemplate 995/1000 0.017186
NonOverlappingTemplate 989/1000 0.225998
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NonOverlappingTemplate 984/1000 0.568739
NonOverlappingTemplate 988/1000 0.635037
NonOverlappingTemplate 989/1000 0.869278
NonOverlappingTemplate 991/1000 0.146982
NonOverlappingTemplate 990/1000 0.404728
NonOverlappingTemplate 990/1000 0.897763
NonOverlappingTemplate 989/1000 0.014150
NonOverlappingTemplate 988/1000 0.437274
NonOverlappingTemplate 992/1000 0.282626
NonOverlappingTemplate 994/1000 0.635037
NonOverlappingTemplate 989/1000 0.999340
NonOverlappingTemplate 989/1000 0.653773
NonOverlappingTemplate 992/1000 0.697257
NonOverlappingTemplate 985/1000 0.530120
NonOverlappingTemplate 992/1000 0.217857
NonOverlappingTemplate 993/1000 0.146982
NonOverlappingTemplate 993/1000 0.897763
NonOverlappingTemplate 990/1000 0.741918
NonOverlappingTemplate 993/1000 0.900569
NonOverlappingTemplate 986/1000 0.620465
NonOverlappingTemplate 992/1000 0.999698
NonOverlappingTemplate 987/1000 0.229559
NonOverlappingTemplate 993/1000 0.866097
NonOverlappingTemplate 993/1000 0.632955
NonOverlappingTemplate 995/1000 0.253122
NonOverlappingTemplate 990/1000 0.651693
NonOverlappingTemplate 986/1000 0.645448
NonOverlappingTemplate 992/1000 0.153763
NonOverlappingTemplate 990/1000 0.442831
NonOverlappingTemplate 993/1000 0.345650
NonOverlappingTemplate 989/1000 0.666245
NonOverlappingTemplate 995/1000 0.745908
NonOverlappingTemplate 989/1000 0.365253
NonOverlappingTemplate 991/1000 0.973718
NonOverlappingTemplate 995/1000 0.289667
NonOverlappingTemplate 994/1000 0.465415
NonOverlappingTemplate 991/1000 0.177628
NonOverlappingTemplate 989/1000 0.105618
NonOverlappingTemplate 992/1000 0.550347
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NonOverlappingTemplate 988/1000 0.279844
NonOverlappingTemplate 981/1000 0.112047
NonOverlappingTemplate 991/1000 0.945296
NonOverlappingTemplate 984/1000 0.496351
NonOverlappingTemplate 987/1000 0.908760
NonOverlappingTemplate 990/1000 0.928857
NonOverlappingTemplate 993/1000 0.490483
NonOverlappingTemplate 984/1000 0.378705
NonOverlappingTemplate 997/1000 0.148653
NonOverlappingTemplate 993/1000 0.429923
NonOverlappingTemplate 990/1000 0.614226
NonOverlappingTemplate 988/1000 0.637119
NonOverlappingTemplate 981/1000 0.162606
NonOverlappingTemplate 995/1000 0.486588
NonOverlappingTemplate 996/1000 0.484646
NonOverlappingTemplate 988/1000 0.366918
NonOverlappingTemplate 994/1000 0.169044
NonOverlappingTemplate 993/1000 0.896345
NonOverlappingTemplate 993/1000 0.444691
NonOverlappingTemplate 993/1000 0.593478
NonOverlappingTemplate 988/1000 0.530120
NonOverlappingTemplate 990/1000 0.452173
NonOverlappingTemplate 987/1000 0.953089
NonOverlappingTemplate 992/1000 0.126658
NonOverlappingTemplate 989/1000 0.790621
NonOverlappingTemplate 993/1000 0.837781
NonOverlappingTemplate 995/1000 0.853049
NonOverlappingTemplate 990/1000 0.796268
NonOverlappingTemplate 988/1000 0.262249
NonOverlappingTemplate 989/1000 0.163513
NonOverlappingTemplate 991/1000 0.245490
NonOverlappingTemplate 993/1000 0.002484
NonOverlappingTemplate 994/1000 0.662091
NonOverlappingTemplate 991/1000 0.242986
NonOverlappingTemplate 989/1000 0.684890
NonOverlappingTemplate 982/1000 0.792508
NonOverlappingTemplate 988/1000 0.783019
NonOverlappingTemplate 991/1000 0.083018
NonOverlappingTemplate 991/1000 0.156373
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NonOverlappingTemplate 989/1000 0.141256
NonOverlappingTemplate 989/1000 0.556460
NonOverlappingTemplate 987/1000 0.274341
NonOverlappingTemplate 991/1000 0.292519
NonOverlappingTemplate 991/1000 0.105618
NonOverlappingTemplate 990/1000 0.212184
NonOverlappingTemplate 992/1000 0.739918
NonOverlappingTemplate 988/1000 0.108791
NonOverlappingTemplate 988/1000 0.753844
NonOverlappingTemplate 990/1000 0.928857
NonOverlappingTemplate 990/1000 0.672470
NonOverlappingTemplate 991/1000 0.719747
NonOverlappingTemplate 989/1000 0.624627
NonOverlappingTemplate 993/1000 0.811080
NonOverlappingTemplate 989/1000 0.612147
NonOverlappingTemplate 986/1000 0.486588
NonOverlappingTemplate 990/1000 0.731886
NonOverlappingTemplate 990/1000 0.067300
NonOverlappingTemplate 992/1000 0.915317
NonOverlappingTemplate 991/1000 0.463512
NonOverlappingTemplate 992/1000 0.837781
NonOverlappingTemplate 989/1000 0.220159
NonOverlappingTemplate 991/1000 0.424453
NonOverlappingTemplate 990/1000 0.591409
NonOverlappingTemplate 987/1000 0.111389
NonOverlappingTemplate 981/1000 0.203351
NonOverlappingTemplate 994/1000 0.272977
NonOverlappingTemplate 985/1000 0.301194
NonOverlappingTemplate 990/1000 0.777265
NonOverlappingTemplate 989/1000 0.446556
NonOverlappingTemplate 986/1000 0.786830
NonOverlappingTemplate 990/1000 0.345650
NonOverlappingTemplate 984/1000 0.928857
NonOverlappingTemplate 990/1000 0.622546
NonOverlappingTemplate 991/1000 0.632955
NonOverlappingTemplate 995/1000 0.110083
NonOverlappingTemplate 993/1000 0.459717
NonOverlappingTemplate 991/1000 0.889118
NonOverlappingTemplate 990/1000 0.016717
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NonOverlappingTemplate 988/1000 0.190654
NonOverlappingTemplate 987/1000 0.126658
NonOverlappingTemplate 982/1000 0.328297
NonOverlappingTemplate 986/1000 0.411840
NonOverlappingTemplate 989/1000 0.680755
NonOverlappingTemplate 989/1000 0.678686
NonOverlappingTemplate 990/1000 0.605916
NonOverlappingTemplate 989/1000 0.213309
NonOverlappingTemplate 991/1000 0.344048
NonOverlappingTemplate 993/1000 0.864494
NonOverlappingTemplate 986/1000 0.614226
NonOverlappingTemplate 991/1000 0.248014
NonOverlappingTemplate 988/1000 0.115387
NonOverlappingTemplate 988/1000 0.896345
NonOverlappingTemplate 994/1000 0.439122
NonOverlappingTemplate 992/1000 0.751866
NonOverlappingTemplate 984/1000 0.459717
NonOverlappingTemplate 993/1000 0.526105
NonOverlappingTemplate 987/1000 0.43359
NonOverlappingTemplate 992/1000 0.13264
OverlappingTemplate 987/1000 0.154629
Universal 987/1000 0.676615
ApproximateEntropy 992/1000 0.61007
RandomExcursions 601/605 0.008316
RandomExcursions 596/605 0.71126
RandomExcursions 597/605 0.673507
RandomExcursions 600/605 0.373906
RandomExcursions 600/605 0.39101
RandomExcursions 598/605 0.104062
RandomExcursions 599/605 0.993624
RandomExcursions 595/605 0.006702
RandomExcursionsVariant 601/605 0.235792
RandomExcursionsVariant 600/605 0.489508
RandomExcursionsVariant 600/605 0.847183
RandomExcursionsVariant 601/605 0.139257
RandomExcursionsVariant 601/605 0.043982
RandomExcursionsVariant 600/605 0.607646
RandomExcursionsVariant 602/605 0.649265
RandomExcursionsVariant 602/605 0.417519
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RandomExcursionsVariant 600/605 0.330628
RandomExcursionsVariant 598/605 0.231756
RandomExcursionsVariant 598/605 0.002775
RandomExcursionsVariant 604/605 0.052219
RandomExcursionsVariant 604/605 0.396813
RandomExcursionsVariant 603/605 0.171079
RandomExcursionsVariant 605/605 0.476590
RandomExcursionsVariant 605/605 0.399734
RandomExcursionsVariant 605/605 0.248226
RandomExcursionsVariant 603/605 0.001462
Serial 996/1000 0.807412
Serial 994/1000 0.262249
LinearComplexity 989/1000 0.162606
Table B.1: Detailed test results of the NIST test suite.
Test ntup tsamples psamples p-value Assessment
diehard birthdays 0 100 100 0.3884704 PASSED
diehard operm5 0 1000000 100 0.55251594 PASSED
diehard rank 32x32 0 40000 100 0.99410513 PASSED
diehard rank 6x8 0 100000 100 0.97719572 PASSED
diehard bitstream 0 2097152 100 0.60253587 PASSED
diehard opso 0 2097152 100 0.07574160 PASSED
diehard oqso 0 2097152 100 0.68587200 PASSED
diehard dna 0 2097152 100 0.18255631 PASSED
diehard count 1s str 0 256000 100 0.95503950 PASSED
diehard count 1s byt 0 256000 100 0.84876632 PASSED
diehard parking lot 0 12000 100 0.76062712 PASSED
diehard 2dsphere 2 8000 100 0.70029124 PASSED
diehard 3dsphere 3 4000 100 0.90753640 PASSED
diehard squeeze 0 100000 100 0.36167153 PASSED
diehard sums 0 100 100 0.27127137 PASSED
diehard runs 0 100000 100 0.95206939 PASSED
diehard runs 0 100000 100 0.63807658 PASSED
diehard craps 0 200000 100 0.72016648 PASSED
diehard craps 0 200000 100 0.69167638 PASSED
marsaglia tsang gcd 0 10000000 100 0.42416794 PASSED
marsaglia tsang gcd 0 10000000 100 0.66397295 PASSED
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sts monobit 1 100000 100 0.21857258 PASSED
sts runs 2 100000 100 0.92528417 PASSED
sts serial 1 100000 100 0.79439247 PASSED
sts serial 2 100000 100 0.95162417 PASSED
sts serial 3 100000 100 0.67673321 PASSED
sts serial 3 100000 100 0.44488057 PASSED
sts serial 4 100000 100 0.97921100 PASSED
sts serial 4 100000 100 0.61503056 PASSED
sts serial 5 100000 100 0.96431388 PASSED
sts serial 5 100000 100 0.81003836 PASSED
sts serial 6 100000 100 0.45914896 PASSED
sts serial 6 100000 100 0.83284907 PASSED
sts serial 7 100000 100 0.21432008 PASSED
sts serial 7 100000 100 0.70647400 PASSED
sts serial 8 100000 100 0.44655300 PASSED
sts serial 8 100000 100 0.95247071 PASSED
sts serial 9 100000 100 0.35387383 PASSED
sts serial 9 100000 100 0.59526540 PASSED
sts serial 10 100000 100 0.75611550 PASSED
sts serial 10 100000 100 0.90583829 PASSED
sts serial 11 100000 100 0.90925764 PASSED
sts serial 11 100000 100 0.79254373 PASSED
sts serial 12 100000 100 0.21588964 PASSED
sts serial 12 100000 100 0.23330235 PASSED
sts serial 13 100000 100 0.08820465 PASSED
sts serial 13 100000 100 0.18195414 PASSED
sts serial 14 100000 100 0.04856379 PASSED
sts serial 14 100000 100 0.91273832 PASSED
sts serial 15 100000 100 0.64666580 PASSED
sts serial 15 100000 100 0.12294428 PASSED
sts serial 16 100000 100 0.69688422 PASSED
sts serial 16 100000 100 0.86885641 PASSED
rgb bitdist 1 100000 100 0.04644339 PASSED
rgb bitdist 2 100000 100 0.13024664 PASSED
rgb bitdist 3 100000 100 0.27828879 PASSED
rgb bitdist 4 100000 100 0.52826795 PASSED
rgb bitdist 5 100000 100 0.20056436 PASSED
rgb bitdist 6 100000 100 0.40752888 PASSED
rgb bitdist 7 100000 100 0.80573943 PASSED
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rgb bitdist 8 100000 100 0.67450283 PASSED
rgb bitdist 9 100000 100 0.79206671 PASSED
rgb bitdist 10 100000 100 0.92872550 PASSED
rgb bitdist 11 100000 100 0.05891923 PASSED
rgb bitdist 12 100000 100 0.81773369 PASSED
rgb minimum distance 2 10000 1000 0.26792489 PASSED
rgb minimum distance 3 10000 1000 0.92847498 PASSED
rgb minimum distance 4 10000 1000 0.69985331 PASSED
rgb minimum distance 5 10000 1000 0.33412276 PASSED
rgb permutations 2 100000 100 0.19821866 PASSED
rgb permutations 3 100000 100 0.72714891 PASSED
rgb permutations 4 100000 100 0.80520528 PASSED
rgb permutations 5 100000 100 0.15495129 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 0 1000000 100 0.13625584 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 1 1000000 100 0.57627143 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 2 1000000 100 0.92628115 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 3 1000000 100 0.61029073 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 4 1000000 100 0.11121035 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 5 1000000 100 0.80844367 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 6 1000000 100 0.51696720 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 7 1000000 100 0.40013489 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 8 1000000 100 0.92473452 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 9 1000000 100 0.92921267 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 10 1000000 100 0.52457511 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 11 1000000 100 0.89559666 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 12 1000000 100 0.62524584 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 13 1000000 100 0.96003619 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 14 1000000 100 0.45500972 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 15 1000000 100 0.71193312 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 16 1000000 100 0.45610632 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 17 1000000 100 0.05903645 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 18 1000000 100 0.43360572 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 19 1000000 100 0.03581270 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 20 1000000 100 0.08951826 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 21 1000000 100 0.84439253 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 22 1000000 100 0.59972137 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 23 1000000 100 0.57228060 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 24 1000000 100 0.08421815 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 25 1000000 100 0.58546967 PASSED
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rgb lagged sum 26 1000000 100 0.22839848 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 27 1000000 100 0.07446733 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 28 1000000 100 0.99397643 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 29 1000000 100 0.98871515 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 30 1000000 100 0.82128134 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 31 1000000 100 0.31772728 PASSED
rgb kstest test 0 10000 1000 0.37105156 PASSED
dab bytedistrib 0 51200000 1 0.75754608 PASSED
dab dct 256 50000 1 0.47880465 PASSED
dab filltree 32 15000000 1 0.28587930 PASSED
dab filltree 32 15000000 1 0.17581146 PASSED
dab filltree2 0 5000000 1 0.31178897 PASSED
dab filltree2 1 5000000 1 0.29090704 PASSED
dab monobit2 12 65000000 1 0.03318549 PASSED
Table B.2: Detailed test results of the Dieharder test suite.
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CHAPTERC
Modified Gray Code
The modification of the 6 bit Gray code [Gra53] was developed in collaboration with
Jo¨rg Duhme.
000001
000011
100011
110011
110001
010001
011001
011101
011111
011110
011010
010010
000010
001010
001000
101000
111000
011000
010000
000000
000100
010100
010101
000101
001101
001111
001011
001001
011011
101001
010011
111001
101100
000110
100100
010110
110100
110110
110000
110010
111010
101010
101011
111011
111111
101111
100111
000111
010111
110111
110101
111101
101101
100101
100001
100000
100010
100110
101110
001110
001100
011100
111100
111110
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CHAPTERD
Generated Key
These are the first 7645 bits of the key that was generated in Chapter 6.5.Appendix D: Generated Key000110110100101110110000011111001011100000100111101101111001111100011000010 . . .
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